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ABSTRACT 
 
States of Suffering: 
 
Marital Cruelty in Antebellum Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin 
 
by 
 
Robin C. Sager 
 
 
This dissertation explores the nature of marriage, violence, and region in the mid-
nineteenth-century United States. Based on more than 1,500 divorce cases, it argues that 
marriages were often characterized by open enmity, not companionate harmony. 
Violence and cruelty between spouses generally erupted as part of ongoing struggles for 
power in the household and in the relationship. As the only book-length study of marital 
cruelty for a southern state, this work challenges much of what historians have argued 
about the relationship between violence and region. It finds that, contrary to what is 
generally understood about the American South, marriages in Texas and Virginia were 
not exceptionally violent, at least not compared with those in Wisconsin. The presence of 
marital cruelty was most pronounced in environments suffering from gender role 
instabilities. As the statement above shows, this dissertation takes seriously the use of 
gender as a lens through which to analyze marital discord. Correcting the historical 
perception of women’s violence as trivial, rare, or defensive, this dissertation contends 
that antebellum wives were indeed capable, and often willing, to commit a wide variety 
of cruelties within marriage. This work presents the first multi-state comparative study of 
marital discord focusing on the United States.  Exploring nineteenth-century marriages 
from “way, way below” allows us to move beyond ideals to examine the messiness and 
unhappiness that characterized many conjugal unions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Mary Jane Lansing appeared before the Winnebago County, Wisconsin, Circuit 
Court in 1862. She sought a divorce from her husband of ten years, Andrew, on the 
grounds of cruelty. Within her bill of complaint and accompanying deposition, Mary 
related a tale of intense suffering at the hands of her husband. After only a single year of 
marriage, Andrew embarked on a spree of domestic terror in which he sought to break 
down his wife’s mental and physical faculties. His preferred mode of attack involved 
striking her head with blunt instruments while simultaneously wishing aloud for her 
death. The disjointed nature of his ramblings only added to her terror. In May of 1859 he 
slammed her against the bedroom wall proclaiming, “Dam you I ought to have killed you 
years ago God damn you I will kill you-you need not think I am afraid to kill you.” On 
one occasion when Mary lay in bed recovering from an illness, Andrew crept in the room 
and whispered that “he hoped she would have a relapse & die.” Even with intervals of 
recovery her health remained fragile as a result of her husband’s continuous assaults. She 
asked the circuit judge to save her life by dissolving her marriage. The court granted her 
request.
1
  
The final verdict in the Lansing case, unfortunately, obscures as much as it 
reveals. On the surface it appears as if Mary came before the court, satisfied the legal 
threshold for divorce, and won her case. While accurate, this brief overview of events 
does not capture the ways in which the Lansing case pushed the court and community to 
engage in a discussion regarding the proper treatment of spousal partners. Mary’s claims 
                                                          
1
 Mary Jane Lansing v. Andrew Lansing (1862), OSH-WC.  
2 
 
brought the generally hidden subject of domestic violence into the light and made others 
reflect upon its meaning. Countless debates of this nature took place across antebellum 
America, forcing society to examine the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable 
marital behaviors. Focusing on the struggles of aggrieved spouses, this dissertation 
explores a series of questions that address the nature of marriage, violence, and region in 
the pre-Civil War United States. What was cruel in the mid-nineteenth century? 
Specifically, what was cruel in marriage? Who was, or could be, cruel? Who could know 
about domestic cruelty? How did understandings of marital discord vary between 
regions? Did instances of marital cruelty in southern or frontier societies reflect a 
uniquely violent context, as we have heretofore thought? 
While clearly not the norm, marriages in crisis forced men and women to examine 
and affirm their core values in the face of failure. Unfortunately for historians, intimate 
conflicts of this sort generally stayed behind closed doors, except when they spilled out 
into the public arena and left their mark on the archive via divorce proceedings. To 
ascertain the nature of marital cruelty, this dissertation analyzes over 1,500 divorce cases 
that took place in Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin from 1840 to 1860. Based upon these 
records, this work presents a multi-part argument. It finds that many antebellum 
marriages were characterized by open enmity. Violence and cruelty between spouses 
often arose as part of ongoing struggles for power in the household and in the 
relationship. With the rise of companionate marriage during this period one would expect 
to find an emphasis on emotion within the records. However, this was not the case. 
Husbands and wives instead described an ideal marriage as one in which both partners 
performed their respective duties adequately. Even in the face of liberalizing divorce 
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grounds, violations of duty, not love, were the focus of discussion. New marital forms, 
including companionate relationships, influenced spouses by emphasizing the importance 
of equal contributions in those traditional roles. For the cases studied, cruelty then did not 
mean—on the one hand—the absence of love but, rather, a failure to fulfill marital labor 
expectations. On the other hand, husbands and wives also used cruelty as a tool when 
they tried to brutally force their own, often traditional, understandings of marital duties 
onto their partners.
2
  
This dissertation explores the degree to which region shaped reactions and 
responses to cruelty. It finds that, contrary to what is generally understood about the 
American South, marriages in Texas and Virginia were not exceptionally violent, at least 
not when compared with those in Wisconsin. The presence of marital cruelty was most 
pronounced in environments suffering from gender role instabilities. In the southern 
states studied, the primary concern was refining the practice of domestic mastery and its 
relationship to violence. Honor, in situations of marital chastisement, limited rather than 
encouraged brutality.  Cruelty for southern husbands and wives meant the pursuit, or 
employment, of inappropriate mastery over one’s spouse. In the two frontier states 
studied, multiple traditions defining the roles of husband and wife combined with unique 
environmental challenges to create widely varying perceptions of what proper household 
mastery entailed. The absence of a dominant gender role tradition often bred confusion, 
fostered marital anxieties, and prompted much, rather intense, violence. Frontier 
husbands and wives turned to cruelty as a tool to reaffirm the importance and positioning 
of mastery and dependency in their relationships. As the above statement shows, this 
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work takes seriously the use of gender as a lens through which to analyze marital discord. 
It finds that the definition and perception of cruelty varied according to the gender of the 
victim and perpetrator. Correcting the historical perception of women’s violence as 
trivial, rare, or defensive, it contends that antebellum wives were indeed capable, and 
often willing, of committing a wide variety of cruelties within marriages. Studying 
nineteenth-century marriages from the “way, way below” allows us to move beyond 
ideals to examine the messiness and unhappiness that often characterized conjugal 
unions.
3
  
The persistent presence of domestic violence in society across time and space 
might lend itself to an analysis emphasizing continuity and similarity at the expense of 
change and difference. A multi-state comparative approach addresses this historical 
problem by highlighting how regional context shaped understandings of cruelty. In 
particular, by focusing on southern and frontier cultures this dissertation challenges much 
of what historians have argued about the relationship between violence and region. What 
we think we know about the South in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is that it 
was extraordinarily violent. Attributing a propensity for brutality to this region has been a 
hallmark of historians for decades. Debates as to why the South seemed particularly 
prone to discord have ranged widely and drawn upon countless theories. Some cite the 
area’s traditionally high temperatures for sparking general ill will or the presence of 
Scots-Irish values for emphasizing aggression for any slight. Others point to the 
persistence of slavery, the surplus of young and single men, the absence of effective 
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government, the widespread practice of carrying firearms, or the influence of an honor-
driven culture.
4
 
 Southern honor, as described by historians, both stimulated and regulated the 
practice of violence in the South. Honor dictated and guided how white men behaved 
when faced with the possibility of threat or insult. According to traditional 
interpretations, southerners of all classes participated in honor culture by serving as an 
audience to ongoing contests of manhood. As Ariela Gross contends, in the antebellum 
South, “to display or exercise honor is to have an honorable character.” In his seminal 
work on this cultural guideline, Bertram Wyatt-Brown makes the claim that honor-driven 
violence in southern society differentiated the region from the rest of nineteenth-century 
America. This distinctiveness extended into marital relations as domestic assaults 
perpetrated by southerners, according to Wyatt-Brown, “probably exceeded” similar 
incidents elsewhere in numerical terms and in presence across social classes. Following 
in the footsteps of Wyatt-Brown, historians of the South have focused on how honor 
stimulated violence, paying less attention to its regulatory functions. However, 
antebellum court records reveal that southerners valued honor because it kept chaos at 
bay during a period of rapid societal change. It did not condone discord wholesale but 
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 For historical works postulating theories of southern violence see W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New 
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carefully distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable practices. As such, southern 
patriarchs ruled under significant social pressures to channel aggression in appropriate 
ways, i.e., in ways that did not threaten the larger practice of legitimate mastery. 
Discussions of marital cruelty in southern courtrooms revealed the extent to which the 
use of violence in domestic settings posed a dilemma not as easily answered as historians 
have heretofore believed. Mounting criticisms focusing on the treatment of enslaved 
dependents in the South made it all the more imperative that other dependents, white 
wives in this case, be protected from the exercise of improper mastery. As such, this 
study demonstrates that historians should exercise caution when pointing to the cultural 
construct of honor as an indicator of southern excesses in all areas of violence and 
cruelty.
5
  
 No one place or location will ever perfectly represent the diversity of an entire 
region. With this cautionary note in mind, Virginia was selected for inclusion in this work 
due to its position in the historiography as the quintessential southern state. The Old 
Dominion in the antebellum period was where centuries-old tradition met reformist social 
change seeping down from the North. Unfortunately, the racial analysis of cruelty in this 
work is shaped by the limitations of Virginia’s legal records. The South refused to legally 
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Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 112-113.  
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recognize the legitimacy of enslaved unions and, as a result, these relationships do not 
appear within cruelty divorce proceedings. This absence in the documentary record 
diminishes the potential for commentary on the marriages of enslaved men and women. 
However, much can still be learned about the southern racial order through an awareness 
of the ways in which Virginia’s slave system coexisted alongside increasingly contractual 
understandings of domestic relations. Investigating the existence of multiple forms of 
violence and cruelty in the South does not diminish the impact that brutal enslavement 
had on the region. Instead, it reflects a need for scholars to move away from blanket 
generalizations as to the nature of discord. Approaching the historical problem of 
violence in the South from a comparative perspective and with a fresh set of questions 
“reveals patterns of violence that have remained hidden until now.” It shows that 
marriages in the South were not excessively cruel or uncommonly peaceful. This leads us 
to wonder if the same could be said about antebellum frontier marriages.
6
  
In American historiography, the frontier is the South’s only rival for the notorious 
label of most violent. This reputation developed over time and built upon descriptions of 
ethnic clashes, environmental challenges, economic struggles, and demographic 
misbalances. A study of frontier divorce records reveals the extreme brutality of 
husbands and wives in Texas and especially Wisconsin. Texas was chosen for this study 
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because it allows for the test of an altered southern model. By 1845 settlers hailing from 
the South had established a firm grip on the state, yet they still dealt daily with challenges 
stemming from frontier conditions. Randolph Campbell and other historians identify 
these pre-Civil War settlers as southern transplants ready to establish a new Old South, 
with an active system of racial slavery, on Texas soil.  However, this mission of manifest 
destiny only came to partial fruition.
7
  
Transplanted Texans proved unable to replicate the foundation of shared family 
and marital values found in traditional southern societies, as exemplified by Virginia. 
Frontier life, as documented by Mark Carroll, heightened gender role instabilities to the 
point of creating alternate domestic arrangements. Being married proved to be an 
incalculable advantage in pioneer society, yet Texas husbands and wives felt uncertain as 
to what exactly that relation entailed. Faced with unforeseen environmental difficulties, 
Texas women often shouldered more of the labor burden while their husbands attempted 
to enforce older understandings of mastery. Not always the isolated and overwhelmed 
shrinking violets depicted by Joan Cashin, women on the southern frontier could be the 
victims or aggressors in marital conflicts. The record of their actions presented in court 
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 Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 110-111; Peter Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the 
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leads this work to argue that gender role confusion clashed with a yearning for the 
traditional and resulted in the growing presence of cruelty in antebellum Texas homes. 
By the onset of the Civil War, a growing population pushed the state out of its pioneer 
period and ushered in a new set of domestic challenges.
8
  
 To more fully understand the nature of frontier discord and to address the 
concern, raised by Edward Ayers, that brutality in Texas during the antebellum period 
simply reflected “[S]outhern violence transplanted,” this study also examines marital 
relations in Wisconsin. Divorce records from the Midwest provide us with an indication 
as to what it meant to be cruel in a frontier society populated primarily by northerners and 
immigrants. Wisconsin in the 1840s and 1850s was a place characterized by ethnic 
clashes, harsh settlement conditions, constant inward/outward migrations, and developing 
legal cultures. For settlers hailing from New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and Europe, 
adaptation was an uncomfortable but necessary part of survival. However, the very 
process of settlement challenged the stability of gender roles, prompting much anxiety 
and violence. In light of these challenges, unhappy men and women struggled for mastery 
and its attendant ability to define the meaning and actual practice of duty in marriage. 
After all, Wisconsin men did not have a system of honor or the subordination of an 
enslaved people to bolster their domestic authority. And not all Wisconsin women 
believed that proper household relations required wives to assume positions of 
dependency and submission. These findings are significant because, as John Mack 
Faragher discovered in his study of Midwestern pioneer narratives, “the key...to an 
understanding of nineteenth-century marriage is an appreciation and evaluation of the 
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place of sexual struggle in the social order.” Continuing the efforts of Faragher, this study 
contends that the role confusion found in Wisconsin fostered a heightened degree of 
brutality on the part of both men and women that supports an interpretation of the frontier 
as a site of extreme and pervasive violence.
9
  
Focusing on Wisconsin also reveals how ethnicity shaped perceptions of discord.  
Of the three states studied Wisconsin was the only one where ethnic conflict repeatedly 
appeared in the records. The ethnic identity of a victim or perpetrator determined, to a 
great extent, whether their actions constituted acceptable behavior or cruelty. Based upon 
stereotypes, Wisconsin citizens argued that certain groups tolerated or even enjoyed pain 
more than others. For example, witnesses might testify that it was proper to make 
Norwegian women perform intense agricultural labors that might otherwise be considered 
cruel when forced upon a woman of New England heritage. In this way Wisconsin 
residents tried to control violence by exposing some individuals to poor treatment while 
protecting others. This work uses ethnicity as a category of analysis by highlighting those 
moments when the court participants themselves chose to focus on ethnic identity
10
  
The institution of marriage has always been a lightning rod for public discussion. 
However, during the two decades covered by this study, 1840 to 1860, the conversations 
and controversies surrounding matrimony reached a fevered pitch. Historians have 
generally recognized this era as encompassing the principle years of the divorce debates, 
the formative period of the women’s rights movement, as well as the beginning of 
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campaigns against cruelty in the United States. It was during this time that men and 
women across the country engaged in a struggle to determine what exactly it meant to be 
married. Hendrik Hartog and Nancy Cott, in their respective historical overviews of 
marriage, both describe the high stakes of these debates. After all, in the words of Hartog, 
“we need to remember how important being married was in nineteenth-century America.” 
The institution helped to regulate everything from labor relations to emotional stability. 
Because of its foundational role in society, any perceived threats or changes to marital 
norms brought to the surface fears of social chaos. Sensationalistic newspaper reports 
highlighting alternative relationship forms such as Mormonism or dramatic divorce trials 
only fed the growing anxiety felt by the general populace.
11
  
At the same time, marriage itself appeared to be transitioning from traditional 
patriarchal models to an emphasis on contractual relations. This new understanding 
threatened to upend domestic relations by diminishing the rights of husbands. Coverture, 
for example, started to disappear as a legal concept denoting a man’s outright ownership 
of his wife’s body. Affect, as opposed to force, was touted as the new hallmark of proper 
unions. Companionate marriage, described by Anya Jabour as a “loving partnership,” 
became the ideal. Under the terms of companionate relationships, both spouses 
emphasized the primacy of emotion over duty. Aided by Jabour’s fascinating and detailed 
study of one Virginia couple’s struggle to perfect their affective relationship, most 
scholars agree as to the outlines of what constituted the companionate marital ideal.
12
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However, the historical community remains at odds regarding the extent to which 
these ideas made their way into the daily lives of men and women. Some, such as 
Michael Grossberg, emphasize the ways in which antebellum relationships transformed 
to include a heightened recognition of feelings and the mutuality of enterprise. Robert 
Griswold, in his work on divorce in mid-nineteenth-century California, comes to a similar 
conclusion, arguing that “men and women from all social classes conceived of family 
relations in affective terms, placed a premium on emotional fulfillment in the family, 
considered women’s opinions and contributions worthy of respect and consideration, 
emphasized male kindness and accommodation....” Assertions such as the one made by 
Griswold have had the effect of lending credibility to the argument that all husbands and 
wives tried to implement companionate marriage wholesale.
13
 
This work reaches a different set of conclusions and finds that husbands and 
wives fought to keep duty, not affection, as the focal point of their relationships.  Simply 
put, emotions were a liability when survival was the priority. Marital cruelty was a 
violation of responsibility, not of love. But antebellum men and women did not abandon 
companionate notions entirely. Instead, they reshaped traditional understandings of duty 
to include an emphasis on mutuality and equality in labor roles. Focusing on local records 
reveals the degree to which higher court rulings did not always accord with day-to-day 
practices and beliefs. Of the states studied, the two known for their liberal divorce causes, 
Wisconsin and Texas, were the ones in which heavy labor burdens placed couples in a 
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defensive pattern, leading them to choose duty as the chief route to happiness. What 
mattered, in the end, was channeling emotion into productive processes. It is true that 
reformers advocated for marital affection, but they also cautioned spouses to maintain 
emotional control.
14
  
 In this period of competing marital norms, divorce offered a potential safety valve 
for unhappy spouses. As documented by Nancy Cott, the percentage of couples pursuing 
separations climbed in the years leading up to the Civil War, causing panic for many who 
viewed divorce as the death of marriage as an institution. Legal divorce in the nineteenth 
century was adversarial, requiring one spouse to find fault with the other. The general 
outcome of most cases fell into three categories: absolute divorce, a vinculo matrimonii, 
with permission to remarry; bed and board separations, a mensa et thoro, denying the 
right to remarry; or, no divorce granted, thus keeping the union legally intact. Divorce in 
the nineteenth century has been a topic of interest in the historical community for some 
time, yet there are relatively few substantial treatments of it. Those scholars who choose 
to explore the practice generally focus on legal developments, favoring policy formation 
above the personal. Norma Basch veered from this trajectory in the late 1990s by 
constructing a cultural history of divorce focusing on perception and belief, as 
exemplified by the ‘framing’ of separation cases. In a similar fashion to Basch, this work 
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uses the process of divorce as an avenue through which to explore antebellum culture. It 
does not profess to be an in-depth treatment of marital law.
15
   
 However, conversations about cruelty emerged in tandem with the pursuit of 
separations, so it is important to understand the legal environment navigated by troubled 
spouses. Virginia owed a great deal to its English legal heritage and, as a result, adhered 
to a relatively conservative divorce model throughout the antebellum period. The 
legislature retained primary authority over the issuance of divorces until 1851 when this 
power passed to the courts of chancery. This transition mirrored a process occurring 
across the country as the constitutionality of legislative divorces became the subject of 
intense debate. Governed by principles of equity and fairness, Virginia courts gradually 
expanded the possible causes of divorce to include impotency, idiocy, bigamy, adultery, 
cruelty, just cause of bodily fear, abandonment, desertion, pregnancy at marriage, and 
criminal conviction/confinement. By the onset of the Civil War the Old Dominion had 
“neither the most permissive nor the most restricted list of grounds,” according to one 
historian.
16
  
 In antebellum Texas, Spanish civil law and English common law combined to 
create a uniquely Texan “subdialect of the American dialect of law.” This hybrid system 
did not recognize separate procedures for equity and law and instead gave the district 
                                                          
15
 Cott, Public Vows, 48, 50; Francelle L. Blum, “When Marriages Fail: Divorce in Nineteenth-Century 
Texas,” (PhD diss., Rice University, 2008); Marylynn Salmon, Women and the Law of Property in Early 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 58; Basch, Framing American Divorce, 
4. 
16
 Glenda Riley, “Legislative Divorce in Virginia, 1803-1850,” Journal of the Early Republic, 11 (Spring 
1991): 66 (quote); Basch, Framing American Divorce, 48, 56; Thomas Jefferson Headlee, Jr., The Virginia 
State Court System, 1776- (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1969); Salmon, Women and the Law of 
Property, 64, 71, 80; Acts Passed at a General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia [Acts of 
Virginia], 1826, 1840-1841, 1847-1848, 1852-1853. For the most comprehensive treatment of divorce in 
the Old Dominion see Thomas E. Buckley, The Great Catastrophe of My Life: Divorce in the Old 
Dominion (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Unlike this study, Buckley uses 
legislative petitions as his primary source base.  
15 
 
courts jurisdiction over general and criminal matters. In 1845 Texas entered the Union as 
a state that embraced married women’s property rights, community property procedures, 
and liberal divorce grounds. These advances owed a great deal to the area’s cultural 
history; however, frontier concerns also weighed heavily on lawmakers. They were torn 
between the dual needs of regulating marriage while at the same time maintaining 
sufficient flexibility in dealing with spousal conflicts. As a result, Texas district courts 
granted divorces based upon a set of causes designed to encompass a wide variety of 
matrimonial wrongs. Marriages were dissolved on the basis of adultery, abandonment, 
and “excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages.” The open-to-interpretation “excesses” clause 
allowed judges and juries a great deal of leeway in determining the future of problem 
couples.
17
   
 Wisconsin joined the Union only three years after Texas, and by that time it had 
established a reputation as a territory with a liberal legal culture. Soon after statehood, the 
legislature passed a woman’s property law and legislators repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, 
attempted to introduce full women’s suffrage. It was also during this period that divorce 
transitioned from being a legislative and judicial process and came under the jurisdiction 
of the courts. Circuit judges heard the majority of divorce cases, and they could dissolve 
a union on the basis of a wide variety of grounds. The Revised Statutes of 1849 allowed 
for absolute divorce in situations of adultery, impotency, imprisonment for three or more 
years, willful desertion of at least a year, cruelty, or habitual drunkenness. Wisconsin 
lawmakers viewed marriage as a civil agreement, open to many possible violations. In 
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addition, settlers to the state often brought with them contractual understandings of 
marriage that were made even more fluid by the influence of harsh living conditions. 
Divorce in antebellum America was not a private process but a public one that reflected 
the needs and desires of the community, state, and nation.
18
   
 Out of all of the possible grounds for divorce, marital cruelty was the focal point 
of much consternation and debate. When discussing legal cruelty, the conversations 
focused on where exactly to draw the line separating cruelty from insensitivity or 
abrasiveness. For the first quarter of the nineteenth century the vast majority of American 
judges and legislators were content to reference the 1790 English case of Evans v. Evans. 
In this ruling, Lord Stowell stated that legal cruelty required “a reasonable apprehension 
of danger to life, limb, or health.” Other forms of mental distress or “what merely wounds 
the feelings” were not admissable as cruelty. Stowell’s remarks gave a wide berth for 
chastisement, while still expanding English doctrine to include threats of violence. By 
mid-century, however, American courts began to depart from this model. As documented 
by Robert Griswold, “judges increasingly recognized that physical well-being could be 
injured by behavior far more subtle than physical blows.” The presence of catch-all 
indignities statutes, such as the one found in Texas, gave testament to the transitional 
nature of legal cruelty in antebellum America.
19
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 This movement towards an acceptance of the variable nature of cruelty owed 
much to the efforts of reformers. A new humanitarian sensibility developed over the first 
half of the nineteenth century and with it came increased attention to the problem of pain. 
Men and women began to differentiate necessary from unnecessary pain. Indeed, 
reformers hoped to restore bodily integrity to a wide ranging group of sufferers. As a 
result, the treatment of the enslaved, prisoners, children, wives, and even animals was 
called into question. In her recent work on the subject, Margaret Abruzzo astutely argues 
that cruelty became associated with “the needless and deliberate infliction of pain.”  
Cruelty reflected a human choice to reject civilizing influences and head down the path of 
savagery. Divorce litigants in the nineteenth century lived within a burgeoning culture of 
reform, even if they themselves did not openly agitate for change. Building upon the 
theoretical findings of Abruzzo, this work steps in to provide concrete examples of what 
average men and women considered to be “needless and deliberate” behavior in 
marriage. It asks: at what point did ‘acceptable’ chastisement in marriage shade into 
cruelty?
20
 As the first multi-state comparative study of cruelty in the United States, this 
dissertation is uniquely positioned to address that question.  
The historiography of family discord truly began in the 1970s with the ‘discovery’ 
of family violence. In the decade following, historians such as Elizabeth Pleck and Linda 
Gordon came forward with their studies of marriages and families in crisis. Pleck focused 
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on social responses to cruelty and traced policy developments from the colonial period to 
the late twentieth century. Gordon mined a difficult record base, the case files of two of 
Chicago’s societies for the prevention of cruelty, and came to the conclusion that family 
discord “has been historically and politically constructed.” Legal historians also entered 
into the fray as Robert Griswold published a series of articles exploring the judicial 
evolution of matrimonial cruelty in nineteenth-century America. In more recent years, 
scholars of marital discord have tried to re-focus attention away from policy and 
appellate decisions and back on local experiences, as exemplified by personal accounts of 
abuse. However, this attempt has only been partially successful. Indeed, many of the 
most useful descriptions of cruelty are still found within studies of divorce conducted by 
historians. Hartog, Basch, Cott, and others present some of the most compelling evidence 
of marital cruelty, yet the constraints of their subject does not allow them to deconstruct 
the actual incidents.
21
 
Another problem within the cruelty historiography is that the great majority of 
works treat violence or cruelty by women as trivial, rare, or defensive. David Peterson del 
Mar produced one of the only monographs examining domestic violence in the 
nineteenth-century United States, but with his focus on Oregon, his work suffers from 
serious limitations. Peterson del Mar made the choice to exclude any discussion of 
violence perpetrated by Oregon wives. He defends this decision on the basis of the rarity 
of husband abuse. He also does not cover emotional or verbal abuse. These omissions 
reflect, I believe, his equating historical significance with representativeness. However, a 
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person/place/thing does not have to be representative of the whole to be historically 
significant.  Violence may have been, in the words of Drew Gilpin Faust, “gendered 
male,” but that only makes it all the more important to study those women who went 
against social conventions. Utilizing a gendered approach to cruelty, this dissertation 
explores what happens when we take women’s marital violence seriously. It also 
considers what it means for antebellum men to be victims of marital abuse. A significant 
influence on my work is Laura Edwards’s article, “Law, Domestic Violence, and the 
Limits of Patriarchal Authority in the Antebellum South.” In this concise and convincing 
essay, Edwards argues that women and slaves, both dependents, challenged the authority 
of white males in the South, thereby demonstrating the limits of patriarchy.  When we 
expand the scope of our study beyond the South, we find that white women across the 
country were perfectly able, and often willing, to engage in cruel and violent acts, a point 
too often downplayed in the historiography.
22
  
Because marital discord was a taboo subject, it is quite difficult to find open and 
lengthy discussions of incidents of cruelty. Divorce records, in part, offer a solution to 
this problem in that they provide intricate accounts of disappointments in marriage. We, 
as historians, get an intimate glimpse of household dynamics as antebellum men and 
women came before the courts and placed the contents of their private lives on public 
display. It is necessary to approach these documents with the reasonable caution afforded 
to most historical records, but the advantages of working with case files far outweigh the 
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possible drawbacks. I believe, in accordance with Nancy Cott, Thomas Buckley, and 
others, that divorce petitions “show the boundaries of normal marital expectations, just as 
actions construed as criminal indicate societal limits.” This work is based upon a database 
of more than 1,500 divorce records from antebellum Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin. All 
of the cases studied come from the courts of original jurisdiction, making it possible to 
keep the focus on local processes and concerns. In addition, the database only included 
those petitions in which litigants or witnesses brought up allegations of cruelty. No 
attempt is made to quantify the exact numbers of cruelty cases filed in each county or 
state. After all, as Laura Edwards finds in her study of North Carolina legal culture, local 
court records are generally incomplete, thus “making quantitative analyses of the 
remaining material pointless.” When this concern is paired with the degree of unreported 
incidents of marital cruelty, even in divorce cases, it becomes clear that the best way to 
avoid numerical inaccuracies is to explore violence and abuse on the qualitative levels of 
description and perception.
23
  
The dissertation is organized thematically according to particular categories of 
marital cruelty. Chapter One explores verbal cruelty, including the particular meanings 
behind ethnic epithets and sexual rumors. Chapter Two focuses on physical cruelty and 
describes, in part, how cruel women used weapons to facilitate violence against their 
spouses. Chapter Three discusses sexual excess, notions of sexual propriety, and the 
transference of venereal diseases as cruelty. Chapter Four examines intemperance and 
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marital cruelty, especially as related to interpretations of cruel neglect. Chapter Five, the 
final chapter, looks at third-party interventions in situations of marital discord, paying 
particular attention to local networks of rumor and report within the three states.  The 
conclusion provides an overview of the comparative findings while suggesting additional 
ways to approach the study of American domestic discord. 
Historians possess a significant amount of information regarding those couples 
who were trying to achieve the perfect companionate marriage, but we know 
substantially less about those spouses who were simply trying not to kill one another. 
This dissertation does not attempt to create a comprehensive picture of antebellum 
marital attitudes, but it does “sketch the outlines” of what it meant to be married in 
nineteenth-century America. Duty, not love, existed at the center of the marital relation, 
and cruelty was a violation of productive potential, not emotion. The work presented here 
is not a celebratory narrative but one which explores intimate violence in the context of 
regional stereotype. Rife with the influence of honor, the institution of slavery, and a 
conservative culture, the Old South is often depicted as more prone to violence than the 
rest of antebellum America. But my findings show that this dichotomy is overdrawn.
24
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CHAPTER ONE 
AS MUCH PAIN AS BLOWS AND KICKS: 
THE VERBAL CRUELTIES OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES 
 
 Rebecca’s marriage started off on an unpromising note. Shortly after saying “I 
do” to Robert Harper, she learned that on the very night of their wedding another woman, 
from the same county, stood waiting “all dressed with her family and guests” to marry 
him as well. This attempt at a dual-wedding outraged the couple’s small Texas 
community and, living up to his reputation, Robert only played the part of a doting 
husband for a short time before revealing a cruel and violent disposition. Wandering 
around the house murmuring vulgarities and obscenities, he would burst into anger when 
even asked the most civil question, telling his wife, “not to speak to his head but to his ---
--.” If Rebecca combed her hair, Robert would come by and rumple it. If Rebecca was 
sick and in bed, Robert would order her to get up, pushing her if she did not move. Even 
when faced with her husband’s ongoing attacks, Rebecca wanted to keep their marriage 
intact and attempted to bring about a reformation of his character.
1
 
 Robert dashed all hopes of improvement, however, when he began to publicly 
defame his wife. While she still resided in his household, he placed notices in local 
newspapers stating that she had left his bed and board and now lived as a known 
adulteress. In addition, joining together with his father, Robert verbally abused Rebecca 
in private on a regular basis. On one occasion the two men called her a “whore” and 
“bitch” and then proceeded to charge her with committing adultery with her brother-in-
law. They also declared that her mother “was a whore and that she had raised a large 
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family of daughters to be whores.” Ignoring Rebecca’s sick condition at the time, the two 
men forced her out of the house, making her walk three miles on foot to her father for 
protection. Upon completing the long trek to her parental home, Rebecca initiated divorce 
proceedings with the goal of severing her three-month marriage. In her bill, she asked the 
court to recognize Robert’s words as not only slanderous, but cruel. After a short trial, the 
judge acknowledged the existence of verbal cruelty, found in Rebecca’s favor, and 
granted the separation.
2
  
Drawing upon the spousal struggles of Rebecca and others, this chapter explores 
how antebellum men and women defined verbal cruelty in marriage. It asks: How were 
husbands and wives verbally cruel? Why were husbands and wives verbally cruel? And, 
it finds that the verbal attacks employed by spouses generally fell into three categories: 
epithets, character assaults, and threats. Antebellum husbands and wives used verbal 
barbs to draw attention to perceived deficiencies in their partner’s performance of marital 
duties. As a result, the vast majority of verbal attacks centered upon questions of labor or 
issues of sexual morality. This chapter contends that antebellum men and women 
believed that verbal cruelty occurred if a person could demonstrate a “reasonable 
apprehension” of physical injury based upon the comments of their partner. Cruelty also 
took place if the words of one spouse caused the other to sustain emotional distress that in 
turn crippled his/her ability to function in society. The chapter begins with a discussion of 
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epithets before moving on to examine harmful accusations and threats directed at 
spouses.
3
  
With the exception of linguistic studies that analyze the practices and origins 
associated with socially distasteful terms, the presence of foul language throughout 
history remains a subject primarily unexplored by scholars. Even treatments focusing 
specifically on cruelty only hint at the broader meanings and implications behind the use 
of words such as bitch, liar, and whore within the antebellum popular discourse. 
Historians are clearly aware of the existence of these terms. However, epithets tend to 
fade in importance and practically disappear when considered in conjunction with attacks 
of overt physical violence. A husband calling his wife a whore seems the less significant 
element of an assault in which he also chases her around the house with a knife 
threatening to “cut her in the guts.” The discussion below focuses on epithets and reveals 
patterns of usage and motive that hint at the gendered dynamics of antebellum 
marriages.
4
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Across the three states studied, spouses often used epithets to enact not-so-subtle 
commentaries on the work habits of their partners. For disgruntled husbands, this 
generally meant emphasizing a woman’s failure to behave properly as a productive wife.  
It was not uncommon for men to refer to their wives as “lazy trifling worthless & of no 
account.” And, within that series, the term lazy made the most frequent appearance. 
Husbands employed this particular epithet out of an attempt to force their wives to 
conform to their ideas of what industrious, hard-working housewives should act like. 
However, in an interesting twist, the critiques made by these men implicitly recognized a 
woman’s critical role in a household’s success while also denigrating the extent of her 
efforts.
5
 
The records demonstrate that frontier husbands, especially those residing in 
Texas, particularly relied upon epithets. “Lazy” and other derogatory terms served as 
tools that frontier men used to stress the ways in which their wives detracted from, 
instead of added to, the family’s worth. Reeling from the clashing of transplanted 
southern gender ideals with the harsh realities of settlement, some Texas husbands gave 
vent to their frustrations via name-calling. The continuous presence of terms such as 
“lazy” in the court documents hints at the possibility that Texas husbands expected their 
spouses to take on even heavier labor loads while simultaneously not challenging their 
husband’s position as master of the house. It was critical for Texas men to maintain 
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marital mastery because, as historian Randolph Campbell has shown, the frontier lifestyle 
created circumstances in which women could “direct their lives in ways that were 
anything but docile and submissive.” While the courts were sympathetic towards women 
who suffered from the ill effects of name-calling, the isolated usage of epithets still did 
not make a husband guilty of marital cruelty.
6
  
 However, if a husband paraded his name-calling in a public way, a woman could 
pursue a cruelty ruling by emphasizing the physical consequences of mental anguish and 
embarrassment. Within their bills, injured wives recounted how insults especially stung 
when made publicly where other members of the community were placed in a position to 
evaluate a woman’s essential “value.” Take, for example, the case of Victoria Frederic 
who suffered from continual ridicule by her husband, Samuel. She recounted to the court 
how, after their marriage in March 1856, she expected them to live a peaceful and happy 
life together. Unfortunately, her dreams turned into nightmares shortly after the marriage 
as Samuel “disclosed an angry, turbulent & brutal disposition.” On one occasion, he even 
pointed a loaded gun at her and threatened to shoot. In addition to threats and physical 
violence, Samuel also emotionally crushed Victoria by proclaiming publicly and 
privately that “she was worthless & no value.” As she related to the Texas court, 
Samuel’s public comments caused her much “mental suffering” and damaged her quality 
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of life. Fearing for her general welfare, Victoria fled their house after less than six 
months of cohabitation.
7
   
Name-calling focusing on the nature of a woman’s economic contribution could 
cause tension in a marriage, but the majority of epithets and accusations made by 
husbands towards wives centered upon issues of sexual morality. Out of all of the 
epithets directed at wives across the three states, the terms whore, bitch, and strumpet 
appeared the most frequently. All of these negative labels carried explicit, and nationally 
understood, connotations of sexual licentiousness. In a fashion similar to labor epithets, a 
husband could generally lob sexual insults at his wife with impunity within the confines 
of the private sphere. However, if he chose to regularly employ such comments in public 
arenas, he ran the risk of being accused of marital cruelty. The nature of these public 
‘performances’ of verbal cruelty by husbands varied a great deal depending on the 
individual couple. In many cases, for emphasis and elevated drama, husbands would 
combine the above epithets with a “damned,” such as when Texan Henry Carlisle drew a 
knife on his wife, threatened to kill her, and called her a “damned whore and strumpet.” 
On other occasions, the base insult remained the same with the addition of a colorful 
cultural curse phrase. One husband, a former English citizen residing in Wisconsin, 
referred in public to his wife as a “bloody bitch.”  Vile terms of this ilk quite often served 
as the opening salvos of extended verbal attacks that would progress into detailed 
attempts at character defamation.
8
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An accusation of illicit intercourse was the most serious allegation that a husband 
could level against a wife. As legal understandings of marital discord expanded in the late 
antebellum period, adultery accusations were increasingly recognized as satisfying the 
minimum threshold for a divorce on the basis of cruelty. In 1855, Texas Chief Justice 
John Hemphill authored an opinion in which he argued that false allegations of adultery 
made against a wife “undoubtedly” constituted “an act of gross cruelty.” Hemphill’s 
ruling existed as a forward-thinking acknowledgement of the extreme “mental pain and 
anguish” resulting from cruel words and of the need to penalize accusatory husbands, 
when possible.
9
  
The story of Anne Souther, a Virginia wife, is illustrative of the damage wrought 
by sexual allegations. After tolerating almost two years of abuse by her husband, Simeon, 
she filed for a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and adultery. In the usual form, Anne 
claimed that she married her husband out of sincere attachment, but soon realized that he 
possessed a jealous demeanor. Shortly after the match, he began “to make the most 
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insulting and unmerited charges against” her. For example, on one occasion a nearby 
neighbor ran into the Souther’s house looking for a missing dog. Simeon was not home at 
the time and the neighbor left without finding the dog. Anne thought little of this incident 
until her husband returned and accused her of “being together” with the said neighbor. 
Needless to say, Anne was shocked and outraged. But, even worse, Simeon was 
consistent in his allegations.  He constantly accused her of committing illicit intercourse 
with anywhere from six to eight men. Simeon’s jealousy reached its height when he 
“prevented her from joining the church as she desired saying, ‘she designed it as a cloak 
for her wicked purposes [.]’ He said, ‘her reading the holy scriptures was only for the 
obscenity they contain.’” In his answer, Simeon admitted that he disliked the church but 
never forbade Anne from attending. He refused to comment on any of the other cruelty 
claims presented by his wife.
10
  
Although many of the couple’s clashes took place in private, Anne still feared for 
the general damage inflicted upon her reputation. As aptly described by Laura Edwards 
and Ariela Gross, while white southern men possessed the right to perform and practice 
honor, white southern women claimed their own versions of honor through the concepts 
of “character” or “credit.” According to these interpretations, women gained credit by 
performing their familial roles in a proper fashion and avoiding any hints of societal 
deviance. A woman’s credit then determined how she was treated by the entire 
community. So, it made sense that Anne evinced concern regarding how her husband’s 
verbal attacks might alter her social standing. The couple’s neighbors recounted how 
Simeon rarely missed an opportunity to denigrate his wife in public. Without remorse,  
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he would call her sexual epithets, such as “Damned Old whore and old strumpet.” It 
eventually reached a point where Simeon’s public allegations required an equally public 
response. In the southern states studied, it was an unspoken societal rule that 
unchallenged accusations were true; therefore it was imperative that Anne defend herself 
or forfeit her character wholesale. As opposed to engaging in a war of words on the 
street, Anne took the civilized approach and filed a divorce petition. She would suffer 
some stigma contingent with pursuing a separation, but the court documents gave her an 
opportunity to present herself as a victim of cruelty as well. Anne recognized that she had 
to defend herself from her traditional defender, her husband.
11
  
 Damaged wives also claimed that knowingly making false allegations of adultery 
constituted cruelty. Angry at being accused of being unfaithful with “several men,” 
Harriet Smith made sure to stress to the court that her husband “well knew” that his 
statements were “utterly false.” His charges “affected her character as a chaste & virtuous 
woman,” thereby, impairing her ability to fully function in society.  According to Harriet, 
her husband behaved in a calculated manner and intended to destroy her life. Mentioning 
such calculations was important because an antebellum judge and jury might have felt 
inclined to excuse the cruelties if they believed that the statements fell under the same 
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premise as crimes of passion and stemmed from intense emotional anguish.
12
 In contrast, 
intentionally making false statements demonstrated a desire to inflict crippling mental 
suffering on one’s spouse, an outcome clearly recognized as cruelty across the three 
states studied. Acknowledging the importance of intent, men accused of verbal cruelty 
initiated damage control by gesturing towards their uncontrollable emotions. For 
example, Garland Mallory avowed that “out of fullness of the heart, the mouth spake.” 
Admitting partial guilt, Mallory understood the true social injury caused by “cast[ing] an 
imputation upon” one’s wife but, nevertheless, he resisted being labeled a cruel husband 
by the court.
13
  
 However, unlike Mallory, the records show that some men embraced verbal 
cruelty as a creative outlet for their marital frustrations. These men knew that their words 
would continue to haunt their spouses even if they made far-fetched allegations that were 
generally dismissed and immediately refuted by others. Robert Harper, of Texas, for 
example, charged his wife with committing adultery with her sister’s husband, as she was 
a whore raised in “large family” of whores. Wisconsin citizen Caleb Creswell divided the 
entire community when he accused his wife of having an illicit connection with his own 
brother. In another case, Torrence Hughes, fueled by liquor, made a similar charge. He 
“publikcly & privately” accused his wife, the self-proclaimed daughter of a respectable 
Virginia family, of committing “incestuous intercourse with her own son, a boy then 
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about 14 years of age.” Regardless of the truthfulness of the actual charge, residents 
documented that Hughes’s pronouncements continued to linger in the Campbell County 
air long after they were issued. As one witness to a divorce case stated, “such charges 
against a virtuous woman was like sending a dagger to her hart.” In honor-driven 
southern communities, a woman might flee to avoid future social stigma on the basis of 
false allegations. In Wisconsin communities, a woman’s reputation was also important as 
strangers settled near one another and used gossip as a means to create and enforce social 
order. As such, a label of troublemaker was almost impossible to shake off.
14
 
Staying within the territory of sexual slander, cruel husbands could also expand 
on the epithets of “whore” or “strumpet” and give detailed accounts of their wives being 
prostitutes or contracting venereal diseases via prostitution. Following accusations of this 
nature, the marriage of Fredericka and Charles Nordhausen fell apart rather quickly. 
Married in June 1854, Fredericka filed for divorce citing cruelty less than a year later. 
She described how Charles, his mother, and his brother, would verbally abuse her, calling 
her whore and other false names. Looking in vain for Charles to defend her honor, 
Fredericka was alarmed when he instead publicly identified her as a prostitute and 
alleged that she was diseased with the clap. Charles, for his part, admitted the above 
incident to the court, but asserted that he spoke the truth. He claimed that it was only after 
marriage that he discovered his wife’s disease. And, to make matters worse, her infection 
resulted in a “noxious and sickening” smell so foul that he could not “come near or stay 
about her.” In an acknowledgment that Fredericka’s social life was ruined by the case and 
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the accusations contained therein, Charles offered to pay to send her to Europe. We do 
not know if she accepted his proposal, but his actions indicate that he wanted to obliterate 
their marriage from memory. In this case, the truth of whether or not Fredericka did 
indeed have the clap is not as important as the community reaction to the allegations. 
Historians have documented how antebellum American gender ideals stressed female 
sexual innocence and passionlessness, therefore even allegations of prostitution and 
disease could ruin a woman’s future possibilities.15  
The evidence shows that communities possessed little tolerance for public 
displays of epithets and accusations by cruel husbands. To encourage the peaceful 
resolution of marital troubles and to guard against public disruptions, antebellum citizens 
mobilized certain defensive measures. Morality sections in local newspapers would 
instruct spouses to maintain emotional control at all costs. As The (Clarksville, TX) 
Standard in an article entitled “Guard Against Vulgar Language” admonished, “There is 
as much connexion between the words and the thoughts as there is between the thought 
and the words; the latter are not only the expression of the former, but they have a power 
to re-act upon the soul and leave the stains of their corruption there.” This newspaper 
expressed the forward thinking opinion that verbal cruelty, even in private, was a public 
problem and, quite often, a precursor to serious physical violence. When assessing 
whether or not verbal cruelty had actually occurred, the community would often take into 
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account the intended audience. As part of the chivalric code of honor embedded in 
southern ideology and the general understanding of decency in the North, husbands were 
supposed to watch their language towards their wives, children, and other women. 
Serving in the role of protector, husbands were called upon to temper their passionate 
natures as a sign of respect for womanhood.
16
  
Under these terms, John Pratt was no respecter of southern women or his wife. In 
her bill for divorce, Elizabeth Pratt enumerated her husband’s physical and verbal 
cruelties, including hitting her in the mouth with a turkey leg, striking her in the forehead 
with a fire shovel, and calling her a “damn worthless bitch” in front of the neighbors. 
Elizabeth’s sister, Jane, resided with the couple and wanted the court to note for the 
record that John was “harsh and very cruel in both words and actions.” To drive her point 
home, Jane concluded by stating, “He treated her more like a slave than a wife.”  In 
another cruelty case, describing the harsh verbiage of a neighbor, Jacob Mason observed, 
“I should not suppose that all men or young men should use such language when ladies 
are present.” In a similar fashion to many deponents, he declined for reasons of decency, 
respect, or simply lack of information to provide examples of the specific terms. But he 
was able to convey the general message that vulgar husbands were not socially 
acceptable anymore. However, it still fell to the wifely litigant to prove that the foul 
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language in question not only caused emotional distress but actually resulted in tangible 
injury to her standing in society, thereby constituting cruelty.
17
 
Drawing attention to the ways in which cruel words were just as harmful as 
physical abuse was one tactic employed by wives and deponents. Sally Baggs of 
Walworth County, Wisconsin, was just fourteen years old when she married Horace in 
1847. In the seven years following he frequently refused to provide any household 
support, forcing her to take in sewing to pay for groceries. Known in the neighborhood 
for kicking his wife out on a regular basis, Horace’s physical abuse in the form of 
choking, kicking, and hitting Sally reached the point to where neighbors intervened and 
filed an assault charge against him. But this did not stop Horace who, along with the 
physical attacks, made sure to swear at his wife whenever possible. Regarding his 
profanity, Sally commented that it had caused her “as much pain in her feelings as have 
his blows and kicks.” A boarder in the household, Elvira Fairchild, agreed and added, “I 
think the language he used was worse than the blows he gave I should rather a man strike 
me than to call me such names as he called his wife.” Sally’s case rested upon the 
assertion that her husband’s physical and verbal cruelties were one and the same. They 
both caused mental suffering and physical debility. Through her petition, Sally warned 
her peers that they would lose a productive member of the community if they failed to 
recognized Horace’s cruelties and grant her a divorce.18 
Sally and other wives called upon the courts to shield them from cruelty that 
surfaced as part of a man’s nature and natural temperament. Antebellum society believed 
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that men biologically suffered from tendencies toward passionate behaviors. Mastery of 
one’s emotions, therefore made one a capable master of others. However, not all men 
could harness their emotions into productive channels. Take, for instance, the case of a 
man whose continual reliance upon epithets led to his neighbors referring to him as the 
“swearing fellow.” This “fellow” simply could not restrain himself and “his course was to 
speak well of nobody.” And, in support of a divorce proceeding, community members 
related to the court how this man’s wife was exposed to his swearing ways on a regular 
basis.
19
 When faced with allegations such as those found above, the husbands in question 
often turned the tables and accused their wives of wearing down their masculine restraint 
with constant nagging or harassment. They would claim that they only broke down and 
used terms regarded “by ears polite” as “low and vulgar” after “incessant and severe 
cross fire” from their wives. Regardless of the excuses presented, antebellum judges and 
juries appeared to have felt little sympathy for those husbands suffering from 
uncontrollable cruel passions. They were especially concerned about those cases that 
hinted at the possibility of escalating violence.
20
  
While some women sought out ways to escape from their husband’s verbal 
attacks, other wives were the ones accused of committing verbal cruelties. As historians 
have shown, the verbally cruel wife in antebellum America joined a long historical 
tradition of women using their tongues to challenge, as Terri Snyder has argued, 
“traditional political and domestic authority.” Through the very act of speaking up in a 
negative way, a wife contested her husband’s ability to govern dependants and “gave lie” 
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to his pretensions of absolute mastery. Southern husbands, in particular, could ill afford 
to have their authority questioned so openly. It was perhaps for this very reason that the 
records show almost no Virginia wives accused of committing verbal cruelties in 
marriage. As honor depended on the display of mastery, the cost of pursuing such cases 
was too great for the husbands in question. Protecting one’s manhood in Virginia meant 
privately dealing with a wife’s unruly tongue or providing more egregious evidence for a 
divorce. So, verbally aggressive wives undoubtedly existed in Virginia marriages, but 
their stories do not make it into the available records.
21
   
If we turn our attention to the frontier communities of Wisconsin and Texas, we 
find divorce cases focusing on the actions of verbally cruel wives. In particular, husbands 
presented complaints alleging that their wives would refer to them in animalistic ways.  
Edward Luxton, a Milwaukee man, found no solace with his wife as she, aside from 
neglecting her household duties, bit and pinched his arm, all the while calling him a 
“beast and brute.” His bill went on to lament that she has “frequently told him to shut up 
his head.”22 When a wife called attention to a man’s beastly nature, this charge could be 
perceived as cruelty as it mocked what many men considered to be a real internal 
struggle. Historians studying antebellum manhood, including Anthony Rotundo, have 
argued that men during this period fought to “achieve an inner balance between the 
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civilized and the primitive” within their daily lives. They were supposed to be powerful, 
yet also restrained. Therefore, in their divorce petitions, husbands often claimed that 
wives committed cruelty when they criticized a man’s attempts to civilize his internal 
savage beast.
23
 
Frontier husbands also described how their wives relied upon another manner of 
attack, namely applying cruel labels intended to ruin or destroy a man’s moral and 
financial standing in society. Liar, scoundrel, swindler, rogue, blackguard, villain, rascal, 
and thief appeared the most often in the petitions, answers, and depositions. Each of these 
terms implied that a man possessed a faulty moral compass. They also suggested that the 
wife in question had had her trust violated in some way. For John Miller it appeared as if 
his wife Eliza believed that his constant trips between Texas and their original home in 
Alabama were leading him to disregard his duties in their household. Henry McNealy, 
who lived with the couple as an overseer, overheard a conversation in which Eliza 
suggested that her husband “did not govern his family.” In addition, Eliza’s public verbal 
cruelties, including calling John a liar and a fool, did not begin until he first visited 
Texas. Of course, Eliza’s implications proved particularly harmful because John was 
trying to establish himself in a new community, and his honor was critical to that goal. 
He needed people to know that his word was his bond, and his wife calling him a liar in 
public did not aid in that cause. As Ariela Gross notes, even the appearance of lying 
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could damage a man’s honor irrevocably. Being “given the lie” was a tragedy indeed for 
any man.
24
  
In addition, wives committed cruelty if they publicly or falsely accused their 
husbands of sexual deviancies. Interestingly enough, in the opposite scenario as discussed 
above, society did not generally consider it cruel for a woman to accuse her husband of 
extramarital dalliances. A man’s reputation, whether in Wisconsin or Texas, could 
withstand, or even embrace, a straightforward adultery accusation. On the contrary, false 
or public allegations that suggested extreme sexual indulgence or sexual deviance were 
problematic and cruel. Therefore, Evra Barzak was cruel when she called her husband a 
“whoremonger.” And Almira Brown behaved cruelly when she included “whoremaster” 
in a stream of insults to her husband. Almira may, or may not, have been responding to 
her husband calling her a “dirty whore.” For added emphasis, wives would often pair 
these epithets with “old” as in “old whoremaster” or “you old devil.” The implication 
being that a husband was no longer fit and able to maintain his duties in the relationship, 
especially providing for the family, as compared to a younger man.
25
 
Some women continued with their insults and accusations until the point of 
suggesting outright physical impotence. While living in East Texas, Harriet Brewer not 
only called her husband impotent and other “foulest names and epithets,” but she also 
deserted him to cohabit with one William Taylor, who lived only 300 yards from her 
marital home. Seeking to reclaim his manhood, Harriet’s husband filed for divorce on the 
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grounds of cruelty, adultery, and desertion.
26
 In late 1850s Dallas County, Elisha Lovell 
came to court precisely to defend his mastery and to cut off an unruly dependent, his wife 
Mary Ellen. He made the trip to court after learning that she had circulated scandalous 
reports about him in their community. In particular, she had told their friends and 
neighbors that her husband “had tried on several occasions to make her cohabit with one 
M. A. Durrell a neighbor for the purpose of raising an heir” as he “was physically unable 
to beget one.” Elisha made sure to let the court know that he had had several children by 
a former wife, therefore Mary Ellen was clearly acting out of an “utter want of love or 
even respect for him.” James Brewer and Elisha Lovell came before Texas courts out of 
an effort to reassert their compromised manhood. Their honor demanded that they 
respond promptly to the allegations made by their partners because “a mere statement” 
whether “true or untrue” was “among strangers” enough to injure a man’s reputation and 
bring scandal upon him.
27
  
Husbands and community members alleged a wide variety of motives that 
inspired vitriol-tongued wives. They would quite often point to nature and the fact that 
some wives, in a similar fashion to the husbands described previously, simply possessed 
“quarrelsome & abusive tongue[s].” In fact, when one Fayette County, Texas, judge 
delivered his orders to the jury in a divorce proceeding, he cautioned, “It would not only 
be farsical and ridiculous but extremely dangerous to the morals and well being of society 
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to allow a divorce for every little manifestation of temper and indulgence in ill natured 
harsh or abusive language, particularly by a woman.” According to this judge, a woman’s 
words, while admittedly cruel, did not always meet the legal qualifications for cruelty 
because such language was almost to be expected as part of the marital package.  
Even though they would face difficulties in securing divorces based upon a woman’s 
harsh words, husbands from Wisconsin and Texas still presented cases centering upon 
verbal attacks. They stood a better chance at success if they could demonstrate a pattern 
of verbal abuse or if they could hint at the possibility of future physical violence. Thomas 
Dickinson of Dallas County, Texas, believed that his wife’s abuse and mistreatment 
emerged out of her general “malignity of feeling” towards him. He offered no additional 
explanation. Another Dallas husband, Elisha Lovell, described how his wife called him a 
villain and blackguard and confessed that “she did not love him, she wished she had not 
married him and she would not live with him much longer.” For the antebellum period, 
historian Norma Basch has observed that, “Men, no less than women, gave evidence of 
suffering unrelenting psychological cruelty.” However, emotional injury alone was not 
sufficient to warrant a divorce on the grounds of cruelty.
28
 
 Therefore, husbands emphasized the ways in which a woman’s verbal cruelties 
could compromise a man’s ability to rule his household. Verbal attacks that took place in 
front of other dependents were considered to be particularly problematic. Although the 
stresses associated with mastery in a slave society did not weigh upon them, the two 
following complaints by Wisconsin husbands hint that they too, like their southern 
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counterparts, felt the need to exert unblemished authority over their household and 
business dealings. They understood, as Stephanie McCurry states, that “Dependence was 
the stuff of which independence-and manhood were made.” Albert Bowker came to the 
court alleging that his wife “commenced a course of cruel conduct” within the past two 
years (after almost two decades of marriage) and refused to let him manage his household 
affairs. Aside from neglecting the washing and mending, she “has been in the constant 
habit of interfering with & preventing plaintiff from governing & correcting their 
children and addressing to him in their presence the most abusive vulgar and insulting 
language.” Neighborhood witnesses came forward to corroborate Bowker’s account, 
stating, “I never saw a woman treat her husband so unkindly & cruelly.” However, just 
when the case seemed quite clear, Mereda Bowker delivered her answer and admitted 
that she did interfere with his management of the children, but only when it was 
necessary due to his “brutal & inhuman” treatment. As such, she defended herself by 
asserting that her cruelty was not cruelty at all because of her primary motive of 
protection of the helpless and the prevention of Albert’s cruelties.29   
 Julius Strauss, a blacksmith from Milwaukee, in his answer to his wife’s petition 
for divorce, provided evidence as to his own understanding of cruelty. Quickly passing 
over the fact that he had been fined $25 for a physical assault against his wife, Julius 
moved on to describe how Anna would come into his shop, which was attached to the 
house, and abuse him in front of his laborers. She would call him names and “also abused 
& asailed said workmen in like manner” so much so that he “had great difficulty keeping 
them in his employ.” In a state of growing frustration, he determined to lock the door 
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against her because he had reached his limit of tolerance as a “man of passions as other 
men, and sensitive to and impatient of abuse, though from the hands or lips of his wife.” 
Aside from annoyance, he claimed that his wife’s actions prevented him from earning a 
proper living. Julius and Albert presented stories of mastery under attack, and looked to 
other men in their communities for sympathy and assistance. After all, they argued, the 
problem of unruly dependents was an issue that affected all men, regardless of position.
30
 
So far this chapter has discussed verbal attacks ranging from sexual and labor 
epithets to accusations of adultery. Within all of the cases, injured husbands and wives 
had to not only show emotional distress, but an impaired quality of life if they hoped to 
win a divorce on the grounds of verbal cruelties. Judges and juries hoped to protect the 
productive potential of individuals by recognizing the connections between emotional, 
social, and physical damages. The third category of verbal cruelty found within the 
records, threats, lent itself quite easily to cruelty rulings on the basis of “reasonable 
apprehension” of physical injury. After all, as Jane Turner Censer finds, “Intrinsically 
cruelty was not the act, but its motives and effects.” And if a threatening statement 
created a fear of bodily harm in the recipient, then it satisfied the threshold for cruelty.  
According to the premise of the law, threats of imminent danger severely reduced quality 
of life. The recognition of this category of cruelty reflected a desire on the part of judges 
and juries to respond to these threats before the action alluded to was actually carried out. 
As such, threats were viewed as the type of verbal cruelty that was as close as possible to 
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physical violence. And, not surprisingly, threats appeared in a majority of the court cases 
examined for this study.
31
 
The regulation of threats against wives assumed particular importance as the 
nineteenth century progressed due to a growing discussion focusing on the physical 
consequences of anxiety. Popular and medical literature from the antebellum period 
described how a woman’s body was exceedingly frail in composition. Following this 
logic, even the smallest hint of discord could wreck havoc on a woman’s overall health. 
As historian Mary Poovey describes in her study of the antebellum medical profession, 
because of women’s perceived “greater delicacy and sensitivity...it seems hardly 
surprising that doctors thought women were subject to a bewildering array of physical 
and emotional disorders.” In accordance with this interpretation, wives within the court 
records attempted to clearly demonstrate how the foreboding words of their spouses not 
only ruined their daily quality of life but also left them unfit to perform the simplest of 
tasks. One example of anxiety-induced debility comes from the case files of Charlotte 
Cowen. Charlotte appeared before the court and recalled how her husband would, when 
intoxicated, take up an axe, hold it above her, and proclaim his intention to split her head 
open. His actions led to Charlotte’s existence being “one of continual uneasiness anxiety 
& misery.” Years later and across the country, Isabella Clark complained that her 
husband’s verbal cruelties and personal violence left her “prey to constant anxiety.” For 
wives such as Isabella, the historical evidence demonstrates that the settlement conditions 
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found within frontier Texas and Wisconsin were stressful enough without the addition of 
abuse. Anxiety was also a concern for general society because it was widely believed that 
women such as Charlotte and Isabella might have trouble bearing children as a result of 
cruelties. Historians of sexuality and the body reference how “The uterus, it was 
assumed, was connected to the central nervous system.” Therefore, the cruel words of a 
husband could potentially endanger the life not only of a wife but of her future unborn  
children.
32
 
The general threat to take a spouse’s life, made by both husbands and wives, was 
frequently found within the court records. A threat against a person’s life was, at its core, 
a simple way to instill fear. Petitioners also relied upon life-threatening statements 
because they satisfied the legal definition of cruelty, at the most fundamental level, while 
requiring only minimal detail. Based upon court documents, it appears as if this particular 
type of threat was tossed around fairly freely within unhappy marriages. The daughter of 
one Texas couple related to the court how her father threatened “so frequently” to kill her 
mother “that I cannot remember all the times and places it was a common threat used 
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almost daily.” Not content with simply declaring their general intentions, cruel husbands 
and wives would often try to emphasize their murderous intentions. Peter Madden, for no 
reason his wife could later understand or relate, drew his knife and declared that he would 
“have her [his wife’s] life if he had to die the next minute, and that no person could stop 
him.” Other husbands would go into even more specific detail, providing an exact time 
for their planned assault. Nancy Hilburn of Texas and Catharine Crandall of Wisconsin 
both lived with husbands who declared at various points that “murder would be done 
before night” and murder would happen “at the dead hour of night.” For Nancy and 
Catharine, cruelty no doubt brought many sleepless nights.
33
 
Although we commonly associate threats with firearms or knives, the records 
indicate that many cruel spouses leveled threats in which their bodies would serve as the 
weapon of choice. A husband could hint at his lethality, for example, by saying that he 
would “stamp the life out” of his wife. Or, he could indicate a desire to damage the facial 
area of his wife. Married in the fall of 1854, Christy and Evan Mattison of Wisconsin 
never lived peacefully together. Evan became a habitual drunkard, coming home from 
binges and striking, kicking, and calling his wife names. During one brutal encounter, 
Evan attacked Christy all the while promising “that he would smash her face so she could 
not talk any more.” The graphic image of brain injury also appeared with regularity 
within the records. One man threatened to “smash” his wife’s “head almost every night.” 
However, it would be a mistake to assert that only men proved capable of threatening 
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severe violence. Women also swore that they would “beat out the brains” of their 
husbands. The extent to which these wives followed through with their comments will be 
seen in the following chapter.
34
 
Aside from creatively worded warnings, cruel spouses particularly favored 
threatening their partners with imminent bodily harm while using ‘traditional’ weapons 
as props. Traditional, in this case, can refer to the use of a knife or gun, as opposed to a 
weapon of opportunity, such as a heavy spoon or water pitcher. Antebellum judges and 
juries viewed these types of interactions as particularly worrisome because only a thin 
line separated a deadly threat from murder itself. Consider, for example, the case of Ann 
Chick, a Virginia wife tortured by her threatening and often outright violent husband, 
Littleton. Aside from inflicting blows on Ann and their children, Littleton developed a 
pattern in which he regularly threatened to cut Ann’s throat. In these moments of terror, 
he would “hold a knife in one hand” and a lump of her hair in another and “threatened 
and indeed seemed earnestly endeavoring to cut her throat.” She generally escaped his 
potentially deadly embrace aided only by her “state of terror and alarm.” Her husband 
also tended to get extremely upset over seemingly trivial occurrences. In one situation, he 
was sick and requested a pillow, which she handed him. Then, he yelled that he did not 
want a pillow, so she asked what he did want. He jumped up, “took a knife out and swore 
he would cut her throat.” She ran to another room in the house where she happened to 
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meet arriving visitors who “saved her.”35 An interesting aspect of Ann’s bill is that the 
image of cutting a throat was a dramatic one. The spouses, more often than not husbands, 
who relied upon this threat intended it to have an exaggerated effect, as compared to a 
threat to stab, which may or may not be immediately life threatening. In her study of 
domestic violence in mid-nineteenth-century New York, Pamela Haag describes how 
verbally assaultive husbands tended to “underscore an unnegotiable right over wives and 
control of the private sphere by reveling in their capacity to determine the very life and 
death of their families.” Men such as Littleton wanted to make clear their level of control: 
they could take a life at will.
36
  
A knife threat undoubtedly escalated the level of tension within marriages. Three 
cases, out of many, from Wisconsin are illustrative. One woman, married to a confirmed 
drunkard, described how she had been turned out of doors on numerous occasions. 
However, even her home was not a haven as her husband “had a knife hid with a standing 
threat that he would kill [her] with that knife.” Almost a decade later, another Wisconsin 
wife lamented to the local circuit judge how her husband, also a drunk, would torment 
her when “he took out his pocket knife and began to sharpen it and threatened to kill” her. 
For Lucinda Benson’s husband the use of a knife was intended to cause anxiety of a 
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different type. Charles Benson wanted his wife to know that if she ever revealed his 
general cruelties to anyone, he would kill her. The couple only managed to live together 
for a few months, and he “disregarded the feelings and happiness” of Lucinda the entire 
time. She finally was forced to flee to a relative in February 1850 when he drew a knife 
on her and threatened that if she ever told anyone about his treatment of her, “she would 
tell it but once before he would stop her.” In these situations, husbands employed very 
traditional weapons to elicit a very expected emotion, terror. This description of threats 
involving weapons would be remiss if it did not include a mention of the importance of 
guns and angry words. The divorce papers show that across all three states, cruel 
husbands quite often leveled threats with firearms in hand. The standard story included a 
man loading a pistol or shotgun and aiming it at his wife, often accompanied by cruel 
statements, many described in this chapter.
37
 
 Although wives were far less likely than husbands to resort to threats with 
traditional weapons, it was still possible. Those wives who grabbed a knife or gun to 
threaten their husbands were, unknowingly, broadening the understanding of cruelty 
during the period. The cruel woman with a weapon was not able to be identified on sight. 
She could be anybody. For example, the Daily Milwaukee News described how “a rather 
good looking woman, with a fur cape, black velvet cloak, clear teeth, brown hair, and a 
nervous looking eye, went into a gun shop down town, and purchased a neat little 
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revolver, and was particular to learn how to load and fire off the institution.” Evidently, 
with “wrath in her countenance,” the newspaper editor was certain that she was off to 
shoot and kill somebody. Lacking the physical force to carry out their threats, other 
women took up knives to emphasize their dangerous intentions. After four years of 
marriage, John Fowler of Texas decided to divorce his wife Eliza. Aside from using 
“vexing” language and proclaiming that she could no longer love him, Eliza decided that 
she wanted him to leave his own house. Grabbing a knife in her hand in a threatening 
manner, she told him that “she was one of the sort that would stick the knife into him.” 
Clearly, John claimed, he could not live with that “sort” of woman and required a 
divorce.
38
  
While certain women handled weapons to their advantage, the records show that 
many wives included excessive weapons-carrying as fitting within the boundaries of 
marital cruelty. The very presence of weapons was enough to cause anxiety and terror 
within the hearts of many women, as in the case of Dorcas Nelson, a Virginia resident. 
She married Moses Nelson in 1851. They immediately set off to visit his relatives in 
Tennessee, and it was on this trip that Dorcas “first discovered in part the true character 
of her husband.” Upon arriving at the family home, her husband’s brother took her aside 
and avowed “that her husband was a dangerous man and advised” her “to endeavor to 
induce” him “to “lay aside his deadly weapons, with which he was constantly armed.” 
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Following the brother’s advice, she requested a disarming, which her husband absolutely 
refused. Upon the couple’s return to Virginia, Dorcas was in such a state of fear that she 
convinced her husband to agree for them to move in with her father so that she would be 
afforded some protection. The situation only worsened, and Moses abandoned her in 
1854; but up until that point “her life was one of continual fear and trouble” due, in part, 
to her husband’s habit of constantly carrying deadly weapons on his person. Although she 
never alleged that her husband actually made a statement about using the weapons 
against her, which weakened her legal case, Dorcas believed her husband was cruel 
because of the constancy with which he armed himself. He was never without a firearm. 
This resulted in Dorcas being unable to relax and enjoy a normal home environment. 
Because “he thought every body was his enemy,” she was forced to bear his anxieties as 
well as her own. The court agreed and granted the divorce.
39
 
While husbands in all three states declared their right to possess arms of various 
sorts on their persons, their wives cited cruelty to make claims to the contrary. 
Descriptions abound in which men are described carrying around “a gun, ax, cutting 
knife, & other weapons” on their persons. On occasion the information would include 
exactly the type of type of knife, clasp-bladed, etc., or style of gun, “five or six 
shooter.”40 In response to these allegations, husbands replied that they carried weapons 
for specific, useful purposes. Garland Mallory, a Virginia resident, in response to his 
wife’s cruelty petition, stated that he carried a revolver “not to take his wife’s life, but to 
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protect her virtue.” He even went so far as to surrender his bowie-knife to his wife with 
“lamb-like meekness” upon her request, thus clearly indicating that she never stood “in 
great peril” from him. For Garland, his revolver and knife were symbols of his manhood, 
therefore he could only submit partially to his wife’s demands of disarmament.41  
In court, wives could, and did, present arguments that the presence of deadly 
weapons violated the sanctity of the domestic sphere. Susan Menefee, of Virginia, 
complained that her husband was in the habit of shooting off firearms within the house. 
He answered that he did shoot a gun out of the bedroom window but only to “scare off a 
pack of wild dogs.” In this situation, it is clear that Susan would have preferred Banks to 
pursue this impulse out of doors. One Wisconsin boarder recalled how the couple who 
owned the house he boarded in would quarrel on a regular basis. He went on to assert that 
cruelty clearly occurred when the husband “when in his cups” would “load his rifle, and 
pistols, and stride up and down his room, and conduct himself like a madman.” Needless 
to say, this boarder was happy to leave after two-and-a-half months. In particular, wives 
would complain that their husbands brought weapons to bed on a regular basis. One 
Botetourt County, Virginia, husband was in the habit of carrying “weapons about his 
person” that he then took “with him to bed at night, with a view, either to alarm or 
terrify” his wife. Ira Hall, a Wisconsin resident, would take his gun to bed and “has slept 
with the same in his arms thus loaded with powder and ball all night.” John Cooper 
“placed a razor under the pillow of their bed” for the purpose of intending to take his 
wife’s life. In stereotypical Texas fashion, Anton Leitenberg took a “large bowie knife” 
into bed in order to “frighten and intimidate” his partner. These ‘weapons violations’ bred 
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anxious wives because they could imagine no other purpose for firearm use in the house, 
much less keeping a gun in the intimate space of the bed, except to harm them. And, as 
the moral guardians of the domestic sphere, women felt uniquely positioned to ask for an 
end to these behaviors. They argued that the presence of weapons made it difficult for 
them to create a peaceful and calm household, one of the principle tasks allotted to their 
sex. However, husbands usually refused to compromise on this ultimate sign of 
manhood.
42
 
Just as the presence of weapons could alarm wives, the threat of poisoning 
seemed to strike fear into husbands. By the antebellum period, the possibility of 
poisoning hovered in the southern air and coincided with a growing fear of slave 
defiance. According to the rumors, slaves, often in charge of preparing food, could 
dispatch plantation owners with relative ease. Historians will never know the exact 
number of individuals who lost their lives in this way; but it was this context that, in part, 
made threats of poisoning a particularly efficacious form of wifely cruelty. After their 
wives had made a poisoning threat, husbands, in order to avoid a painful death, would 
refuse to drink or eat food prepared by their wives. As such, one man left the coffee 
brewed by his wife untouched. Another wife let it be known that “she would in a certain 
contingency (in case she should again become pregnant)” poison her husband and their 
two children. She also would pour “vitrial” in her husband’s eyes while he was sleeping. 
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The anxiety and stress caused by these toxic threats led one man to declare that, “if the 
cruelty had not been extreme I should not know what extreme cruelty would be.” When 
wives made poisoning threats, they pointed out their husband’s vulnerability stemming 
from a woman’s domestic role. And, as a result, they gained extra maneuvering room in 
the marriage. Few men would order a wife to cook dinner if they feared she would poison 
the food.
43
 
Petitioners would also come before the courts citing a spouse’s threats to burn 
down the home as a form of cruelty. The twenty-three-year-old son of Betsey and 
Archibald Carter described how his father was “very quarrelsome” and said “he would 
burn the house and run away by its light.” This was after his father piled all of the 
family’s bedding and curtains on the floor and attempted to burn them. Burning the house 
would not only possibly kill the entire family but generated the specter of total property 
loss and poverty. Men understood that a woman without any real or personal property 
faced a difficult road ahead, especially if she was without familial resources. This threat 
was taken very seriously by Virginia’s courts and records from the Eastern State Hospital 
show female patients admitted due to insanity caused by the progression from threats of 
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burning the house to physical violence. Marital duty required that a husband providing 
basic goods for his family, so cruel men could turn the threat of abandoning these 
responsibilities into a way to leverage for more power in the relationship. After bearing 
sixteen children over more than two decades of marriage, Mary Crowell described in her 
bill how her husband, Joseph, used just such a threat. He “expressed an intention to sell 
his property and abandon her, leaving her penniless.” It was an idle threat in this case; he 
never left. Nevertheless, Joseph’s statement served to remind his wife of her subordinate 
place in the relationship. He could cause her physical pain, which he did. But he could 
also injure her by wrecking her chances of survival.
44
 
In addition, husbands could frame threats around child injury or removal. William 
Crawford was a local drunk who failed to support his family and would leave for 
intervals of time with no notice. When he was home, Martha, his wife, continually 
avoided any close physical contact with him due to a fear of harm to her or her child. 
Upon returning home from one of his drunken sprees, William even “threaten[ed] to tear 
the child from her arms and dash its brains out against a tree.”  These threats resulted in 
Martha filing for divorce. She was seriously concerned that in a fit of drunken rage he 
might carry out his threats and kill her and her child. Although the wife might be the 
primary caretaker of a child, a husband could quickly demonstrate that he was still the 
most important authority figure in a child’s life. Threats to remove a child from a 
mother’s custody were viewed as cruel during the antebellum period. Recognizing that a 
woman’s mobility was somewhat limited, her husband could also threaten to take the 
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children to a far off locale, such as Georgia. These threats represented attempts to make it 
clear to women that motherhood was a privilege granted to them by their husbands. 
Threats of this nature were deemed cruel because they flew in the face of an increasing 
recognition of the significance of the mother’s role, as evident by the rise of custody 
decisions favoring mothers.
45
 
While threats could arise out of seemingly random situations, spouses often used 
them to encourage their marital partners perform certain tasks. For example, a husband 
could tell a wife to leave the home and never return, or else. The “or else” aspect of the 
threat quite often involved a death by shooting or some other means. Isaac Farrell of 
Frederick County, Va., kept a gun ready in case his wife returned to the house, refused to 
leave, and “needed” to be shot. According to witness accounts, a Wisconsin man, Samuel 
Galbreath, carried a gun on his person and “said that he had long intended to kill her [his 
wife] and that he would do so unless she should quit the house and leave him within a 
specified time which he named.” Galbreath and others were also accused of failing to 
provide necessary goods for their families, so perhaps forcing their wives to leave was a 
way for them to drop all appearances of marital obligation. They fact that they threatened 
violence to achieve these aims, however, made their behaviors cruel.
46
  
Across all three states, husbands and wives cited a spouse’s temper as a one of the 
principal contributing factors behind the marital verbal cruelties discussed in this chapter. 
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This emphasis on tempers deserves a quick treatment at this point but will also be a 
theme carried throughout later chapters. In particular, husbands called wives to task for 
possessing frightful and cruel tempers. Within court papers, a reference to a wife’s 
temper did not always require additional explanation in order for it to be taken seriously. 
It was understood that temperamental women, otherwise known as shrews or scolds, 
could hound their husbands until the men, in a similar fashion to the threatened wives, 
lived in a constant state of anxiety. However, men’s reactions usually combined anxiety  
with annoyance. Their wives’ temper held more of a danger to their mental state than to 
their well-being in a physical sense. References to a woman’s temper could describe it as 
“high” or “bad” or “violent” or “ungovernable.” Women with high tempers were not 
calm and soothing in accordance with womanly ideals. Women with bad or violent 
tempers could be prone to making physical assaults. Women with ungovernable tempers 
were a danger to society’s hierarchal structure, wherein a wife should always be obedient. 
By describing a temper as ungovernable, husbands admitted their own failure to govern 
their households and invited the entry of other men into their domestic sphere.
47
 
It was believed that a wife’s cruel temper could lead a man to destruction. In a 
treatise on family government, one author described how a man who was “industrious, 
sober, temperate, and entirely amiable” was driven to drink by his wife. The man proved 
“mistaken” in his choice of wife and “wedded a lovely form, but it enshrined the temper 
of a demon.” Men also claimed that part of the damage wrecked by a woman’s temper 
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was that it brought out the cruel side of men as well. L.D. Spragins recalled how after 
“being provoked by an incessant and severe cross fire” from his high-tempered wife, he 
then “may have used expressions that were not very witty or fashionable and that might 
have been regarded by “by ears polite” as “low and vulgar.”” Hence, his wife’s cruelty 
drove him to vulgarity. Charles Yearout also admitted that his wife’s “exceedingly 
peevish and fretful” demeanor led to him using “abusive language” towards her. Other 
men would respond with physical violence, but that will be discussed in the following 
chapter. Emotionality, seen as a female weakness, taken to the extreme could lead to an 
irascible temper.
48
  
 Interestingly enough, the problem of a woman’s temper was not unsolvable. 
Treatise and newspaper writers expounded that cruelty, in this case, was avoidable. To 
prevent the development of an unruly temper, a wife should exercise constant diligence 
with respect to her own emotions. She should focus on her wifely duties as opposed to 
romantic longings. The Young Wife’s Book cautioned that “continued differences and 
bickering will undermine the strongest affection,” therefore, “a wife cannot be too careful 
to avoid disputes upon the most trivial of subjects.” Of course, trivial is a subjective term 
and the husband defined it in these cases. To achieve a peaceful marriage, “Every wish, 
every prejudice must meet with attention, and the first thought of a woman should be the 
pleasing and providing for her husband.” Under these instructions, a wife pursing any 
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other focus than her husband’s needs ran the risk of developing, and displaying, an 
unwomanly temper.
49
 
 It should be stated that concerns about men’s tempers also appeared with 
regularity within cruelty cases. While women were cautioned to cultivate pleasant 
dispositions, men were told to control their passionate natures. Essentially, in all three 
states, those husbands who could not regulate their own tempers were unfit to lead 
separate households full of dependants. As one treatise author argued, “He is an 
unworthy head of household who cannot control his own temper, who is constantly 
breaking out with angry remarks.” Cruelty, as elaborated in divorce cases, was the natural 
outcome of an uncontrolled masculine temper. A Wisconsin wife recalled how her 
husband “was a man of violent ugly temper, got mad quick, when he had no reason for it, 
got mad very often...He would get so mad he couldn’t help himself.” In the process of 
court proceedings, male deponents would act as expert witnesses in the use of mastery 
over self, pointing to the moments when husbands “did not appear to exercise any 
control” over their brutal passions.50  
 This chapter opened by asking: how and why were antebellum husbands and 
wives verbally cruel? And, it has shown that verbal marital cruelties could take a variety 
of forms. Epithets, character attacks, and threats used by spouses demonstrated the degree 
to which marriage was often an ongoing power struggle. Cruelty was a tool that 
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antebellum spouses employed to control the behavior of one’s partner. However, society 
on the whole did not sanction verbal cruelties. In particular, judges and juries were 
sympathetic to claims by injured spouses alleging crippling emotional distress or a 
“reasonable apprehension” of physical injury. They believed that words could, and did, 
hurt.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
QUIVERINGS OF AGONY:  
THE PHYSICAL CRUELTIES OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES 
 
 After five children and over a decade of marriage, Albert Bowker finally reached 
his breaking point. In a detailed bill, he described to the Dane County, Wisconsin, circuit 
judge why he no longer wished to stay married to his wife, Mereda. He explained that 
shortly into their union he discovered that she possessed a demon temper, a fault he was 
willing to tolerate. However, over the past two years, Mereda had conducted an all-out 
war on his domestic authority. During regular “fits of anger and rage” she would fall into 
the “constant habit of kicking, striking, scratching, & pushing” him. She even took her 
aggression so far as to hit him on the head with an “iron stove hook.” In addition to being 
cowed by her physical prowess, Albert also related to the court that his wife sought to 
undermine his parental rule as well by “interfering with & preventing” his governance of 
the children.  A witness confirmed Albert’s account, adding that the Bowker household 
was a “kind of hell upon Earth.” Julia Barnes, a former boarder, provided additional 
insight regarding the day-to-day operations of the Bowker family. Barnes claimed that 
Mereda not only refused to do the cooking, washing, or mending, but she acted in an 
outright confrontational manner towards Albert. During one incident, Mereda shook her 
fist in Albert’s face and “dare[d] him to put his hand on her, and said if he did she would 
knock him over with the first thing she could get hold of.” Albert declined the invitation 
and walked away. However, he did not savor the victory as he felt as if he had been 
relegated to a position of marital servitude. In the end, Mereda behaved cruelly by not 
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allowing Albert to be the master of his household and by positioning herself in his 
rightful place.
1
 
 This chapter examines how antebellum men and women in Virginia, Texas, and 
Wisconsin defined and perceived physical cruelty in marriage. It asks: How were 
husbands and wives physically cruel? Why were husbands and wives physically cruel? 
Unsurprisingly, violence between spouses often arose from a struggle for power in the 
household and in the relationship. When discussing physical cruelty, the debates of the 
period focused on where exactly to draw the line separating cruelty from insensitivity or 
abrasiveness, for example. This chapter argues that brief emotional outbursts of violence, 
whether in the form of a slap or a blow, were understood by many to be unpleasant but 
tolerable parts of marriage. Willful and systematic physical attacks, evidenced by blood, 
repeated blows, etc., were where nineteenth-century Americans drew the line between 
impulsive violence and cruelty. Moreover, reasonable chastisement shaded into cruelty if 
a spouse perpetrated the ‘punishment’ in an overly emotional way or if the action resulted 
in permanent physical injury.  A fine line existed between chastisement and cruelty, 
proper mastery and improper mastery, honorable and dishonorable manhood.  
 This chapter contends that, in the southern states studied, husbands both attacked 
wives in an attempt to assert mastery (and were divorced for it), and they claimed to have 
been victimized by abusive wives who sought inappropriate mastery over their husbands 
(and were granted divorces on those grounds). Southern cultures of honor and mastery 
buttressed traditional gender roles, and men’s violence within households helped them to 
violently affirm those roles. In Wisconsin, on the other hand, there were fewer traditions 
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that defined the roles of husband and wife; indeed, there were many new conditions of 
daily life that demanded improvisation. How much of traditional gender roles remained 
relevant in the pioneer context? Such a question, and the confusion it reflected, 
apparently grated on couples and prompted much, rather intense, violence. All in all, the 
actions of cruel husbands and wives in Wisconsin led to more permanent injuries and 
generalized brutality within marriages than can be seen in either Virginia or Texas for the 
period. This chapter begins by examining the cruelties of married men before turning to 
an analysis of the cruelties of wives. As such, this work does not aim to present a 
comprehensive picture of unacceptable practices but rather to trace the outlines of 
behavior and perception in antebellum America.
2
   
 The cruel husbands examined within this study manifested their ill feelings 
toward their spouses in a wide variety of ways, often relying upon sheer physical 
superiority to ‘carry the day.’ By far, the most prevalent form of physical abuse was the 
slap or blow. A slap was an open-handed hit, frequently directed at the facial area. In 
contrast, a blow occurred when a person struck the other with a closed fist. Although a 
closed handed attack was viewed as the more dangerous of the two, a slap could hold 
perils of its own. For this reason, judges and juries gave full consideration to spouses who 
came before the courts claiming injury due to cruel hand-based assaults.  Wives, for their 
part, would rely upon language that recognized the potential utility of the slap or blow, 
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while pointing out their husband’s individual failings in usage. As Laura Edwards argues 
in her study of southern legal cultures, “The issue was not whether they should be 
subordinate, but what their subordination should entail.” As such, wifely litigants would 
concede that chastisement required physical force but took issue with what they 
perceived as the overzealous application of domestic punishment. Their goal was to 
refine the practice of marital mastery, not destroy it. After all, the vast majority of women 
who received divorces due to cruelties would go on to marry again.
3
  
In particular, wives and witnesses called attention to those moments in which out- 
of-control emotions, as opposed to sound logical principles, guided a husband’s violent 
hands. Assaults of this nature could come out of nowhere, as Lucy Burwell described to a 
Virginia court. Once when her husband was “angry with her for some cause,” he snuck 
up behind her, pushed her so that she fell down, and then “twice slapped her in the most 
humiliating manner.” She lived with the markings from this attack on her face for more 
than a week. Lucy and other wives successfully argued that the causal agent of “anger” 
moved a slap or blow out of the category of benign “discipline” and into cruelty. After 
all, domestic mastery revolved around control, consistency, and a careful application of 
violence. A husband who ruled unpredictably could foster potentially contagious feelings 
of dependant discontent and rebellion. Therefore, any and all instances of inept mastery 
represented a community problem. Moreover, scholars have described how the actions of 
excessively violent patriarchs were particularly problematic in southern areas. By the late 
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antebellum period, the South was trying to project the image of a benevolent society in 
which dependents, especially white women, were treated fairly.
4
 
Citing a man’s natural temper and establishing a pattern of emotional outbursts 
added further credibility to a cruelty complaint. Numerous petitions alleged that a 
husband’s “excitable & harsh” temper existed at the core of the marital disputes in 
question. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was generally accepted that men 
possessed deep animal instincts, but society required that they harness these impulses and 
direct them toward productive pursuits. For antebellum husbands, according to E. 
Anthony Rotundo, “How to achieve an inner balance between the civilized and the 
primitive was an urgent problem.” And, this was a problem that not all men solved 
successfully. Domestic discord could escalate if a husband became a slave to his temper 
and behaved cruelly as simply a matter of habit. Giving in to all of their destructive 
impulses, these men would enact systemic wife torture, often by “every species of 
domestic cruelty.” Moreover, their behaviors were particularly terrifying to wives as they 
appeared to offer no potential for reform. If a woman felt as if she could not change a 
man’s core demeanor or deep-ingrained practices, then her only recourse was to pursue a 
legal separation.
5
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 When a woman came to the court requesting a divorce, she pushed her fellow 
community members to evaluate what constituted a normal versus excessive use of blows 
or slaps. Did a single blow satisfy the legal threshold for marital cruelty? The simplest 
answer was that yes, it could, but that most of the time it did not. Husbands accused of 
committing cruelty understood this and quite often mounted a defense by saying that they 
required only a single slap to set their entire household back to order. They would try to 
limit the damage by only admitting to a lone act of violence, a singular moment of 
weakness in an otherwise solid record of mastery. And, they reached out to other men 
with a question: if faced with a wife like mine, wouldn’t you do the same? However, on 
occasion, the ferocity of a solo blow captured the court’s attention. Sarah Budd’s 
statement began ominously with a description of her husband’s unpredictable fits of 
temper. In a particularly violent assault that left their marital bed drenched in fresh blood, 
John Budd relied on his fists to do his cruel work. Upon his wife’s return from helping a 
neighbor, John pounced on her and threw her on to the bed. While she was on her back in 
an obviously vulnerable position he then “struck her a violent blow in the face which 
caused the blood to run from her nose & mouth in a frightful manner,” ruining the bed 
sheets. Managing to slip free, despite the blood, Sarah then ran into the street screaming 
for help. To secure a divorce she needed the judge and jury to recognize that her 
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husband’s fist was a deadly weapon in and of itself and that single blow could constitute 
cruelty.
6
 
 As they struggled to erect boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviors, antebellum citizens repeatedly emphasized the importance of assessing the 
exact number of slaps or blows. This, perhaps, reflected a desire to impose a sense of 
order on otherwise chaotic scenes of marital conflict. While the victim and perpetrator of 
the supposed assault might provide a numerical summary of the incident, the most 
valuable information usually came from witnesses. Out of the direct fray, these 
individuals possessed the opportunity to carefully listen and observe as scenes of abuse 
unfolded. A household servant could recount, for instance, “he hit his wife with seven 
blows two with open hand, one with closed fist.” Children, in particular, provided some 
of the most detailed estimates. They generally went unnoticed in the midst of conflict, yet 
were close enough to absorb every detail. Sixteen-year-old Emeline Giese recounted how 
her father initiated a struggle that culminated when, “father struck mother with his fist in 
her face, and on her head, on her arms, and breast, all over. He struck her five or six 
times.” Witnesses generally paid close attention to the ways in which domestic arguments 
unfolded because they needed to determine exactly when to intervene, if at all. The 
implication, again, was that a single blow might be forgiven as an emotional outburst, but 
a series constituted a larger threat. Cruel husbands chose to escalate their attacks while 
simply inept ones lashed out infrequently only causing minimal injuries.
7
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 To gauge the ferocity of a marital confrontation, judges and juries would 
encourage witnesses and litigants to provide detailed descriptions of where exactly a 
husband’s hits fell upon his wife. The location of the blows might offer an indication as 
to intent. The assumption being that those husbands who planned to seriously injure their 
partners would generally concentrate their energies on the critical areas of the head, neck, 
etc. In Virginia, Elizabeth Binn’s husband slapped her on the jaw. Meanwhile, one Texas 
husband struck his wife in the face so hard as to knock a pipe from her mouth. The said 
pipe then fell onto the child the woman was holding, “badly burning” the infant as a 
result. The man continued the assault by pulling the woman out of the chair by her hair 
while at the same time proclaiming that “she had better go back to Indiana.” By the end 
of the attack, this Texas woman was left out of doors to nurse her own injuries and those 
of her child. She believed that her husband had initiated the assault out of a desire to 
drive her from the home and enact an informal separation. Historian Norma Basch has 
documented how frontier husbands, in particular, “created de facto divorces” while 
“women sought out legal ones.” If divorce was not something that a man wished to 
pursue, or if a wife refused to leave, then violence could be used to push a wife out of the 
domestic space. In the end, cruelty offered husbands an avenue, albeit a cowardly one, in 
which to effectively end cohabitation.
8
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When looking for evidence of cruelty, antebellum men and women also wanted to 
know whether or not the blows were concentrated on a particular part of a woman’s body 
or if multiple areas were damaged. Therefore, it was not uncommon for a petitioner to 
enumerate the degree of injury sustained by all body parts. Although gendered ideals of 
modesty traditionally dictated that a woman’s body was not a suitable topic of public 
conversation, court participants expected and anticipated graphic testimony. The need to 
decisively demonstrate that cruelty had occurred made “what would have been 
considered a serious breach of etiquette at home—the public discussion of a person’s 
body,” not only okay but necessary. On the whole, marital disputes blurred the 
boundaries of public and private. By violating their conjugal vows through violence, 
husbands further diminished their rights to private ownership over a woman’s body. 
History has shown that a man’s claims to domestic privacy frequently reflect his desire to 
beat his wife without recourse. However, in the antebellum period, when a woman such 
as Delia Tubbs walked around with her face “blue” from a recent attack, her body made 
her private sufferings public. Her visible injuries invited members of the community to 
comment on and explore not only her particular circumstances, but the degree to which 
cruelty was tolerated. However, in a fashion similar to other Wisconsin men, Lyman 
Tubbs probably never apologized and felt no fear of public retaliation.
9
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The court records indicate that Wisconsin husbands frequently resorted to near 
lethal levels of force in domestic confrontations. Moreover, when questioned they 
showed little remorse for their actions and, in fact, proclaimed their right to control their 
wives using whatever means they chose. Clinging to the enactment of traditional gender 
roles, they would declare that they, for all intents and purposes, owned the bodies of their 
wives. As prominent historian Hendrik Hartog has observed, “Wife beating was a 
practice of men who believed they owned their wives, who believed they had a right to 
do as they pleased with what was theirs, including beating them.” Although Wisconsin 
residents regularly intervened in domestic disputes, a practice discussed in a later chapter, 
the statements given by husbands clearly indicate that they did not fear public reprisals 
and instead sent their wives out with the evidence of their cruelties plainly visible. As 
such, it was quite common to find women in the records who went through life without 
front teeth due to a husband’s assault. In contrast, imbued with the cultural precepts of 
honor and vengeance, Virginia men exhibited more restraint. Southern men were, rightly, 
concerned about retaliation on the part of the general public and/or male relatives of the 
wife. Historians of southern culture have described how cruel husbands could be placed 
under community scrutiny if public evidence surfaced of wife mistreatment. Therefore, it 
only makes sense that Virginia husbands would, even in the midst of angry passions, 
generally avoid inflicting permanent physical injury upon their wives. Not only did those 
types of injuries not accord with the reverence of southern womanhood, they also made a 
man a potential target for community violence.
10
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Moreover, the divorce documents indicate that a spouse who sustained permanent 
injuries as a result of angry blows or slaps stood an excellent chance of receiving a 
divorce on the basis of cruelty. After all, severe bodily harm existed as the first generally 
acknowledged form of spousal abuse and by the antebellum period this recognition had 
hardened into a virtual zero tolerance policy. To that end, divorce bills often included 
information regarding the serious aftereffects of physical confrontations. Sparing few 
details, damaged wives appeared before the courts and described how they sustained 
bruises, broken bones, severed limbs, and bloody noses. The son-in-law and son of 
Lorana Jincks, of Wisconsin, described her appearance following a physical conflict with 
her husband. According to their accounts, she appeared to be in a “lame condition...her 
right eye was discolored, commonly called black and blue and that she appeared to be 
hurt on one side of her body.” Her son also noted that she had in her possession “a large 
bunch of hairs” which had been pulled out of her head mid-attack. Another Wisconsin 
husband hit his wife so hard with his fist that he actually broke her collar bone with a 
single blow. The two husbands in question clearly behaved cruelly.
11
  
As the above stories indicate, the records suggest that Wisconsin husbands were 
far more likely to inflict permanent injuries on their wives through acts of physical 
cruelty, at least when compared with Virginia and Texas men. Interestingly enough, it 
appears as if their desire to extract maximum domestic contributions from their wives 
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also drove them to actions that could render a woman useless in the household. For 
example, the husband mentioned above broke his wife’s collar bone in the midst of a 
disagreement about whether or not she would take over the burden of financially 
supporting him and their family. However, following the attack, she was unable to even 
perform her housework and filed for divorce shortly thereafter. The court agreed that her 
life was in immediate danger and dissolved the union. After all, the destructive use of 
marital power in frontier communities was a problem with consequences that spread far 
beyond the individual relationship in question. Developing societies, in particular, could 
not afford to support crippled or abandoned spouses. Aid for the poor was practically 
nonexistent.  In light of these realities, Wisconsin’s legal system offered a permissive and 
progressive list of divorce grounds designed to allow spouses to escape problematic 
unions before permanent injuries took place.
12
  
 The courts and community members across the three states studied reserved their 
harshest critiques for cruel husbands who chose to pursue attacks while their intended 
victims attempted to flee or fell to the ground.  The sheer physical force employed by 
violent men virtually guaranteed that many women would end up on the floor at some 
point during an assault. Quite often the most dangerous injuries resulted from the fall 
itself and not the prior blows. Witnesses described how Virginian John Mullens, during 
his four-year marriage with Mary Ann Mullens, would strike his wife with such “great 
violence” as to make her “stagger” and nearly collapse. As an indicator of the force that 
John used, in one instance when a blow intended for his wife missed its mark, it “fell on 
the stove pipe—in which it made a deep indention.” Once a woman was down on the 
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ground, the attack could develop in a variety of ways. In the best of circumstances, the 
husband would choose to end the assault. Then, the determination of cruelty would be 
based upon his actions up until that point. Unfortunately, this was usually not the case, 
and domestic conflicts would generally persist in their development. Part of the 
progression could involve a husband dragging his wife around the floor, generally by the 
hair, continuing the assault. He “did then and there, in a violent and brutal manner drag 
her over the yard,” read one Texas woman’s account of cruelty. Another Texas woman 
recalled how she escaped from her irate husband only to be found again by him at which 
point he “draged her about by the hair for the half a mile back home.” Grabbing a handful 
of hair from above generally prevented a woman from attempting to make a successful 
escape, or possible counter-attack. In this very primitive manifestation of physical 
dominance, husbands sought to totally cow their wives into submission. Dragging also 
resulted in few visible injuries, thus making it possible for a man to plausibly deny a 
woman’s allegations of cruelty in court. This defense only worked if no other witnesses 
came forward to describe the assault.
13
  
 As a wife lay upon the ground, her husband could also escalate the degree of 
bodily injury by kicking. Wisconsin wives, in particular, requested relief from kick-prone 
cruel husbands. The specific nature of their complaints can be partially attributed to the 
attire of the area. Many Wisconsin men worked as loggers, lumberjacks, and outdoor 
                                                          
13
 Mary Ann Mullens v. John Mullens (1851), LVA-Ly (first and second quotes); Elizabeth Graves v. John 
W. Graves (1854), DCTX-AC (third quote); Mary Dunn v. J. K. Dunn (1858), DCTX-GuC (fourth quote). 
For instances of husbands knocking wives on the ground see, Julia Childs v. Joseph Childs (1860), SHRL-
JeC; Marg Leitenberg v. Anton Leitenberg (1857), DCTX-FC; Sarah Smith v. Archelas Smith (1856), 
DCTX-BC; Mary West v. John West (1861), EC-EC. For examples of hair dragging see, Elizabeth Herman 
v. Henry Herman (1858), DCTX-ComC; Elizabeth Behrens v. Johann Behrens (1855), DCTX-GC; 
Dorothea Mohr v. George Mohr (1857), MIL-MC; Maria Burrucker v. Friedrick Burrucker (nd), WHS-
DC; Martha Revely v. John Revely (1853), LVA-Ly; Patsey Slack v. Josiah Slack (1852), LVA-No. 
74 
 
laborers and wore heavy boots with regularity. This choice in footwear made any ensuing 
kicking assaults all the more brutal. The Baraboo Republic newspaper reported that a 
“miserable brute of a husband” appeared before the Police Court on charges of “kicking 
his wife with great heavy boots, so that she was nearly killed.” He was freed after she 
refused to testify against him. This woman’s choice to stay silent indicates that the nature 
of cruelty was very much up for debate in the antebellum period. Although legal officials 
recognized her husband’s behavior as worthy of censure, she may or may not have 
agreed. And, even if she believed that he had behaved cruelly, the necessities of survival 
might have required that she rescue her abuser and attempt to salvage the relationship. 
After all, life for a single woman in rural Wisconsin possessed hardships of its own.
14
 
  While kicking could be used to inflict real damage, it was also present in the 
records as a form of general harassment. The Hersey marriage lasted less than one year. 
On their wedding trip, George Hersey demonstrated that aside from being border-line 
suicidal, he also possessed a maniacal temper. When travelling in rail cars he would push 
his wife, Caroline, up against the side of the car, injuring her “very much.” Then, upon 
their arrival at one of the hotels, he “insisted in sleeping with his feet” in Caroline’s face, 
which could have been harmless except for the fact that he then proceeded to kick her 
“with all his might” in the face. He also held her against the bed wall “with his feet for 
some time” until she begged for release. On the same trip, he grabbed a pair of “heavy 
soled cow-hide boots” and swore that he would knock her brains out. For George, feet 
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and footwear were his preferred domestic weapons, until he finally deserted his wife in 
April 1857. Under normal circumstances, the wedding tour was an opportunity to enjoy 
one’s spouse and revel in the marital state. In contrast, George embarked upon this 
journey with a goal of showing his new wife exactly what it meant to live under his rule. 
His actions suggest a desire to literally trample his wife’s health and happiness 
underfoot.
15
  
Unlike George, the vast majority of husbands still preferred to use the power of 
their hands to perpetrate cruelties against their wives. Choking, or placing both hands 
around another person’s neck and applying pressure, appeared frequently within the 
records. Wives and witnesses who sought cruelty rulings on the basis of choking 
incidents tried to argue that this particular form of intimate violence was almost always 
detrimental to life and served no purpose related to domestic mastery. As it did not fall 
under the rubric of chastisement, choking was an illegitimate use of violence requiring 
regulation by the courts and community. To bolster their arguments, wifely litigants 
would describe being choked “nearly to death” all the while listening to their husbands 
snarled death threats. When husbands expressed their lethal intentions during choking 
attacks, their comments would then be repeated in a courtroom setting. For example, a 
Wisconsin court heard how local husband John Curliss seized his wife by the throat and 
declared, “I believe by God I’ll shut off your breath and the sooner it’s done the better.” 
John’s comments turned an already violent attack into a clear situation of cruelty by 
uniting deadly intent with harmful action. Moreover, wives and witnesses framed 
choking as a particularly intimate and opportunistic form of cruelty. The records indicate 
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that husbands generally initiated choking attacks in the bedroom, the most sacred of 
domestic spaces. A pattern emerged in which a man would sneak up on his wife while 
she lay asleep in bed. Then, when he was close enough he would wrap his hands around 
her neck, perhaps smothering her with a pillow as well. This manner of approach allowed 
for maximum surprise as well as leverage. After properly positioning his hands a man 
could squeeze and, in the process, cut off all oxygen available to the victim. As related by 
women in court, these incidents often proceeded with an eerie calmness as a person who 
is being choked immediately loses some capacity to control body movement. In a similar 
fashion as hair-pulling, choking could be used to place the entirety of the victim’s body 
under the attacker’s control.16 
Armed with limited medical knowledge, antebellum men and women struggled to 
identify and understand the biological hazards associated with choking. Modern-day 
society, fed by a variety of academic and popular studies, recognizes choking as one of 
the clearest indicators of malicious, even fatal, intent on the part of husbands towards 
wives. However, antebellum observers and courtroom participants did not have the 
benefit of wide-ranging analyses and therefore relied upon popular perceptions of 
violence. To assess the extent of injury, individuals would reference either body markings 
or the degree of deprivation of oxygen. To fulfill this evidentiary requirement, a Texas 
wife, Sarah Burdett, asserted that the bruises on her throat from her husband’s attack 
lingered for a “long time.” It was not uncommon to find wives within the records who 
lived with finger prints on their necks for weeks or months. Although an asset in a 
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divorce proceeding, the presence of bruises prompted much public gossip and 
questioning. As such, some women would occasionally devise ways to conceal the 
physical evidences of abuse. The eleven-year-old son of Rachel and Augustus Gardner 
recalled in his deposition how his mother “wore a handkerchief on her neck for several 
days” following a physical domestic dispute in order to “hide the marks.” Interestingly 
enough, the records suggest that bruises alone were generally not enough to sustain a 
cruelty ruling. Indeed, as the argument went, some women bruised easily and wounds of 
this sort, typically, did not impair overall functionality. To get a divorce on these 
grounds, a woman needed to prove that choking was a form of wife torture.
17
  
Elizabeth Waid’s case is illustrative in this context. In her bill to the Franklin 
County, Virginia, chancery court, Elizabeth claimed that her husband “several years ago 
in a fit of drunkenness and rage, while in bed...caught her rudely by the neck and 
violently choked her, leaving the prints of his fingers upon her flesh for many days.” A 
few weeks later he choked her again, but this time he also hit her about the head and 
“kicked her in the abdomen & groins with great violence, knocking her speechless and 
senseless, and also biting out of her hand a large piece of flesh.” Determined to pursue a 
divorce after these two attacks, Elizabeth approached the court only to delay filing after 
her husband promised to reform. He later continued his cruel actions, albeit in new forms, 
and she re-instigated her divorce action. Within her statement to the court, Elizabeth 
emphasized how her husband acted out of “rage” and without reason. His animalistic 
attacks, including hand-biting, served no larger purpose except to humiliate and injure 
                                                          
17
 Sarah Burdett v. Henry Burdett (1844), DCTX-AuC (first quote); Rachel Gardner v. Augustus Gardner 
(1859), WHS-DC (second quote). One of the articles that has garnered more recent, and widespread, 
attention is a study pointing to choking as an clear indicator of possible spousal murder, see Nancy Glass 
et. al., “Non-Fatal Strangulation is an Important Risk Factor for Homicide of Women,” Journal of 
Emergency Medicine, 35 (October 2008): 329-335. 
78 
 
her. Moreover, Elizabeth drew attention to the brutal elements of their confrontations by 
using terms such as “violently” and “rudely” to describe her husband’s behaviors. As a 
result of her attention to detail, Elizabeth presented a very convincing bill before the 
court.
18
  
 The most legally compelling choking cases, however, centered upon those 
moments in which a woman’s breath left her body and the attack became imminently 
fatal. Depriving one’s spouse of vital oxygen clearly qualified as cruelty, if not attempted 
murder. The challenge for litigants was to convince a judge and jury that the physical 
conflict in question had gotten to that point. As such, injured spouses called upon those 
witnesses who could provide minute-by-minute commentaries of the day’s events. A 
person requested to appear in court in this capacity might give an estimate as to the 
number of minutes that the victim went without breath or the ability to speak. Common 
sense dictated that the severity of the overall injury coincided with the length of these 
impairments. Sometimes the information was less specific, such as when a witness 
recalled a woman being choked “almost to insensibility.”19 Choking was clearly a 
terrifying event, and wives struggled to make others feel the vulnerability and fear that 
characterized those cruel moments. To that end, the testimony of a child witness proved 
enormously useful. George Compton appeared before the court and described how he 
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was awakened from sleep one night by his mother running to his bed claiming that his 
father was going to kill her. Almost immediately his father then arrived and caught her 
and “pulled her loose” from George’s hands. Then, as George recollected, “my father put 
his hand over her throat for her breath seemed to stop.” The recognition of the lethal 
possibility of the attack prompted George to action and he “caught hold” of his father, 
allowing his mother to escape to a neighbor’s house. While the son knew that his father 
was behaving cruelly, he had to wait for a certain level of danger to be attained before 
acting in defense of his mother. If he interfered prematurely, he ran the risk of being 
subjected to abuse as well. However, in the courtroom setting, George demonstrated with 
clarity that his mother suffered under cruelty via the application and apprehension of 
severe bodily injury at the hands of her husband, George’s father.20 
As we move away from direct, body to body, physical assaults by men, we turn 
our attention to those husbands who perpetrated cruelties against their wives with the aid 
of outside weapons. Unlike slapping, pinching, kicking, or choking, whipping appeared 
to constitute, if anything, a traditional form of chastisement. A history of whipping within 
U.S. households extends well prior to the antebellum period. In colonial families, 
husbands served as the hierarchal heads of households and, as such, they needed to keep 
their dependents in line, even if this required corporal punishment. In order to ensure that 
all men chastised their dependents with restraint, an informal ‘rule of thumb’ developed 
and eventually made its way into courtrooms as a general assessment of proper 
correction. According to a recent scholar, the ‘rule of thumb’ in England and the United 
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States stated that if a husband beat his wife with a stick or switch “about the size of one 
of his fingers (but not as large as a man’s thumb),” he should be left “immune from 
prosecution.” In theory, this restriction would limit the possibility for an emotional 
outburst and would also lessen the severity of damage inflicted on a wife’s body. 
Although colonial courts regularly applied this threshold in domestic management cases, 
historians have generally argued that the ‘rule of thumb’ was all but gone by the 
antebellum period. The evidence within this study suggests that this is only partially true. 
It finds that Virginians rarely referenced the rule of thumb because they were already in 
the midst of tightening the restrictions connected with marital chastisement. In this 
context, they believed that the rule allowed for too much tolerance for the practices of 
domestic tyrants. On the other hand, Texans looked to the rule as a general guideline. 
They hoped to use it as a tool to regulate mastery with an eye towards the needs of 
frontier families. Wisconsin residents mentioned the rule the most frequently with 
husbands claiming the concept was too restricting and wives lamenting that it allowed 
brutal husbands too much behavioral freedom.
21
  
As their differing applications of the rule indicate, the three states took varying 
approaches to cases involving whippings perpetrated by husbands towards wives. Many 
men in Virginia and Texas utilized whipping as a tool in the management of household 
dependents. According to the logic of southern mastery, a whipping kept dependents in 
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line while lessening the possibility of a power struggle. In their divorce documents, 
husbands would repeatedly reference a dialogue of familial control that all members of 
society were able to understand, if not necessarily agree with. The general belief was that 
a chink in the husband’s armor of authority caused, for example, by a disruptive wife, 
could result in other dependents questioning or challenging their positions within the 
household. As scholars have observed, masculine authority in the South proved 
particularly important as it was critical to maintaining a slave society. Whipping was a 
common form of punishment used upon the enslaved, and this practice extended to other 
household members. The “most important commonality” between slavery and marriage, 
according to Nancy Cott, “was the master-husband’s power to command the dependent.” 
Southern husbands, therefore, employed whipping as a way to remind their wives of their 
position in the family order. One husband was overheard stating that, “he had as much 
right to whip her [his wife] as he had to whip one of his horses.” However, as the 
antebellum period progressed, even southern husbands found their rights of chastisement 
coming under increasingly under attack. Moreover, whipping was at the center of a 
growing discussion regarding the line between the proper practice of authority and 
domestic cruelty.
22
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In matters of authority, James Flinn’s answer to his wife’s divorce petition is 
instructional. Following the standard format, he admitted that they had married many 
years prior to his wife’s bill. He also mentioned that, yes, he was indeed hurt by his wife 
accusing him of insanity. Accusations such as these, according to James, “were well 
calculated to make a bastards heart bleed.” But he was prepared to live with her oddities 
until the point at which she attempted to subvert his direct authority in his own home.  
Namely, she placed herself in the doorway of the house with a knife and refused to allow 
him entrance. Claiming to be at the limit of his benevolent tolerance, James “thereupon 
broke from the bough of a peach tree, a switch with which he restored peace to his house 
and family.” His wife, “alarmed at this exercise of authority...ceased with her menaces & 
became quiet.” According to this logic, the most effective way of bringing about peace in 
a southern home was to use violence. James recognized that he should not resort to such 
violence immediately and, in his closing remarks, reiterated that “he has not exercised 
over her [his wife] any authority, much less practiced cruelty, over her, which was not in 
his judgment essential to the due regulation and peace of his family.” James’s statement 
reinforced the idea of a controlled, and limited, chastisement as an unpleasant, but 
essential part of society. In James’s opinion, cruelty only occurred when a husband 
moved closer to enacting the rule of thumb. It is interesting to note, however, that James 
also dehumanized his wife by never mentioning any of the physical consequences of the 
whipping itself. She “became quiet” but he offered no other information on her bodily 
condition post-incident.
23
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When looking at the experiences of James Flinn and other Virginia husbands, a 
historian discovers significant evidence to support a theory of embattled southern 
domestic authority. These husbands were operating in an environment in which the 
relationship of honor and mastery was increasingly fraught. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese 
describes how family organized southern society and was seen as the “bulwark” against 
“disorderly social change,” not the site of change. To be perceived as honorable and to 
maintain the stability of southern society, a man must not only govern his dependents but 
do so in a proper manner. The definition of “proper” served as the battlefield for debates 
over domestic authority. In the face of criticisms focusing on the violence and inhumanity 
of the southern slave system as well as general campaigns against corporal punishment, 
Virginia husbands still argued for their right to chastise dependents. But this was an 
increasingly limited right, at least with regards to marital rule.  The whipping of slaves, 
according to historian Ariela Gross, “did not amount to cruelty because it was the usual 
punishment.”24 But, in contrast, the whipping of wives potentially constituted a cruel 
violation of southern conjugal norms. And, household heads could face challenges from 
the unlikeliest of sources. Consider, for example, the case of Margaret Compton of 
Rappahannock County, Virginia. She filed a divorce petition claiming that her husband 
had choked her, whipped her, and kicked her out of their house. A nearby neighbor, 
Elizabeth Dowden, recalled one of the conversations that she had with John Compton 
regarding the treatment of his wife. When Elizabeth asked him to “quit abusing” his wife, 
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John replied by saying that “he would do as he pleased...if she [his wife] did not do better 
he would get switches and whip her or confine her in some place, until she was better.” In 
his response, John not only asserted his right to chastise Margaret, but also made it clear 
that he was the person who determined if she acted “better” or not. This case file 
demonstrates how community members, such as the neighbor Elizabeth, could call into 
question a man’s right to rule. Although James and John might have felt justified in their 
actions, they lived in a society increasingly skeptical of the traditional practices 
associated with chastisement, especially when those ‘punishments’ were visited upon 
southern white women.
25
 
Texas men also struggled to delineate the boundaries of proper mastery, yet they 
differed from Virginians by more freely turning to cruelty as a tool for marital 
management. The environment of frontier Texas presented many challenges for settlers, 
and traditional gender norms began to erode under the pressures of such conditions. 
Husbands would often respond to these changes by using cruelty to push their wives back 
into a state of ‘proper’ subordination and dependency. When questioned about his 
actions, one Texas husband defended his cruelties by stating that his wife insisted on 
“interfering with his business and wished him implicitly to follow her rule, indeed desired 
to be master of all and was not content to be mistress of his house.” Therefore, he would 
whip her or hit her in an attempt to “maintain the dignity of his position as husband.” The 
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home sphere was one area in which men demanded to maintain control, a haven of 
authority in an unsettled environment.
26
  
Unsatisfied with merely accepting a husband’s word that his wife deserved 
corporal punishment, southerners created an active dialogue focusing upon the varying 
degrees of cruelty encapsulated within wife whippings. When assessing the severity of a 
whipping and, therefore, the possibility of cruelty, Virginians considered a variety of 
factors. To begin with, what weapon was used? The weapons can generally be divided 
into sticks and proper ‘traditional’ whips. Sticks were often small branches grabbed from 
nearby trees. A ‘good’ whipping stick or branch was pliable enough to support a quick 
striking motion while also not breaking under the pressure of the blows.  A traditional 
whip was usually an item used around the house, often to control animals, which became 
a weapon upon its usage against a human being, usually a dependent of some sort. 
Cowhide, wagon, and horse whips were all mentioned frequently in the records. A whip 
was an easily accessible weapon of choice. If an area had trees or animals, a husband had 
a ready-made whip.
27
  
Some husbands cruelly prepared in advance to administer whippings. This type of 
pre-meditation demonstrated that their actions were not in response to a domestic breach, 
but rather the outgrowth of a twisted habit. This is only somewhat surprising considering 
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that, as other studies of violence have shown, instruments of violence can occasionally be 
the focus of fetishization. Essentially, an individual or group can develop an almost 
obsessive focus on a certain weapon; such was the experience of John Clopton. He was a 
husband, a father, and a violent abuser. He preferred to injure his wife with whipping 
assaults in which he would “attack with horse whips, cowhides, sticks anything he could 
get ahold of.” Not to be limited in his behaviors, Clopton would perpetrate these cruelties 
in front of neighbors and even while his wife was pregnant. At one point a female friend 
of his wife observed “splinters” in Mary Clopton’s head after an assault. But, as a 
Clopton daughter would claim, her father truly preferred to mete out abuse with his 
special “cowhide which he said he had made for that express purpose.” The daughter 
described how her father tested out this device by hitting her mother on the body and 
head until “her eyes were so swolled that she could not see.” Apparently satisfied with his 
work, her father then proclaimed that he intended to use the cowhide whip to kill her 
mother “by piecemeals” so that he would have no fear of “being hanged” as a wife 
murderer. Clopton’s preparation and planning transformed what could have been a 
‘typical’ cruel whipping into premeditated wife torture. His wife lived in a state of 
constant apprehension of physical violence, which Clopton fed by his bizarre behaviors. 
A proper patriarch sought familial and marital stability, not conflict.
28
 
Southerners also made particular note of the number and nature of the ‘stripes’ 
inflicted on a woman’s body. As the emotions of the situation often did not allow an 
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exact count, witnesses would often provide an estimate as to the number of blows. It was 
generally believed that a “few” stripes, though cruel, were excusable, whereas “many” 
were, literally, harsh beyond measure. Again, when in doubt, individuals would focus on 
the body itself for answers. They would describe the nature of the marks left behind on 
the woman’s skin. During one episode in which James Fulford “inflicted punishment” on 
Rosina, his wife, he left long bloody lines on her back and “contusions of the flesh which 
remained for one week.” A beating such as this could result in Rosina being permanently 
disfigured, a gross violation of the protection owed to wives by husbands in Virginia and 
Texas. The location of the blows was also important, with the majority usually falling on 
the body but occasionally on the face. Stripes on the face were deemed very serious 
because they could lead to scarring or even blindness. A resultant facial deformity could 
then diminish a woman’s public standing, thus satisfying the cruelty threshold of 
permanent damage.
29
 
The violation of a wife’s body by her husband during whipping reached another 
level of unacceptability if, by chance, the woman’s nakedness was exposed. The 
whipping then damaged a woman’s chastity by presenting her body to other dependents 
and to the general public. As historians of slavery have shown, the abolitionist movement 
was particularly effective at using these types of images of slave women to elicit empathy 
among white women and men. Even in Virginia, the whipping of a white woman to the 
point at which she ‘lost’ her chastity, meaning her naked body was on display, was a 
major misuse of mastery and a case of marital cruelty. In a moment of deep intoxication, 
William Waid committed such a cruelty on his wife Elizabeth when he “jerked her off of 
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the bed, stripped her clothing above her waist, and inflicted upon her naked limbs and the 
lower part of her person a most severe and cruel whipping with switches, cutting her skin 
in a number of places.” As a result, she was unable to sit for numerous days. And, to 
heighten the humiliation, her fifteen-year-old son was there to witness the entire incident. 
The son, Wingfield, would later recall how his mother had begged his father to desist 
even as he continued to “wear out” a “handful of switches” on her. As historians of the 
U.S. South have documented, southern honor dictated that a husband was supposed to 
protect his wife’s chastity and virtue, by lethal force if necessary, so whippings of this 
sort violated marital norms on multiple levels. And, “as white women were not expected 
to defend insults on their own behalf,” victimized southern wives looked to the courts for 
assistance.
30
  
However, it would be a mistake to stereotype these women as shrinking violets in 
constant need of male rescue. In fact, their court statements indicate that injured women 
not only desired, but expected, justice. For example, lawyers in an 1843 case would 
sarcastically claim, “It is for the Court to say whether striping an aged and respectable 
Female of her clothing and inflicting stripes upon her back with a cowhide” constitutes 
“legal cruelty.” Their sixty-year-old client, Anne Souther, had been whipped in this 
manner on at least one occasion by her forty-five-year-old husband. As Anne related to a 
friend of hers, she had decided that she could put up with a variety of cruel acts on the 
part of her husband, but she would not submit to whippings and filed for divorce. Anne’s 
lawyers believed hers to be an open and shut case of marital cruelty. By proceeding in an 
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overly deferential manner to the court, they implied that the public consensus was already 
formed in their clients favor.
31
 
Aside from using their hands, whips, and sticks as weapons, spouses would also 
transform regular household items into dangerous objects. As a continuation of the 
pattern discussed up until this point, it appears as if husbands in Virginia used the most 
‘innocuous’ weapons set, followed by Texans, with Wisconsin husbands opting for more 
deadly tools of cruelty. While husbands might have reached for weapons in a 
spontaneous fashion, they chose the items that best suited their overall intent. Men also 
had the option to use objects that women were less able to wield as effectively, such as 
chairs. Across all three states, husbands were accused of throwing chairs at their wives or 
using chairs to beat their wives. In particular, Virginia husbands would grab tongs, 
skillets, or other household items in domestic conflicts. As described in the previous 
chapter, knives and guns were also available, but this set of husbands did not wish to 
generally kill their wives, although many threatened it. Moving on to Texas, we find a 
wider variety of weapons used. Chairs, boards, glass bottles, and tailor’s shears were only 
a handful of the weapons mentioned. Of course, Texas husbands also grabbed their fair 
share of odd objects with which to assault their wives. For example, John Pratt struck his 
wife “in the mouth with a wing of Turkey which bruised her face.” And Peter Betz threw 
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an umbrella at his wife, while James Barrett preferred to lob socks and glass bottles in his 
wife’s general direction.32  
If we turn our gaze to Wisconsin, we find the same weapons listed above with the 
addition of more purposefully deadly items, handled with a desire to commit serious 
injury. Many Wisconsin husbands looking for a domestic weapon would perhaps throw a 
wash basin at their wives or strike them with a fire shovel, pitcher, pail, iron spoon, 
teacup, table fork, candlestick, teapot, or a hammer. However, if those items did not 
result in the degree of physical damage desired, a husband might reach for a more 
dangerous item. Husbands could even throw pitchforks at their wives. Given the general 
agricultural nature of Wisconsin society, this tool was readily available and could be 
injurious from quite a distance. William Bryerton, after a fierce drinking fit, grabbed a 
pitchfork and threw it at his wife through a window, in the process breaking out “three or 
four lights of glass.” Luckily, his wife managed to dodge the fork and escape mostly 
unharmed. Wives recognized that a pitchfork was a “deadly weapon” and, in the case of 
Margaret Lewis, they would state this fact to the court.
33
  
The axe was one of the most frequently mentioned, and one of the most harmful, 
weapons wielded by Wisconsin husbands. Regular articles in local newspapers described 
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what could happen when husbands took their cruelties too far and actually murdered their 
wives with axes. The particularly violent story of Adam Rettig provides a singular 
example of marital discord. As reported by The Daily Milwaukee News, Rettig was a 
farmer near Milwaukee who, while his wife was kneeling down performing housework, 
grabbed an axe and “dealt her a dreadful blow on the head, breaking in her skull, and 
knocking her senseless to the floor.  Not satisfied with this, the wretched man then took a 
kettle of boiling water and poured it over her from head to foot, while she still lived and 
shrieked in tortures worse than death.” He then fatally shot himself in the head with a 
rifle.
34
 Although this was an admittedly extreme situation, Wisconsin wives in divorce 
papers described scarily similar scenarios within their own households. Harriet Ann 
Davey lost the use of her left arm after one such attack. Harriet and her husband Thomas, 
both English emigrants to Wisconsin, never lived peacefully together. He always found 
fault with her and could quickly turn violent. In one incident, Thomas knocked her to the 
floor and then swung an axe at her “which she partially avoided,” the blow landing on her 
neck and shoulder. As she lay “senseless” on the floor, he then took a razor, dipped it in 
her blood, and spread the report that she had cut her own throat. His plan did not work, 
however, because she lived to tell the tale and it became “understood in the neighborhood 
that he had struck her with an axe.” Thomas Davey’s action led to not only a divorce suit, 
but also a criminal assault case. Although this dissertation does not focus on criminal 
cases, the evidence suggests that domestic disputes in Wisconsin were walking a very 
fine line between life and death.
35
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The elevated and ferocious nature of marital violence in Wisconsin owed a great 
deal to husbands reacting to the pressures of maintaining domestic control in a topsy-
turvy society. Wisconsin society in the 1840s and 1850s was still a frontier, characterized 
by clashing cultures and harsh environmental conditions. As such, husbands and wives 
could look to a wide variety of gender models when creating their own households. 
Unlike in the South, Wisconsin men did not have a system of honor or the subordination 
of an enslaved people to bolster their domestic rule. Therefore, it appears as if Wisconsin 
men took their cues from the violence that they witnessed in their communities and 
perpetrated physical marital cruelties as part of a quest to reinforce their authority as the 
heads of households. In a manner similar to what Christine Stansell observed for 
antebellum New York, this study finds that Wisconsin’s violent men often acted out of 
“an attempt to recapture and enforce older kinds of masculine authority.” In this context, 
every domestic argument could be seen through the lens of embattled masculine rule. 
These anxieties partially explain why violence could erupt out of seemingly trivial 
disagreements. For example, Horatio Castle threw a butcher knife at his wife because he 
“wanted a different piece of meat on his plate.” In general, Wisconsin husbands reacted 
in cruel ways because they felt as if constant displays of domestic control might 
somehow shore-up their fragile frontier mastery.
36
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Thus far, this chapter has discussed the behavior of, and societal perceptions 
surrounding, the physically cruel husband in antebellum America. It has argued that 
physical cruelty occurred if a man ‘punished’ his spouse in an overly emotional way or if 
his actions resulted in permanent bodily injury. Across the three states studied, 
communities expected male household heads to behave in a controlled manner and to 
protect, not hinder, the productivity of their dependents. While it is clear that husbands 
were the most frequent perpetrators of physical marital cruelty, the cruel actions of wives 
should not be overlooked by scholars. The current historiography of marital discord 
focuses primarily on the actions of men, at the same time painting any evidence of 
violence by women as trivial, rare, or defensive. In the works that do mention women as 
violent actors and men as victims, only a few pages are devoted to the topic. In his 
multiple studies on antebellum domestic violence, David Peterson del Mar refrains from 
discussing violent women and defends his choice by asserting that “husband abuse” was 
“rare.” While Peterson del Mar is factually correct, the minority presence of violent 
women is not a valid reason to exclude them from study. As Linda Gordon and Victoria 
Bynum have astutely argued, “placing subordinate people center stage need not trivialize 
the effects of institutionalized oppression. Nor should viewing women as active agents of 
their own lives suggest that they were to blame for their own oppression.” Studying the 
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lives of violent women does not minimize or trivialize the challenges posed by 
patriarchal rule in antebellum America.
37
  
Utilizing a gendered approach to the study of cruelty, the remainder of this 
chapter explores what happens when we take women’s marital physical violence 
seriously. It also considers what it means for antebellum men to be victims of physical 
abuse. This analysis is significant, in part, because we, as historians, know a great deal 
about the ideals of womanhood, yet we still need information regarding the actions of 
those women who lived at the opposite spectrum of the norm. As individuals struggled to 
understand the actions and motivations of cruel wives, they outlined how wives/husbands 
should behave and how marriages should proceed. This study argues that an antebellum 
wife committed cruelty if she permanently injured her spouse or if her actions severely 
impaired his labor productivity. The records also indicate that southern wives generally 
refrained from committing the most lethal forms of cruelty against their husbands. When 
they contested a husband’s domestic authority, they did so in ways calculated to achieve 
maximum impact with minimum danger. In contrast, Wisconsin wives were more likely 
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to use dangerous weapons, include threats against life, and conduct attacks focusing on a 
husband’s domestic and business contributions. The presence of frontier conditions 
fostered gender role instabilities that resulted in Wisconsin wives feeling uncertain as to 
their exact place within the home. This, in turn, led to women pushing for more 
autonomy in their marital relationships.
38
 
 Finding extended descriptions of physically cruel wives within the court records 
poses a challenge for several reasons. As mentioned earlier, fewer cases exist as women 
were less likely than their male counterparts to perpetrate physical assaults upon their 
spouses. In addition, husbands were generally hesitant to pursue a divorce on the grounds 
of physical cruelty. A claim of this nature required a man to come before a group of his 
peers and relate a story of how his wife had managed to physically dominate him. This 
admission would speak directly to man’s inability to control dependents on the most 
basic of levels. As Hartog has stated, “The corollary of wife’s obedience was husband’s 
authority.” For southern men, these statements could also signify the loss of a man’s 
honor, leaving him in a position of weakness and womanhood. Essentially, the assault 
itself was the initial trauma, but coming before a court to relive the incident was 
damaging as well. With an awareness of the limitations presented by the source materials, 
it then becomes necessary to look very closely at the existing petitions that describe 
women’s physical cruelties.39 
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 In general, wives were less likely to perpetrate direct physical attacks on their 
husbands sans weapons. Engaging in hand-to-hand combat required a measure of 
physical superiority that many women clearly did not possess. If a woman attacked in this 
way, she could very quickly find the tables turned on her and end up the recipient of 
abuse at the hands of her intended victim, her husband. It is clear from the records that 
women generally understood the dangers of close physical proximity when conducting 
their assaults and therefore attempted to proceed from a distance. However, some women 
ignored all dangers to their own well-being and proceeded to boldly attack their husbands 
with blows and slaps. One husband described how his wife would use abusive language 
and “beat [him] with her hands” which “greatly annoyed and injured his feelings.” In 
stark contrast to the complaints presented by injured wives, when husbands were the 
victims they rarely counted the number of blows or slaps or even recorded the location of 
their injuries. Instead, they typically described a frenzy of hits. Riley Pratt, a Texas man, 
alleged that soon after marriage his wife “commenced such a system of persecution, 
upbraidings and criminations as to make his house a place of torment.” Aside from 
expressing a general “aversion” to him, Elizabeth Pratt also “struck him and fought him a 
number of times.” His recollection of events was intended to draw attention to 
Elizabeth’s prolonged attack on his authority, therefore the stories he related only needed 
to sketch the outlines of her cruelties.
40
  
Husbands also argued that a particularly violent solo blow by a wife could 
constitute cruelty, depending on the physical aftereffects. Hits on the face were the 
subjects of particular attention. After nine years of marriage, the union of Mary and 
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Richmond Oliver was in a state of disarray. Mary came before the Portage County, 
Wisconsin, court claiming that Oliver was an exceedingly cruel man, often in the habit of 
whipping and choking her. In response to Mary’s petition, Oliver denied everything and 
countered that his wife was actually the cruel partner. As such, he provided a detailed 
account of a September 1858 incident in which Mary struck him with her fist on the 
chord of his neck, “which raised a lump thereon as large as a hen’s egg and rendered it 
exceedingly painful.” To Oliver, this assault constituted cruelty as it resulted in the 
unnecessary infliction of pain. Moreover, he wanted the court to recognize the public 
humiliation associated with carrying around the physical evidence of this confrontation 
for all to see. The records indicate that wives could also disfigure their husbands by 
scratching the men’s faces, arms, or other body parts. These attacks were generally 
described as animalistic in nature, characterized by the spontaneous release of angry 
emotions. A Virginia husband, for example, complained that his wife “repeatedly 
attempted to chastise him” with a broom stick. When he then pulled the broom stick out 
of her hands she flew at his face, serrating it “severely” and leaving “three imprints of her 
nails.” He immediately went to the local justice of the peace and exhibited the marks 
upon his face as evidence of her assault. In similar complaints, other husbands attested to 
the fact that scratching attacks could result in deep facial lacerations and even scarring.
41
  
Many wives also relied upon non-bodily weapons during instances of domestic 
discord. Eschewing traditional weapons, such as guns or knives, women most frequently 
transformed household items into assaultive tools. They relied upon what they knew. For 
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example, a domestic cleaning implement might turn into a club while in the hands of a 
cruel wife. Men, including Wisconsin’s Robert Vill, would complain to the courts that 
their spouses had assaulted and beaten them with “broom sticks” on the head or on other 
parts of the body. Vill’s wife also “tried to strike him on the head with an iron pot.” 
Archibald Hinton, of Texas, was beaten severely until he managed to remove the broom 
from his wife’s hand. Some wives grew creative in their efforts and actually tried to 
utilize all parts of the broom. In Harrison County, Texas, Alfred and Susan Council were 
married in December 1855. Only a few years later, Susan attempted to poison Alfred by 
mixing toxins in with his daily medicine pills. While he lay in bed near death, Susan 
taunted him by saying, “that the pills were curing him and that he looked better than he 
ever did.” After making a semi-full recovery, Alfred had more obstacles awaiting him. 
One day when he returned home from the field with sores on his legs from the bugs, his 
wife proceeded to stick the “jagged and rough ends” of a broom into the open wounds. 
Susan turned a regular household item into a weapon, and Alfred was completely unsure 
how to react, although he clearly considered her actions to be cruelty and felt confident 
that others would agree.
42
  
When wives reached for the items that they felt comfortable handling with force, 
their hands also might alight upon shovels, candlesticks, fire tongs, or even churn dashes. 
In his daily diary Virginia resident William Matthews Blackford recalled how one 
“domestic feud” between a neighbor couple “came to a head” due to a battle over 
candlesticks. A Mr. Dabney was attempting to take a pair of candlesticks to be restored 
when Mrs. Dabney decided that she was not in agreement with his plan. She suddenly 
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pounced on her husband and “hit him on the head with one of the candlesticks...then put 
the fragment into the fire.” As Blackford recalled, this scene quickly became the “town 
talk” due to the gossip of slaves who had witnessed the entire episode. It was hinted that 
Mrs. Dabney, in part, committed this action out of desire to protest her husband’s 
perceived infringement on her domestic authority. As such, she ensured that her husband 
would think twice before even attempting the slightest alteration to ‘her’ possessions.43 
In particular, the kitchen served as a prime location for wives to express 
themselves in cruel ways. To begin with, as Jeffrey Adler has observed, this was a spot 
literally busting at the seams with possible domestic weapons that women could handle 
with great dexterity and expertise. After all, a wife was either the primary cook or she 
oversaw the cooking process, thus making it possible for her to throw hot coffee or tea on 
her husband without the man suspecting anything prior to the attack. Unlike the presence 
of traditional weapons, kitchen items aroused no alarm and allowed wives to get close to 
their targets. The court records relate how angry wives would look around the kitchen 
and take up all sorts of items that could inflict injury. A witness to one such attack, 
Hannibal Cox, recalled how this wife would strike her husband “with any instrument that 
she could get ahold of.” While eating in the kitchen, she would “take up cups, plates, 
knives, forks etc” and throw them at her husband, accompanied by words of hatred. 
Instead of holding/throwing a wide variety of kitchen items, wives could seize upon one 
particular object to wield against their husbands. Interestingly enough, even a seemingly 
innocuous table fork could turn into a dangerous weapon in the hands of wives. By 
resorting to personal violence and abusive language, Sarah Lee made her household a 
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place of discord instead of harmony. After her husband had successfully gathered a crop 
of wheat from the field, she proceeded to scatter the wheat on the ground and on the floor 
of the house, thereby ruining it. When her husband tried to interfere, she “gethered a table 
fork and attempted to stab” him in the chest. Failing at this initial attack, she then 
“gathered a skillet or baking oven of some six or seven pounds weight which then threw” 
at him with apparent success. Almost a year after the above incident, Sarah again 
attempted to take the life of husband by mixing poison in with the family’s milk supply. 
By the time that Sarah’s husband filed for divorce, the couple could no longer even eat in 
the same room together without breaking out in conflict.
44
  
Why was the kitchen such a prevalent site of cruelty by women? At its core, the 
kitchen represented ongoing marital conflicts focusing on gender roles and labor 
expectations. Across all three states, husbands expected their wives to be involved in the 
food preparation process. The final meal appearing on the table, even if not made by her 
own hands, was the wife’s responsibility. Wives, in contrast, could view the kitchen as a 
location of oppression. Daily food preparation, especially on the frontier, could descend 
from an art form into a stream of endless drudgery, which many wives resented. They 
also, of course, took issue when their husbands decided to criticize the meals, down to the 
smallest details. Therefore, the kitchen environment was primed for domestic conflict at 
its core. While living in Texas, Eveline Wade continually tried to demonstrate to her 
husband that she was the dominant actor in the kitchen space. Upon his arrival at meals, 
she would call him a wide variety of epithets before she would serve the food. On one 
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particular morning, David Wade came into the kitchen area to find Eveline setting up two 
breakfast plates, as usual. However, she held back the plates and waited for a gentleman 
boarder to arrive. She then sat at the table with the boarder and ate breakfast. David stood 
by in a state of clear shock. Not only did she leave him without breakfast, she gave his 
food to a paying stranger. Aside from this statement of control and choice, Eveline 
intermixed physical cruelty into the relationship as well by sometimes grabbing a 
hammer and hitting her husband on the temple.
45
 
The records suggest that, while some wives might attack perfectly healthy 
husbands, many others proceeded in an opportunistic fashion. Mounting assaults as their 
husbands were sleeping, weak, or injured these women attempted to eliminate the male 
advantage of strength. The situation of John and Charlotta Allridge, a Virginia couple, is 
illustrative. After nearly thirty years of marriage, John claimed he could no longer 
tolerate living as a “perfect martyr to the shrewish tempers of his wife.” He claimed that 
for many nights past he had been forced to leave to sleep in other locations due to her 
continual night attacks. Charlotte “often awoke him at night by the application of hot 
irons to his body and...would often seize him when asleep & scratch & abuse him with 
the ferocity of a tigress.” John admitted that he was particularly vulnerable while lying 
down. Other husbands complained that their wives behaved cruelly while they were sick 
and in bed. Texas wife Elizabeth Veasy hit her husband with a shoe three times while he 
was confined in bed and barely able to raise up. It is important to note, however, that the 
above accounts were based upon the words of husbands, so it is possible that the men 
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emphasized their own incapacity in order to minimalize the damage to manhood involved 
in admitting to being beaten by one’s wife. In his study of antebellum Virginia, Joshua 
Rothman observed that appearing in divorce proceedings was damaging to southern 
manhood and “this insecurity had to be compensated for by a proclamation of 
masculinity.”46  
It also appears as if men tried to excuse their own ineffectiveness in dealing with 
cruel wives by claiming that particular women might possess exceptional levels of 
strength. Again, a man could more readily explain why he succumbed to a beating by his 
wife if she was an Amazon and simply too strong to restrain. Appearing before the 
Wisconsin legislature, one husband asserted that he had to build a separate dwelling for 
himself in order to escape the evil machinations of his wife. According to his account, 
she was “a woman of remarkable physical prowess, stronger in muscle than most men.” 
He elaborated with examples of how she would stride around the house ripping off doors 
from hinges and breaking out windows with her bare hands. He concluded with a plea, “I 
fear that she will take my life, will beat and bruise me whenever she can get a chance.”  
This wife behaved cruelly because she made her husband fear great bodily injury at her 
hands.
47
  
Conflicts over the nature of household productivity often served as the precursors 
to cruel actions perpetrated by wives. While the possibly lazy husband could earn the ire 
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of a wife, women might also assault husbands for not performing domestic tasks in the 
‘correct’ way. In frontier areas, a thin line often separated the marital contributions of 
men and women, thus creating the possibility for battles of authority focused on specific 
tasks. Lucinda Smith, of Wisconsin, was in the habit of interfering with her husband’s 
farm work on a daily basis. She would refuse to cook meals for the hired help or would 
threaten suicide to distract him from his labors. While working with many other men to 
fence the perimeter of their property, Samuel Smith noticed that Lucinda came out to 
inspect their progress. Thinking nothing of her presence, the men continued to work until 
Lucinda commanded them to halt and ordered that they use a different sort of rails. When 
the men brushed her aside, she then ran over to the wagon and pushed the rails off. As 
Samuel shoved her away, she “raised her fist and struck” him on the nose, making it 
bleed as a result. In an unusual turn of events, the couple sat down later that evening and 
discussed what had happened. They “had a conversation in relation to their respective 
duties towards each other.” However, no real progress was made. While Samuel argued 
that he was the “head of the family and as such to be regarded by her,” Lucinda replied 
that she did not respect him in that role, whereupon she left the house. Through their 
critical actions and words, Lucinda and other wives attempted to impact the productive 
processes of their own households.
48
  
Wives could also perpetrate cruelties in order to enforce their right to perform 
their household tasks as they saw fit, without being subject to oversight by their 
husbands. Cruelty, in this sense, could provide a pathway to some measure of labor 
independence. Husbands often complained jointly of cruel neglect, described in a 
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following chapter, and physical cruelty. For example, one man related to the court how 
his wife refused to cook or do any other domestic work. As a side note, he added that she 
also regularly inflicted blows and scratches on his face. Wisconsin women, in particular, 
pushed for more autonomy in matters related to household productivity. Daily life on the 
frontier was difficult and couples required the labors of both partners to succeed. In this 
tense atmosphere, confusion over the basic distribution of domestic tasks prompted wives 
to commit rather severe acts of violence against their partners. One woman, Jane Patrick, 
grew tired of the stifling behaviors of her husband and his refusal to allow her to procure 
household goods without his “immediate inspection & surveillance.” Perhaps pushed too 
far by these constraints, Jane lashed out with sudden acts of violence, even seizing him 
by the throat during one altercation. In effect, Jane responded to her husband’s efforts at 
control with her own tactics intended to bolster her authority in the marriage.
49
  
In addition, if a husband behaved cruelly in a marriage, his wife might respond in 
kind. Essentially, a peaceful woman could grow violent in response to constant abuses at 
the hands of her husband. This phenomenon was well known and often appeared within 
the divorce records, as well as criminal cases from the period. Fourteen-year-old Caroline 
Brenig recalled how her mother and father had a difficulty one day that led to murder. 
Her father arrived home and demanded supper, at which point her mother placed some 
butter and cheese on the table. He then ordered her to make some coffee, which she put 
on the stove. As Caroline remembered, her father then “said it took to long and then he 
hit her [Caroline’s mother].” When Caroline asked why he struck her mother, he then 
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slapped the girl “more than once” so that her “nose bled.” The mother and daughter both 
left the house at that point to complete a few chores. A little while later Caroline’s mother 
ran out of the house screaming for her children to flee. It was later learned that the mother 
had struck her husband in the head with an axe several times, resulting in death. Clearly, 
not all abused wives went so far as to commit murder, but retaliatory cruelty or violence 
existed as a definite possibility.
50
  
This chapter has revealed that physical cruelty was often a byproduct of marital 
power struggles. Recognizing the stresses associated with marriage, society generally 
tolerated a limited amount of physical violence between spouses. A line was crossed, 
however, if a partner behaved in an overly emotional manner, resorted to violence with 
regularity, or permanently injured their counterpart. In Virginia and Texas, cruelty was 
understood in the context of chastisement and mastery. However, in Wisconsin spouses 
used cruelty as a tool as they jockeyed for position and power in the household and in the 
relationship. From the experiences of men and women across the three states studied, we 
learn that while many couples were heavily invested in refining their marriages towards 
the ideals of the period, other couples were simply trying to limit the bloodshed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXCESSES AND OUTRAGES:  
SEXUAL CRUELTY IN MARRIAGE 
 
Five years after her 1847 marriage, Christiana Wadkins appeared before a Texas 
district court requesting a divorce on the grounds of sexual cruelties, excesses, and 
outrages. She related a tale of deep discord describing how her husband, Samuel, spent 
most nights lost in drink, only occasionally getting up from his chair in order to chase her 
around the house.  If and when Samuel managed to catch her he would either drive her 
from the home or wrap his hands around her neck, applying pressure until she would pass 
out. Christiana told the court that she tolerated her husband’s violent behaviors, but drew 
the line when Samuel began to make sexual demands that she deemed dangerous, 
including forcing her to engage in intercourse even when she was “far gone with child.”  
In these moments of intimate terror, Samuel would proclaim that “if he could not kill her 
any other way he would in that.”1  
When Christiana approached the court she did so out of a desire for protection, 
but in the process of presenting her claims she fostered a judicial conversation that 
pushed at the boundaries of Victorian moral conventions. After all, her success depended 
upon the growing belief that society could, and often needed to, regulate the sexual 
practices of others. Even in the face of these developing concerns, passing judgment on 
the intimate actions of others proved no easy task for judges and juries who struggled 
with how to differentiate between expected marital obligations and dangerous demands.  
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Using personal documents and divorce records, this chapter explores how men 
and women in communities and households across Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin 
understood and defined possible situations of sexual cruelty, as found within antebellum 
marriages. Not only did local citizens make supposedly private sexual practices the 
fodder for public discussion, they also struggled to align larger legal interpretations with 
community behavioral norms. This chapter traces how, in light of expanding conceptions 
of cruelty and a growing awareness of bodily pain, residents began to actively explore 
what constituted proper sexual practices in Victorian America. And, it argues that the 
discussions surrounding sexual cruelties often reflected ongoing struggles to control the 
productive processes of women’s bodies. The concerns over how certain sexual practices 
affected a woman’s bodily integrity varied according to region with frontier cultures 
stressing the importance of sustaining a woman’s labor potential.2    
 The chapter opens with an analysis of divorce proceedings in which the absence 
of sexual relations was the primary complaint. It then transitions to look at cases 
centering upon excessive or bizarre sexual practices. A vast array of behavioral oddities 
prompted wives, in particular, to come before the courts and describe nascent scenes of 
marital rape. The chapter closes with an examination of whether or not the transmission 
of a venereal disease to one’s spouse constituted marital cruelty in antebellum America. 
In addition to the topics listed above, this chapter will also highlight those moments in 
which pregnancy violence intersected with sexual cruelty. Not only the product of sexual 
relations and a key moment in a woman’s productivity, pregnancy was also significant in 
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that communities consistently set the bar for sexual cruelty lower in cases involving 
pregnant women. Therefore, moments of pregnancy abuse give historians glimpses as to 
the trajectories of cruelty interpretations in nineteenth-century communities. 
Although they generally perceived marriage as something beyond a physical 
alignment of two bodies, it is important to understand that antebellum spouses anticipated 
some degree of sexual interaction within their unions. When selecting marital partners 
men and women took care to choose individuals who appeared physically sound and 
prepared to participate in the creation of offspring. Therefore, if a husband or wife 
refused, or was unable, to engage in intercourse, this gestured to an unnatural element 
within the relationship, which in turn opened up the possibility for community regulation. 
Biological impotence was an accusation leveled at both husbands and wives within the 
records. The vast majority of spouses who requested divorces on these grounds claimed 
that, beyond the condition itself, the pre-marital concealment of vital biologic 
information constituted cruelty. Mary Dennis, for example, argued that her husband John 
hid his impotence by “artfully and mischievously plotting.” Following three years of 
childless marriage, Mary discovered the truth in the midst of a heated confrontation when 
her husband confessed that he had knowingly misled her. She filed for a divorce citing 
cruelty, not fraud, as the principle cause. The records show that the courts were generally 
inclined to grant separation requests in which one spouse, such as Mary, presented 
uncontested allegations of impotence. Appearing before a judge and jury of one’s peers to 
level charges of biologic dysfunction was an embarrassing proposition, to say the least, 
and it appears as if the majority of spouses did everything that they could to avoid a 
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public trial. Recognizing the concomitant shame of separation on sexual grounds, many 
couples even chose to relocate prior to pursing their cases.
3
 
However, seemingly simplistic impotence proceedings also held the potential to 
spin out of control if a spousal defendant felt obligated to tender a statement in opposition 
and, in the process, attempt to rehabilitate his or her tarnished reputation. When Peter and 
Susan Moore “contracted a matrimonial alliance” in 1843 they appeared to have made the 
perfect match. They resided together for two years before Peter discovered “to his utter 
surprise and astonishment” that his wife was “not a natural woman.” Armed with this 
knowledge, Peter felt compelled to leave her and to file for a divorce. To cement his case, 
Peter’s petition to the Virginia legislature included the request that a court-appointed 
surgeon examine Susan in order to verify his claims that she suffered from an “unnatural 
malformation.” Peter refrained from offering any further explanation as to what Susan’s 
supposed “malformation” entailed. However, he underestimated the resourcefulness of 
his conjugal mate. Susan refused to give in to his request and countered by presenting a 
statement from her personal physician. Her doctor not only refuted the accusation of 
malformation, but stated that Susan clearly engaged in regular intercourse, as evident by 
her “missing hymen.” Humiliated yet vindicated by this testimony, Susan told the 
legislators that she presented her physician as a witness so that Peter would understand 
that she would not stand by and be publicly shamed for a fault that was not her own.
4
 In 
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the end, the Moore’s case aptly illustrates the extent to which sexual cruelty proceedings, 
even more than other types of cruelty conversations, relied upon the opinions of supposed 
medical professionals. As Ariela Gross has documented, “medical jurisprudence was a 
nineteenth-century phenomenon,” fed by the idea of trained insight into intimate matters 
of the body. However, even with a medical advantage in one’s corner, court 
conversations centering upon impotency and cruelty often strayed into embarrassing 
territory and involved great sacrifices of personal privacy.
5
  
Regardless of whether the case centered upon biologic dysfunction or an outright 
refusal of intercourse, winning a divorce on the basis of sexual dissatisfaction required 
not only evidence as to the problematic practice, or lack thereof, but also a statement as to 
why these behaviors proved injurious. Some men and women might have been perfectly 
content in a relationship sans intercourse, so it fell to the dissatisfied to present a 
compelling case to the contrary. Husbands were far more likely to appear before the 
courts lamenting the absence of conjugal interactions, and it proves useful to consider 
how they approached these delicate matters. Historians have traditionally placed male 
criticisms of female sexuality with a duty based paradigm. According to this 
interpretation, wives owed husbands sex in exchange for protection, shelter, etc. So, we 
would expect to find husbands arriving at court stressing their wives’ duty to provide 
them with sole sexual access. However, the records present a picture that is a bit more 
complex. Husbands within Wisconsin and Texas were more likely to base their cases 
upon the existence of marital rights, duties, and obligations. Jacob Chancellor’s wife 
“deprived him of all conncubinal rights.” John Edgrine’s partner “entirely refused and 
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neglected to comply with her legal obligations as his wife, and the obligations of the 
marital contract.” And, Shepherd Adam simply wanted to “exercise his right as a 
husband.” In contrast, Virginia husbands appeared more reticent to argue for the right to 
sexual intercourse and when they did file under this heading, they utilized language that 
emphasized the emotional aspects of sexual marital relations. Take, for instance, Leonard 
Bailey who pleaded to the Virginia legislature that his wife “seems to have become to a 
considerable extent abandoned in her feelings [and] has wholly abandoned her sexual 
intercourse with your petitioner.” Jacob, John, Shepherd, and Leonard all suffered from 
the same problem, so why the differences in framing, language, and approach?
6
  
A glance at the place of marriage within antebellum sexual struggles gestures 
towards a few possible explanations. By the mid-nineteenth century husbands across 
America felt increasingly under attack as various conjugal rights came under growing 
scrutiny. According to prominent marital historian Hendrik Hartog, an antebellum 
husband, “knew—or might suddenly discover—that he was no longer sure of his legal 
rights over his wife....” The gender role instabilities present in frontier Wisconsin and 
Texas only served to magnify these anxieties, leaving male heads of household feeling 
overwhelmed and under attack. As such, to shore up their flailing mastery, frontier 
husbands chose to emphasize the contractual elements of matrimonial unions. This 
explains why male partners in frontier locales often presented the courts with extensive 
lists of rights complaints in which sexual interactions appeared alongside cooking or 
washing duties. Clinging to traditional contractual understandings provided the illusion 
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that the duty-based paradigm of marriage still held true in a time of perceived social 
chaos. It also allowed for an interpretational mechanism by which men could continue to 
harness and control all categories of women’s productive potential, including 
childbearing.
7
  
Husbands in Virginia, however, did not evince a need to directly place marital 
sexuality within a rights discourse. Perhaps they believed, due to longstanding patriarchal 
traditions, that they could reap the benefits of the rights of duty without making overt 
references in that direction. Or, maybe they were influenced by the growing ideals of 
romantic love. Either way, the records show that Virginia’s men were far more likely to 
create an association between a woman’s sexual failings and her general immorality. In 
some cases this meant bookending cruelty complaints with hints of adulterous behavior. 
In his petition for divorce Jacob Cool alleged that his wife cruelly refused to sleep with 
him any longer. As a possible explanation for her behavior, he offered up the possibility 
of adultery. Stopping short of accusing his wife of outright infidelity, he instead intimated 
that the couple’s neighbors and friends doubted her faithfulness. Sexual innocence and 
virtue existed at the core of a southern white woman’s identity, so Jacob’s comments held 
the potential to severely damage his wife’s social credit or character in the local 
community. By drawing attention to his wife’s potential moral weaknesses and by 
directly refraining from mentioning what he felt he was owed, Jacob successfully painted 
himself as a masculine victim saddled with a wifely villain.
8
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Aside from unnatural malformations or extramarital entanglements and despite 
their husband’s claims to the contrary, antebellum women often possessed good reasons 
to avoid engaging in marital intercourse. First and foremost, sex led to pregnancy and 
childbirth, two experiences characterized by physical danger. Numerous scholars have 
aptly described how antebellum women greatly feared “the much-glorified institution of 
motherhood” for the trials contained therein. Despite harboring anxieties, the majority of 
wives continued to fulfill their marital sexual obligations, even if unwillingly. However, 
some women pushed their marriages to the brink by enacting elaborate plans to avoid 
sexual intercourse. The divorce bills of their disgruntled husbands provide historians with 
an indication as to how these women proceeded.
9
  
Although various abortificants were available to antebellum wives, the preferred 
way to steer clear of pregnancy involved occupying a separate bedchamber from one’s 
spouse. It is important to note that husbands generally considered this act of physical 
separation and sexual denial cruel in and of itself. After all, a man living with a woman 
under these conditions not only relinquished his right to her body, he also lost 
management over a portion of his own home. The records show sexually spurned 
husbands frequently complaining to the courts that they cohabitated as strangers 
alongside their spouses. Harriet and Cornelius Dow, for instance, lived in a Wisconsin 
household together, yet they refrained from speaking to or sleeping with one another. 
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When questioned about her distant demeanor, Harriet admitted to the court that she “did 
object to raising more children” and behaved in a manner designed to avoid the 
possibility of impregnation. After bringing up twelve children with only minimal 
assistance from Cornelius, she had had enough and was determined to enact a de facto 
sexual separation. She remained unapologetic as she described to the court how she rarely 
interacted with Cornelius. As the Dow case amply illustrates, separatist actions centering 
upon the bed chamber quite often spread to include living spaces and eating areas as well 
as spouses avoided even the most basic of contacts.
10
   
 Not content with simply staking claim to a separate sleeping area, some women 
chose to employ threats and physical violence to defend these new domestic 
arrangements, much to the consternation and chagrin of their mates. Striking at the base 
of the issue, they would use threatening language in an attempt to create a negative 
association in their husband’s minds between sexual intercourse and pregnancy. Simply 
put, they wanted men to fear the possibility of pregnancy as much as women did. So, 
defensive wives would warn their husbands that various catastrophic events would occur 
upon the discovery of a pregnancy. Poisoning was one of the most effective threats that a 
woman in this position could make as it exposed the degree to which men relied upon the 
food preparation skills of their wives. Stephen Miles, a Texas husband, told the court that 
he was afraid to ask his wife for intercourse after she, quite shockingly, proclaimed to 
relatives and neighbors that she would poison her husband and their two children if she 
was to become pregnant once again. Suffering from shame at his own inept mastery, 
Stephen waited years before coming to the court and asking for a divorce on the grounds 
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of cruelty. Within his bill he grudgingly admitted that his wife’s actions had the intended 
effect as he avoided approaching her bed chamber due to the virulent nature of her verbal 
barbs.
11
  
If threats failed to prove effective, wives occasionally relied upon a combination 
of advance planning and physical action to maintain distance from their spouses. After 
all, the possibility of engaging in hand-to-hand combat was an undesirable outcome as 
wives recognized that they would, generally, be outmatched in term of physical force. 
One approach was to bar the door of the bedroom to prevent entry. Another tactic wives 
employed involved ordering a husband from the bedchamber for the entirety of evening 
and night hours. If a husband then ignored his wife’s admonishments and proceeded to 
the bed he might be seriously injured as a result. After being married only a few months, 
E. Blair learned that he was not welcome in his wife’s bed. She told him to stay away and 
when he tried to get closer, she “procured a knife and took it to bed with her,” telling him 
that if he approached the bed she would kill him. Not always making idle threats, some 
wives enforced their orders with potentially deadly force. Consider the case of Joanne 
Lamkin, a Texas wife, who stabbed her husband with an iron poker when he entered her 
bedchamber, after ignoring admonishments to the contrary. Silas Lamkin received a 
divorce because the jury, while not sympathetic to his absence of sex complaint, was 
convinced that cruelty occurred when Joanne proceeded to physically injure her spouse.
12
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The evidence indicates that frontier wives, in particular, evinced a willingness to 
defend their personal space with physical aggressiveness. Caged in by isolation and with 
limited opportunities to call on others for assistance, defense-minded wives in frontier 
spaces perhaps drew upon extra levels of force in order to counter the challenges directed 
at them by their husbands. The sex-avoidance strategies employed by antebellum women 
accords with Laura Edwards’s argument that, “Wives did not try to establish their own 
position as equal individuals in physical confrontations with their husbands. But they did 
use force when they thought husbands had pushed the limits of their authority too far or 
expressed it inappropriately.” Through their acts of sexual resistance Lamkin and other 
women expressly denied the idea that husbands should enjoy unlimited access to marital 
conjugal interactions and instead demanded the right to maintain control of their own 
reproductive processes within marriages. And, those husbands who sustained injuries in 
intimate spatial contests hoped to show the courts that the physically aggressive actions 
of their wives demonstrated that their marriages were damaged beyond repair. Refusing 
sex may not have been a divorceable wrong, but permanently injuring one’s spouse in the 
process of avoiding intercourse constituted cruelty.
13
  
Whereas men were the vast majority of spouses who appeared before the courts 
complaining about the lack of intercourse, it was women who generally mounted protests 
on the basis of excessive or bizarre sexual practices in marriage. Through their divorce 
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bills these women forced the courts to engage in uncomfortable conversations regarding 
exactly what constituted normal sexual relations. They asked: at what point did intimate 
requests or demands become excessive and satisfy the legal requirements of cruelty? In 
general, wives who pursued divorces on the basis of sexual deviance faced an uphill 
battle in proving their cases. To begin with, they were in the unenviable position of 
pressuring their peers to discuss matters that generally remained hidden behind closed 
doors. They also were asking a group of men to recognize the need to regulate sex which, 
in turn, could place these same men in a position of being vulnerable to judicial sexual 
policing. And, in order to satisfy the ‘clean hands’ doctrine of adversarial divorce, a wife 
needed to maintain an aura of innocence and virtue while presenting information to the 
court that was anything but innocent or virtuous. This posed quite a challenge as, in the 
words of Robert Ireland, “According to both the written and unwritten law it was 
sometimes worse to speak about the conduct than it was to engage in the conduct itself.” 
Victorian society felt a marked reticence about broaching sexual matters in public and the 
litigants who did so ran the risk of being labeled vulgar or rude just for their initial 
efforts.
14
  
Although justices across the country increasingly recognized mental anguish as a 
viable cause for separation, winning a divorce on the basis of sexual excesses required 
clear evidence of physical injury or the reasonable apprehension of it. Eliza Wyman’s 
case is illustrative of the antebellum evidentiary requirements. Married only a short time, 
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Eliza filed for divorce claiming that her husband’s ongoing physical violence 
compromised her already delicate health. In particular, William Wyman “was excessive 
in his demands for sexual intercourse.” To prove her allegations, Eliza’s physician Alman 
Lull appeared and described how he had diagnosed her with a “local inflammation of the 
womb.” He recalled how she had been “unable to turn herself or sit up in bed” due to 
being “completely goded out with sexual intercourse.” Based upon his observations of 
her body, he felt as if he could conclusively tell the court that her condition directly 
stemmed from “too much intercourse.” Satisfied with Lull’s testimony, the court 
dissolved the Wyman’s marriage. By issuing this ruling, the court found that William 
needed to more fully embody the growing Victorian ideal of masculine self-restraint and 
emotional control. While women were admonished to follow the precepts of 
passionlessness, society increasingly called upon men to control their baser animal 
instincts, especially in marriage.
15
  
While many men heeded this warning, others went to the opposite extreme and 
forced their wives to engage in intercourse. Marital rape as a legal concept was just 
beginning to gain traction in the years leading up to the Civil War. Under the earlier legal 
model of coverture, courts could not convict husbands of marital rape because they could 
not hold a man accountable for damaging what was considered his own property, his 
wife’s body. In the words of seventeenth-century legal theorist Matthew Hale, “The 
husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their 
mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto 
                                                          
15
 Eliza Wyman v. William Wyman (1849), MIL-MC (all quotes). For information on the growing 
importance of emotional control, see E. Anthony Rotundo, “Body and Soul: Changing Ideals of American 
Middle-Class Manhood, 1770-1920,” Journal of Social History, 16 (Summer, 1983): 27; Griswold, “Law, 
Sex, Cruelty,” 721-745; Griswold, “Sexual Cruelty,” 531.  
119 
 
her husband, which she cannot retract.” However, this perspective began to change when 
women’s rights advocates operating in the 1850s drew attention to this legal loophole, 
compared marriage to slavery, and pushed for expanded bodily rights for wives. Other 
social reformers took up the call as well, and by the late antebellum period a significant 
number of tracts circulated advocating for the legal recognition of marital rape. One such 
work, The Fugitive Wife (1866), proclaimed, “If we will save the institution of marriage, 
we must protect the wife, as we do the unmarried woman, against the passions of man, 
and give the husband no more control over the person, body or soul, of the woman, after 
marriage than before.” As the language of the quote makes clear, what was at stake was 
the very survival of marriage in society.
16
  
Despite the developing public conversation regarding marital bodily ownership, it 
would be a mistake to assert that accusations of spousal rape appeared with great 
frequency within the divorce records. Undoubtedly, spouses continued to question 
whether or not coerced sex could sustain a cruelty ruling in and of itself. When this is 
considered alongside the fact that female sexual submission, at least in the South, was 
still touted as a hallmark of femininity, it is not surprising that the southern court records, 
in particular, yield few results. Turning to Wisconsin we find far more women willing to 
come to the court on these grounds. Sparing very few details in their pursuit of justice, 
Wisconsin wives laid out their private lives before the courts. One woman, Harriet 
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Hubbard, decided that simply gesturing towards excessive behaviors would not prove 
sufficient for a ruling in her favor, so she quantified what she meant by excess. 
According to her account, Harriet’s husband Mortimer compelled her to have sex “twice 
to three times in every twenty four hours & almost every day.” As a result of his actions, 
her health and constitution were entirely destroyed. To compel a woman to submit, the 
records describe how a husband could use a wide variety of forcible techniques, including 
pushing her against the bed or holding a weapon against her neck.
17
 
For mid-nineteenth-century society marital rape was problematic in numerous 
ways. Forced sex constituted an excessive behavior and it was generally believed that any 
action beyond moderation could yield severe physical consequences. The female nervous 
system, in particular, was perceived as “prone to overstimulation and resulting 
exhaustion.” And, a husband’s ongoing sexual assaults could create catastrophic 
consequences, including the inability to bear children. Such direct attacks on a woman’s 
future productivity could not be tolerated. That is one reason why husbands who forced 
their wives to engage in sex at an advanced state of pregnancy were placed under 
particular scrutiny. Men such as Samuel Wadkins, whose story opens this chapter, 
mortgaged their wife’s productive future for the sake of the present pleasures. If a woman 
could document specific instances of coerced sex and provide evidence of a resulting 
miscarriage, it was difficult for juries and judges to find against her.
18
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 Injured wives could also find a sympathetic audience if they engaged with a 
growing discourse focusing on the nature of pain. In her masterful history of pain and 
humanitarianism, Margaret Abruzzo describes how antebellum men and women came to 
understand cruelty as the infliction of unnecessary pain. In this context, “Cruelty at once 
undermined refined civilization and human nature.” Therefore, a woman’s case was 
immeasurably strengthened if she could chronicle in detail the physical sensations 
accompanying scenes of coerced sex.
19
  Pain played a central role in the divorce bill 
presented by Elizabeth Bruss. After only a month of cohabitation with her spouse, 
Elizabeth came to the Milwaukee court seeking a separation. According to her account, 
Frederick, her husband, regularly “compeled and forced her to have sexual intercourse 
with him.” His actions “gave her extreme pain” as the “unnaturally large” size of his 
genitals led to widespread damage to her “private parts.” In an interesting twist, Frederick 
provided an answer to his wife’s complaint in which he denied forcing her to do anything 
sexual. He also questioned, and evinced surprise at, the fact that “she could pronounce his 
penis and know it to be unnaturally large as compared with others” when, in actuality, 
“his penis is rather smaller than the usual size.” Through his statements, Frederick 
intimated that his wife was not nearly as sexually innocent as she attempted to appear. A 
“thick set, square built, stout and healthy woman” she could withstand her marital 
obligations without experiencing pain. Recognizing the potentially treacherous territory 
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of bodily feeling, Frederick made it a point to emphasize that their relations were pain-
free. Through the graphic descriptions provided therein, the Bruss’ case turned the judge 
and jury into voyeurs who gained glimpses into a bundle of potentially disturbing marital 
dynamics. Armed with this knowledge, they had to determine if Elizabeth’s right to 
bodily integrity was violated by the suffering and pain inherent in her marriage to 
Frederick. The stakes were particularly high for Elizabeth who, in a similar fashion as 
other frontier wives, needed to maintain her productive capabilities in order to survive. 
Unfortunately for historians, the final verdict in the case was not recorded.
20
  
Whereas marital rape was a relatively new legal concept, the willful transmission 
of disease existed as one of the oldest generally recognized categories of cruelty. Even 
with its long pedigree it was not an easy violation to pinpoint. The term “willful,” in 
particular, posed all sorts of interpretational difficulties. In theory, to be found guilty of 
cruelty, a spouse not only had to infect their partner but they had to do so with “willful” 
intent. However, in the face of an onslaught of medical studies postulating a relationship 
between sexual disease and catastrophic bodily dysfunction, antebellum citizens began to 
place less of an emphasis on intent and more of a focus on the ways in which an illness 
altered a person’s productive potential in society. As a result, spouses who infected their 
partners were subject to growing condemnation within the records. Although this study 
does not examine those cases filed as adultery proceedings, venereal disease claims 
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usually existed at the intersections between adultery and cruelty. The disease itself served 
as convincing evidence of adultery, while the transmission of the illness potentially 
constituted cruelty.
21
  
The patterns present in venereal disease cruelty cases varied little according to 
region, although the manner of infection differed somewhat. In particular, the continuing 
sexual assaults upon enslaved women by white men fostered a virulent disease 
environment in the southern states studied. In accordance with the southern sexual 
double-standard, husbands in these areas could engage in extramarital liaisons with little 
thought as to possible marital disruptions. That is, of course, unless they managed to 
infect their wives in the process. If we turn our attention to Wisconsin, many of the 
disease cruelty claims here still possessed clear links to adulterous practices, but the 
coercive nature of racial sexual exploitation did not hold as prominent of a place in the 
records.
22
  
In all of the locations studied, the records consistently show infected spouses torn 
between the desire to conceal their condition and the need to find solace by telling others 
of their troubles. Hiding the disease from one’s marital partner might involve avoiding 
intimate contact during flare-ups or even leaving town for brief periods of time. 
Regarding this exact dilemma, one diarist noted, “Clapp—much itching in my flopper—
must keep away from wife.” However, on occasion, men and women failed to behave 
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covertly in their extramarital dalliances and this same lack of caution characterized their 
disease responses. Mansfield Seymour, a Mecklenburg County, Virginia, resident was 
known for his trysts in the forest with lewd women. A local man even witnessed him 
buttoning up his pants after one such encounter. It was another neighbor, George King, 
who became Mansfield’s unwilling confidante. According to King, Mansfield told him 
that he had been involved with a local mulatto woman and had caught a disease from her. 
Asking for advice, Mansfield then pulled down his pants and showed King his private 
parts which were “much diseased he having to use bandages.” Not stopping there, he also 
removed a secreted chest and showed King “the instrument for injecting his penis” and 
“the boxes of capsules, which he said he was using for a cure.” Even in a culture tolerant 
of male sexual infidelities, Mansfield had gone too far. His irresponsible actions had 
rendered his penis, the very symbol of his manhood, useless and deformed. As such, his 
male neighbors, including King, participated in the case in order to ensure that 
Mansfield’s display of inept mastery did not go unpunished. After all, his lack of caution 
threatened to draw attention to the issue of extramarital relationships on the whole.
23
  
 As Mansfield’s actions demonstrated, many carriers of venereal diseases sought 
curative options and then placed the blame on medicinal failures if they happened to 
infect their partners. Although the biological aspects of infectious disease were a growing 
topic of conversation in the antebellum period, we should not overstate the fact that 
reliable information regarding these illnesses was still quite limited. This meant that 
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many spouses could not identify the exact ailment of combination of aliments that they 
suffered from, thus making effective treatment much more difficult.  And, when and if an 
infected individual obtained a diagnosis, their problems were by no means over. Studies 
of venereal disease wards during this period have shown how the supposed cure could 
actually be more harmful to the person than the disease itself. This was certainly the case 
if the patient happened to be pregnant. Mercury treatments, for example, often led to the 
birth of stillborns. Even with the potential for a negative outcome, antebellum citizens 
continued to trade supposed remedies, magnifying the potential for curative damage. In 
addition to medical excuses, spouses under scrutiny for spreading diseases also mounted 
defenses by accusing their partners of other categories of excess, including drinking. 
Washington Chiles, for example, countered his wife’s allegations that he had a 
“dangerous and loathsome bodily disease” by alleging that she was “in the constant habit 
of indulging in the use of ardent spirits.” Another far less persuasive defense involved a 
husband lamenting that his wife refused intercourse, thereby driving him to commit 
adultery and become diseased. According to this argument, if a sexually frigid woman 
was infected it was as a direct consequence of her own conjugal failings.
24
  
 All defenses generally came to naught if a victimized partner could provide 
physical evidence as to bodily damage caused by a venereal disease. Unfortunately for 
injured spouses, making a case based upon impaired physicality was a difficult task as 
even medical professionals remained divided as to the effects of illness on the body. So 
while doctors frequently provided statements to the courts diagnosing particular types of 
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diseases, they refrained from elaborating too much on the long term consequences of 
infection. This hesitancy broke down if the victim in question happened to be filing for 
divorce on the basis of a disease-induced pregnancy disaster. Women in these situations 
often stood to benefit from the diminishing importance of intent and the escalated 
probability of success if they could provide clear indications of outright damage to the 
child in question. As such, they made it a point to call upon physicians to prove to the 
courts that infants born to an infected mother faced unique health challenges. In a fitting 
example of medical jurisprudence, one doctor operating out of Texas even presented his 
theory to the court that the “filthy and loathsome” disease of gonorrhea produced a 
“shock upon the brain,” killing children shortly after birth.25 
 In addition to eliciting supporting medical testimony, wives with problematic 
pregnancies also presented some of the most detailed bills found within the records. 
Consider, for example, the disastrous marriage of Peter and Eliza Julien. Amid the 
bustling seaport of Norfolk, Virginia, the Julien’s relationship foundered as a result of 
Peter conforming to the naval pattern of disease transmission. According to the standard 
narrative, husbands employed in various naval professions would spend long periods 
separated from their marital partners, engage in sexual liaisons, return home, and infect 
their long waiting wives. Then, they would head off again, leaving the wives to suffer in 
solitude. This pattern took hold in the Julien’s relationship almost immediately with the 
couple marrying young and Peter beginning work as a sailor soon thereafter. It quickly 
became evident, however, that his return visits home were not a cause for celebration. 
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During one short leave he gave his wife a venereal disease identified by a physician as 
the “China Pox.” After a period of intense questioning at the hands of his mother-in-law, 
Peter admitted his error and promised to do better in the future. He then promptly 
returned to his life at sea leaving his pregnant and infected wife with no means of 
support. When he saw his wife the next time, five weeks later, he got her sick again this 
time with the clap. Again, he admitted his actions and apologized. Only a few weeks after 
the receipt of this latest apology, Eliza Ann gave birth to a sickly child who died shortly 
thereafter. Blaming her husband for the infant’s death and frustrated by her own 
continuing bouts with illness, she filed for divorce claiming cruelty, not adultery, as the 
cause. Proving that the transmission of a venereal disease constituted cruelty was not 
always an easy task, but Eliza’s physical trials held the power to sway an otherwise 
hesitant jury.
26
  
 This chapter has shown that sexual marital cruelty in antebellum America could 
take a variety of forms, including refusals of intercourse, excessive behaviors, coerced 
sex, or the passage of disease to one’s partner. When an injured spouse approached the 
court claiming one of these violations, they initiated a conversation that blurred the 
boundaries of public and private in Victorian society. Winning a case necessitated 
providing abundant explicit detail, thus turning average men and women into voyeuristic 
observers wrestling with graphic judicial quandaries. In accordance with the growing 
professionalization of medicine, physicians and doctors shaped understandings of sexual 
cruelty to an extent beyond that of other categories of abuse. After all, it was difficult for 
                                                          
26
 Eliza Julien v. Peter Julien (1857), LVA-No (all quotes). For another example of the naval pattern of 
infection, see Annie Tegetthoff v. Leopold Tegetthoff (1859), LVA-No. In cases involving disease 
transmission, a court might also prohibit the infected partner from remarrying. This was an attempt to stop 
the further spread of infection, see Margaret Norwood v. Nathaniel Norwood (1853), LVA-Br.  
128 
 
everyday men and women to determine the outlines of sexual misbehavior when the very 
nature of sex remained shrouded in biological mystery. Despite these interpretational 
challenges, the records clearly show that the court conversations regarding sexual cruelty 
revolved around how to effectively control, manage, and protect the productive potential 
of women’s bodies.27  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DESTRUCTIVE SPIRITS:  
INTEMPERANCE AND ECONOMIC CRUELTY 
 
 As the daughter of a middling Virginia family, Harriett expected nothing less than 
a loving, stable marriage. To cement her ideal spousal partnership she brought significant 
property, both real and personal, to the marital altar when she wed William Smith. The 
couple enjoyed a comfortable married life until William’s affinity for ardent spirits began 
to disrupt the household. Out of a determination to fulfill her wifely and motherly duties, 
Harriett waited thirteen years before filing for a divorce in the Botetourt County court of 
chancery. In 1847, with years of evidence to support her claims, she submitted a lengthy 
bill of complaint to the court. Unfortunately for Harriett, according to legal precedent, 
intemperance alone was not a viable cause for divorce in Virginia during this period. She 
had to prove that William’s habits constituted, and contributed to, cruelty in their 
marriage. With that legal need in mind, Harriett regaled the court with the real life 
account of how a man could transform from a proud husband into a dangerous wastrel.
1
   
 The most damaging evidence pointed to the fact that William repeatedly made 
financial decisions that threatened the stability of his household. Instead of carefully 
managing his wife’s inherited property, he wasted it and spent his time “wandering 
about” without occupation. To fund his local meanderings he would spontaneously seize 
and sell his family’s possessions, frequently leaving Harriett and the children penniless 
and without support. And, during the many instances in which her husband disappeared 
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from the region, Harriett was left to satisfy his local debts with very limited means. His 
insults reached their peak when he returned home from one intoxicated jaunt and threw 
out all of their furniture, ruining the great majority of it. Perturbed by the constant 
disturbances within the Smith family, locals gave colorful testimony in support of 
Harriett’s claims. After fifteen years as a neighbor to the Smiths, Merryman Sanford felt 
qualified in asserting that, “It is generally known that he [William] has been in the habit 
of using ardent spirits whenever he thinks proper, and that he is apt to take more than 
does him good.” Other deponents contrasted Harriett’s “smart industrious” work ethic 
with her husband’s inability to hold gainful employment due to “sprees.” The general 
consensus was that William’s intoxicated singing, dancing, and praying provided 
community-wide amusement, but his general manner proved “very disagreeable.” In 
response to these allegations, William appeared before the court and admitted to drinking 
to excess on occasion. However, he fervently denied that this habit impaired his ability to 
conduct business as a proper Virginia patriarch. Not convinced by William’s answers, the 
court found that his behaviors violated Harriett’s “natural rights” and granted the 
divorce.
2
   
 In a period marked by the rise of the ideal of the companionate marriage based on 
love and affection, the Smith case is notable for the degree to which the participants 
emphasized duty over emotion as the key ingredient of a successful partnership. In a 
fashion similar to the Smith proceedings, this chapter lies at the intersection of two 
prominent subjects of antebellum conversation, intemperance and marital cruelty. Even 
with the development of a reformist rhetoric based upon the hyperbolic drunkard’s 
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broken home, in the first half of the nineteenth century the meaning of cruelty was 
contested and the definition of intemperance was uncertain. The divorce laws adopted by 
the states reflected and embodied this atmosphere of confusion. Out of the three localities 
examined in this study, Wisconsin proved the most liberal in allowing divorce as a result 
of male and female intemperance. Texas, in contrast, followed an “excesses” clause that 
permitted divorce under a variety of behaviors practiced beyond normal measure. And 
Virginia did not recognize intemperance as a sole cause for divorce. As a result, across 
the three states, adept husbands and wives pursued separations based on multiple grounds 
to increase the likelihood of success. This chapter focuses on those cases in which men 
and women claimed that their spouses were not only intemperate but cruel. Not all 
instances of intoxication constituted cruelty, and divorce proceedings give us an 
indication of the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable imbibing.
3
  
  Based upon a survey of case records and personal papers, this chapter argues that 
antebellum society believed that intemperance constituted marital cruelty if and when it 
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contributed to a further breakdown of traditional gender roles and diminished household 
productivity. Labor expectations varied according to myriad factors, but at the most basic 
level a husband was supposed to generate income to support his family and a wife was 
generally admonished to maintain an orderly and efficient household. The following 
pages describe how intemperance was seen as playing a key part in triggering 
catastrophic role reversals. The alcoholic habits of husbands could result in the loss of 
their ability to contribute financially to the household, which in turn often forced their 
wives into the marketplace as wage earners. The equally destructive female inebriate 
might engage in excessive spending and, as a result, expose her husband to community 
ridicule as a feminized man who could not regulate household consumption and 
production practices. Moreover, a comparative approach reveals that intemperate marital 
cruelty pushed an already taxed frontier labor system to the breaking point. Texas and 
Wisconsin residents stressed to the courts that intoxicated spouses represented too much 
of a family liability in environments where even the most minute financial missteps made 
the difference between survival and death.
4
    
 The great majority of divorce petitions from this period alleging cruelty and 
intemperance opened with an overt statement regarding the importance of mate selection. 
Not simply the product of nostalgia, this introspective exercise spoke to the legal 
requirements associated with conjugal separations in nineteenth-century America. 
Divorce was an adversarial procedure and required a plaintiff to shoulder the burden of 
displaying their own innocence as well as their spouse’s guilt. Therefore, an injured 
spouse needed to convince the court that, at the time of marriage, they were unaware of 
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their future partner’s weakness for ardent spirits. Paying homage to the ample literature 
on the subject of courtship, husbands and wives would describe how their personal 
situations existed in spaces where guidebooks could have rendered little to no assistance. 
They might blame their transgressions on immaturity in age, as Elizabeth White did when 
relating how she was “induced” to marry at the tender age of seventeen. Her implication 
was that society could not expect an innocent youth to identify the potential for inebriate 
behavior in a partner. Another frequent refrain connected one poor moral decision with a 
sequence of others. Eliza Miller, for instance, related how she eloped and evaded the law 
only to marry a future drunk. By recognizing that a marriage that began with uncontrolled 
emotions could only end badly, she hoped to secure a modicum of sympathy from the 
court.
5
  
 To fully prove their own innocence, a plaintiff often found it necessary to provide 
a detailed narrative explaining how their spouse transformed from sober to intemperate. 
Counting out from their marriage date, they would attempt to recall the exact moment 
when their partner’s behavior underwent a change. As described within the record, the 
period of initial marital tranquility could last anywhere from days to years. Texas 
residents Augusta and Christian Rhodius made it a single year before he “became 
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dissipated and a confirmed inebriate.” In contrast, Catharine Chadwick’s partner 
“contracted intemperance” after two decades of marriage. While the word “became” hints 
at a mysterious transition, the word “contracted” implied a view of intoxication as a 
disease or illness. Both explanations were viable because, as noted by Sharon Salinger 
and other historians, no clear definition of what constituted inebriation existed during the 
antebellum period. By keeping these opening statements fairly brief, spousal litigants 
were able to move quickly to the body of the complaint where they enumerated specific 
examples of cruel intemperance.
6
 
 Emphasizing the reciprocal rights of marriage, wives would appear in court 
claiming that cruelty occurred if a husband’s drinking habits led to his inability to labor 
adequately for his family’s support. Of course, as highlighted by Hendrik Hartog in his 
study of marriage, this obligation of support varied according to a person’s “place in the 
social order.” Society did not require that husbands keep their wives in luxury beyond the 
norm. Moreover, antebellum men and women did not always equate alcohol consumption 
with impaired work performance. Imbibing in moderation was perfectly compatible with 
the achievement of class-appropriate material comfort. In fact, American laboring classes 
from the colonial period onward partook of intoxicants as a stimulus for increased 
productivity. The benefits of this practice, however, were illusory. A temporary rush of 
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warmth hid a suppressed immune system. A surge of caloric energy masked a liquid 
lacking any valuable mineral content.
7
 
 Society generally downplayed these negative side-effects until the early 1820s 
when the appearance of an alcohol-fueled ailment, delirium tremens, focused new 
attention on the destructive potential of intoxicants. Individuals suffering with the 
tremens would manifest a variety of symptoms, including shakes, spasms, paranoia, and 
anxiety. Adding to the fear factor, a drunken spree of this nature could come on suddenly 
and last for an undeterminable period of time. Because of its unpredictability, 
determining the exact cause of delirium tremens presented a challenge to nineteenth-
century physicians. However, by the 1850s, they could safely say that “heavy drinker[s]” 
were the most likely to suffer from the tremens, with the majority of bouts occurring after 
“a binge, an illness, or a withdrawal from accustomed portions of alcohol.” Historians 
have even considered the possibility that a rise in the consumption of distilled liquors 
heading into the nineteenth century helped to create a generation of drinkers particularly 
susceptible to the tremens. Regardless, by the mid nineteenth century reformers and 
members of the medical community had harnessed the figure of the ill-drunk and 
plastered his image and told his story in all categories of popular media. The popular 
castigation of tremens sufferers led to elevated censure for those men and women 
accused of this illness in court.
8
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 Divorce records from Virginia, Wisconsin, and Texas reveal the ways in which 
bouts of delirium tremens resulted in general household and labor disturbances and, as 
such, were considered to be instances not only of intemperance but also of marital 
cruelty. One of the most detailed descriptions of this malady in the case files comes from 
a Wisconsin divorce in the winter of 1853. The husband in question, Fletcher Brooks, had 
met his wife Elizabeth six years earlier in Pennsylvania. Shortly after marriage, the 
couple migrated to the Midwest as part of Fletcher’s larger goal to make a living by 
touring and lecturing in the Washingtonian tradition as a reformed inebriate. However, 
everything did not go smoothly upon their arrival in Wisconsin. In her petition for 
divorce, Elizabeth recalled how her husband’s career plans failed due to his continued 
drinking and bouts with delirium tremens. Entire neighborhoods would turn out for his 
lectures only to find him intoxicated and unable to speak. One such patron, a local 
Waukesha physician, attended various events in which Fletcher was billed as the main 
attraction. He also testified that he treated Fletcher over ten times for the tremens. 
According to this doctor’s notes, the intoxicated lecturer was never an easy patient. A 
bloated Fletcher would request “stimulants in large doses,” but the doctor would refuse to 
administer them because, as he told the court, “there was no use in doing any thing” for a 
drunkard this far gone. Interestingly, his assessment represented a conservative approach 
for the time, as many doctors would aggressively treat the tremens with opium and its 
derivatives, thus possibly causing a fatal drop in blood pressure. Fletcher suffered no 
such fate, and Elizabeth’s chief complaint was that her husband’s illness led to him 
missing business appointments and speaking engagements which, in turn, left him unable 
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to pay the bills. His irresponsible ways forced her to rely on her father, living in Ohio at 
that time, for assistance and housing. As such, she felt confident that the court would look 
favorably upon her desire for a divorce on the basis of marital cruelties and 
intemperance.
9
  
Additional wives mirrored Elizabeth’s concern for the ways in which drinking 
impaired a husband’s mental functions and could render him unfit for business and work. 
It was popularly believed, and these women argued, that alcohol suppressed a man’s 
natural abilities in areas of control and logic. Illness in body and mind led to a withdrawal 
from roles typically associated with manhood, including household and labor leadership.  
In Virginia if a husband abdicated his conjugal duties in this manner his actions 
threatened social stability on the whole. As the argument went, morally and physically ill 
masters drew attention to the perversions of southern society. Patriarchs of all classes at 
the very least needed to give the impression of healthy vitality and productivity. 
Additionally, in the frontier areas of Texas and Wisconsin, any weaknesses in manpower 
and leadership were felt in an even more critical sense. After all, families in the rural 
communities of these states required the contributions of every member in order to 
simply survive. Developing frontier economies historically placed great labor pressures 
on all settlers. These challenges would naturally multiply in times of economic downturn. 
For instance, at the middle of the century the rural county of Kenosha, Wisconsin, was 
suffering economically. It was during this period that a leader in the community, Michael 
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Frank, recorded in his diary how the area’s farmers had fallen “deeply in debt.” Desperate 
circumstances forced locals to make difficult decisions in defense of their personal 
financial well-being. As such, Frank recalled how a Kenosha woman pursued a claim for 
damages against the community’s liquor sellers. She was awarded one hundred dollars, 
the maximum sum from the justice court, after arguing that these businesses sold her 
husband liquor “by reason of which sale her husband became sick and incapable of 
rendering her any support.” This “great” trial captured the entire region’s interest as it 
held up the possibility of placing a monetary number on the suffering endured by 
drunkards’ wives. The ruling also supported the belief that wives possessed a right to 
receive the benefits of their husband’s labors and to sue for damages if those rights were 
violated.
10
  
  Even aside from moments of delirium tremens, drunkard husbands developed 
additional habits directly at odds with regular, gainful employment outside of the home. 
Few employers were willing to tolerate the emotional and angry mood swings exhibited 
by inebriates. In addition, punctuality fell by the wayside as sleeping patterns altered in 
conformation with drinking binges. Wives who came to court and discussed this type of 
intimate information often appeared openly distressed. Such was the case when a very 
dismayed sixteen-year-old Sarah Briley complained to the court that her sixty-year-old 
husband took to drinking everyday and usually slept until noon. Like Sarah, many 
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women overcame their initial trepidation and appeared anyway because these habits 
impacted a marriage beyond simple annoyance and actually indicated a man’s inability to 
maintain consistent employment. In the very mobile areas of Wisconsin and Texas, job 
losses connected with drinking combined with other factors to create a mass of 
unemployed, roaming men with families to support. Responding to the fact that one 
category of mistreatment spawned others, wives complained that cruelty occurred when a 
husband purposefully disregarded his spouse’s desire for a permanent home and instead 
uprooted the family on a regular basis. Citing economic and emotional needs, ‘homeless’ 
women would blame alcohol for exacerbating already difficult settlement scenarios. The 
frustration felt by Texas wife Martha Smyth was evident when she told the justices that 
she was tired of her husband dragging her “from one part of the country to another 
without any fixed residence for any considerable time in one place.” Martha understood 
that the law bound her to follow her husband, but she felt that forcing her to acquiesce to 
his alcohol-fueled ramblings constituted cruelty. Because her expectation of marital 
stability was not met, she questioned whether she still owed her spouse allegiance in all 
his movements.
11
  
 While many wives dealt with husbands who were unfit for employment due to 
alcohol-induced illness or habits, other women faced intemperate spouses who openly 
refused to engage in any domestic labors. Gesturing towards the violation of an implicit 
labor contract within marriage, injured wives claimed their husbands acted cruelly by 
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denying responsibility for maintaining the public areas of a family’s domicile. Simply 
put, if a woman took care of the interior of a home, the private sphere, the man should 
exert an equal degree of effort on the exterior, the public sphere. Not to be undervalued, a 
man’s home labors could either earn him the respect or ire of the entire community. If a 
husband chose not to “pursue any occupation” on the home front, then marital discord 
was sure to follow. To fully recognize the implications of a house or farm falling into 
disrepair, one must understand the widespread antebellum belief that connections existed 
between physical and moral imperfections. According to this logic, unsatisfactory 
outward appearances served as an indicator and warning to others that interior 
circumstances were not okay. A ramshackle house was not simply a product of poor 
maintenance but a representation of domestic chaos. According to antebellum reformist 
tracts, the outside estate of a drunkard would always display the moral failings of its 
owner. Benjamin Rush, an avid temperance activist, described a drunkard’s home as 
follows: “Behold!...their houses with shattered windows—their barns with leaky roofs, —
their gardens overrun with weeds, —their fields with broken fences....” The chaos of the 
outside estate proved in direct proportion to the inequities within it. For the wives of 
drunkards, occupying such a home presented numerous challenges. Aside from a loss of 
basic domestic functionality, the attendant shame could almost cause a woman to 
withdraw from society. For example, the embarrassment was palpable in a letter 
composed by a young Virginia woman to a distant friend. In the note she expresses her 
desire that the other woman come for a visit; however, she warns her potential visitor that 
the household and the company may disappoint. As a result of her father being a “lover 
of strong drink,” the family house had fallen into a state of general disrepair and was not 
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even properly furnished. The author explained that she wanted her friend to “not be 
surprised” at the lodgings or her father, but rather to understand everything in its 
appropriate context as a case of parental neglect. In a similar fashion to the letter-writer, 
the wives of drunkards suffered the shame of having their struggles with inebriated 
partners cruelly displayed for all to see via households in varying states of disrepair. 
However, community members quite often recognized the source of the chaos and 
refused to place the entirety of the blame on these women. Instead, it was very common 
to see damning statements in the records aimed at husbands alongside discussions of the 
interplay of intoxication and work. Local residents clearly felt an obligation to evaluate a 
man’s labor potential or lack thereof. After all, the families of inebriates quite often 
ended up on county aid roles, so it was to everyone’s benefit to support those separations 
that might allow one spouse to succeed on an individual level.
12
 
 When a husband pulled out of the labor market, the bulk of the household tasks 
naturally fell upon the other marital partner, the wife. Although some women could and 
did flee to relatives for sanctuary, as will be discussed in the following chapter, this 
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option was not always available. As such, many wives claimed that marital cruelties 
occurred when a husband’s intemperate habits forced his wife to labor to support the 
household. They argued that they expected, at minimum, a degree of labor partnership in 
marriage. They also presented the claim that women could sustain serious physical 
injuries when attempting to perform tasks that were traditionally considered male. The 
women in question did not frame their cases around protesting the fact that they had to 
work. Instead, they pointed out that the immoral choices made by husbands led to wives 
losing any control over their own labors. Wisconsin resident Elizabeth Doyle and other 
women arrived in court prepared to explain why they refused to live with men who 
insisted on “prostituting” them for support.13   
 In addition to mutual emotional engagement, the companionate marriage model 
desired by these women placed an emphasis on equal economic contribution. Regional 
differences emerged, however, in the execution of these demands. Wives in Virginia 
were more likely to present their claims on the basis of physical differences between the 
sexes. Citing the fragile nature of a woman’s constitution, they claimed that the forcing of 
women into men’s work could bring disastrous consequences. Sarah Robinson, for 
example, entered into marriage anticipating that through the “united exertions” of her and 
her husband they might be able to “sustain themselves in comfort, happiness, and 
independence.” Unfortunately, her plans failed to materialize due to her husband’s taste 
for intoxication and other vices. Forced by circumstance to labor night and day, Sarah’s 
naturally “delicate constitution” was gradually “worn down by excessive fatigue and 
exposure.” She appeared before the court asking to be spared an early grave. Historians 
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have described how Virginia women such as Sarah could present portraits of frailty 
because southern slave society was heavily invested in the appearance of white woman’s 
gentility. Of course, the ideal of the pedestal rarely matched the reality, especially for the 
lower classes. But injured wives could draw upon ample common knowledge to support a 
sexual division of labor in marriage. A woman’s fragile uterus, for example, could be 
strained to the point of destruction by heavy lifting. Then, as the argument went, the 
inappropriate labor would have effectively made a woman unfit to perform the most 
important work of all, motherhood. Antebellum society considered it marital cruelty if a 
woman ruined her health by performing tasks to support her family that normally should 
have been completed by her intemperate and lazy husband.
14
 
 The line separating gendered categories of labor was blurred even further in 
frontier areas, which led to the development of a work choice argument by suffering 
wives. New arrivals to both Wisconsin and Texas brought with them a wide variety of 
understandings regarding the ideal economic responsibilities for married couples. They 
then adapted these ideas to the challenging living conditions found in both states. This 
process has been well-documented by historians, such as Mark Carroll, who have 
asserted that new gender roles emerged out of these processes of adaptation. Women 
completed tasks typically reserved for men, and occasionally the reverse happened as 
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well. With these conditions in mind, when did a husband’s intoxicated refusal to perform 
work place enough of a labor burden on a wife to constitute cruelty? The responses of 
frontier wives show that they rarely attempted to argue for protection based upon the 
notion of female fragility. Instead, they reserved the right to choose which labors they 
would complete, and cruelty took place when a husband burdened his wife with a role not 
of her own choosing.
15
  
 Consider, for example, the marriage of Wisconsin residents Catharine and John 
Crandall. The couple only lived together for two years before receiving a divorce from 
the Dane County district court. In Catharine’s bill she alleged that John would get 
intoxicated and violent, even throwing a tin dipper at her head. Frances Wilson, a fifteen 
year old staying with the Crandalls, described how John broke Catharine’s collar bone 
during a drunken rage. However, Frances’s most damning statement was, “I have heard 
him [John] say that if she [Catharine] done her duty she would support him.” This desire, 
in Frances’s assessment, made John not “much of a man.” Within two months of the 
conclusion of the Crandall case an article appeared in the Daily Milwaukee News 
espousing that, “It is the paradise of marriage that man shall work for the woman; that he 
alone shall support her....” It can be argued that this article and others reflected a backlash 
against Wisconsin husbands who took flexible gender norms too far and expected an 
entire role reversal into dependency.
16
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This total disregard for duty by husbands had the effect of forcing wives into 
difficult and often unpleasant labor situations. In many cases the only outside 
employment available for women involved performing “wifely” tasks such as cooking or 
washing for single men in the area. These opportunities were particularly available in 
Wisconsin where mining and logging enterprises created concentrations of single, 
working men. Wisconsin wives who earned money by taking in washing or cooking for 
others did not object to the labor itself, but rather to the fact that it took their attention 
away from the needs of their own homes. Husbands were cruel when they forced their 
wives to make this choice simply to satisfy their own selfish claims of support. Susan 
Hull received a divorce based on intemperance and cruelty after she described her routine 
of “working out by the week in the kitchens of private families,” only to have her 
earnings seized and spent “in idleness and in liquor” by her husband. Similarly, Ida 
Schmidmeyer travelled from house to house in her Eau Claire community taking in 
washing to support her household. And, Mary Moore completed piecework for local 
stores in order to feed her children and send them to school. Moore’s ten-year-old 
daughter confirmed her mother’s hard work when she declared, “She takes care of us the 
best.” Each of these women survived despite having intoxicated albatrosses for husbands. 
They all came to court seeking relief from cruel spouses and citing their own 
accomplishments in the face of patriarchal abuses.
17
 Divorce papers across all three states 
also commented on the ways in which a man’s drinking proved particularly troublesome 
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if it interfered with a woman’s ability to complete basic household chores. This category 
of domestic labor, while not as visible to the public, was an essential part of a fully 
functioning household. Suffering under “King Alcohol,” one Virginia man gained a 
reputation in the neighborhood for sending his wife out to in all kinds of weather to mend 
fences. The general consensus of the community was that he should have completed the 
fence repairs himself. As a result of her husband’s laziness and the rigorous physical 
demands of spousal-imposed outdoor maintenance, the wife in question was “always 
unable to do her housework.” With no one caring for it, the household gradually fell into 
disarray and the couple divorced.
18
  
The use of alcohol by husbands could also cripple a man’s other economic 
responsibility, the proper management of household resources. Antebellum society 
expected that husbands would serve as the principle stewards of the real and personal 
property of families. To adequately fulfill this responsibility a man had to take great care 
in guarding against financial waste and determining what constituted proper or fruitful 
expenditures. Of course, not all heads of household succeeded in creating stability or 
even prosperity for their family groups. However, failure alone did not make these men 
cruel husbands. The wives who appeared in court argued that husbands behaved cruelly 
when they wasted resources by placing their personal needs before family duty. By 
spending money on various vices, including alcohol, these men exposed their wives and 
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children to the whims of the market system. And, as a result, the spouses of intoxicated 
husbands often had to watch helplessly as their family’s financial stability evaporated.  
 To point out the difference between a proper patriarch and an inebriated wastrel, 
wives would recall situations in which their husbands chose to purchase intoxicants 
instead of provisions for the family. In the majority of households in antebellum 
America, the partners each procured items for the home, usually sticking to their 
particular areas of expertise. For example, women might purchase fabric while men 
might buy farm implements. However, it is clear that this balance began to shift when 
one person developed a thirst for alcohol. The individual with the habit would demand an 
increased portion of the purchasing power, and in the case of men, this often meant 
taking control over all money in the home. Instead of funneling this cache of cash, 
however meager, into purchases necessary for survival, a drunk would likely spend 
“every penney” on liquor. In Texas and Wisconsin the catastrophic effects of this practice 
deepened as men would leave their residences on provision trips only to return home with 
nothing of use. Wives spared few words when describing how their husbands abandoned 
them to starvation for the sake of a good time. A Texas woman, married to a blacksmith, 
told the court that her husband could support the family if he so chose, but instead 
“money that should have been expended in procuring food...was dissipated in procuring 
the poison that maddened his brain and transformed him into a demon.” To demonstrate 
this point even more fully, some bills contained estimates as to how much money had 
been wasted over time. Maintaining a state of perpetual drunkenness or being a “soaker,” 
a person “constantly soaked with liquor,” clearly required a great deal of monetary 
investment. Margaret Zimmerschitte estimated that her soaker husband spent “about 
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$3000” over the course of three to four years. And, as a result of his extravagant 
expenditures and lifestyle, he could not afford to take care of her when she fell ill. 
Margaret’s bill made it clear how much suffering ensued when a husband jettisoned his 
family’s only defense against a heartless market-his control and care-in the reckless 
pursuit of booze. The dilemma of whether to procure provisions or alcohol should not 
have been a legitimate concern, but it was in the twisted mind of the drunkard.
19
  
 However, it would be a mistake to assert that all inebriated husbands in 
antebellum America behaved in the exact same way. In fact, the record supports the 
conclusion that drinking habits developed differently across each of the three states. In 
Virginia it was far more common for wives to complain about their husbands drinking 
within the home environment. They would describe how the men would purchase alcohol 
at a local tavern or store only to return home to indulge. This does not necessarily mean 
that all Virginians drank at home exclusively, but it does gesture toward the importance 
of domestic drinking practices. In contrast, the wives of Wisconsin and Texas 
consistently described the development of a public drinking culture in which saloons held 
center stage. This is not that surprising when we consider that historians have 
documented how public drinking houses grew in importance in frontier areas during the 
1850s. Although the tavern was initially intended as a drinking site for travelers, many 
establishments found that they had to attract local customers in order to survive. By 
becoming the social centers of frontier communities, these businesses secured themselves 
a place of importance in developing societies. Of course, these establishments were not 
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welcomed by all. It was not uncommon for new arrivals to both states to note with 
disgust the settler’s propensity for alcoholic indulgence. In describing her neighbors, one 
woman wrote, “one would suppose that old Mother Earth had got drunk and emptied her 
huge stomach into this goodly land of Wisconsin.” Despite this type of protestation, the 
numbers of saloons in operation in both states continued to rise throughout the 
antebellum period. As an indicator, the first Madison village census in 1853 revealed 43 
saloons in operation, or one for every ninety residents.
20
  
 Caught up in this public drinking culture, Wisconsin and Texas husbands would 
often choose to spend time in saloons instead of at home. As a result, descriptions by 
wives of men “coming home intoxicated” regularly appear in the records. In fact, it was 
not uncommon for inebriates, such as William Burch, to establish a pattern of never 
leaving home without returning intoxicated. The actions of Burch and others existed as 
perversions of a market ideal in which household heads were supposed to leave the house 
and return enriched financially as a result of work. Alcohol-related absences led many 
women to argue that they were bereft of the protection that marriage was supposed to 
provide. They made the case that leaving a pregnant wife alone until midnight in the 
wilds of Wisconsin was not acceptable behavior but an act of cruelty. If the absences 
were work related the situation might have differed, but as it stood they only drained a 
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family’s precious financial resources. The violent adverse reaction of women to local 
saloons was also caused by the fear that short absences from home might lengthen into 
permanent ones. A growing temperance movement in Wisconsin, in particular, served to 
remind wives that abandonment was an ever present possibility; and saloons posed a 
serious threat to family stability by contributing to societal pressures injuring a man’s 
connection to his home. This anti-alcohol sentiment fed upon stories, for example, of 
husbands who stepped out for a drink and eventually were found in California gold rush 
towns.
21
  
 Contemporaries described how it was no easy feat to resist temptation in 
antebellum Wisconsin or Texas. While some communities plotted out peaceful 
existences, others experienced regular disturbances and lawlessness. As a result, it was 
not altogether uncommon to witness men and women, in the words of Texan Helen 
Chapman, “violating all laws, human and divine.” The apex of immorality often existed 
in saloons where adherence to morality was optional. As described by historian Thomas 
Pegram, frontier drinking establishments emphasized excess with advertisements for 
cigars and images of female nudes papering the walls. As such, it is not that shocking that 
concerned wives also expressed their belief that drinking served as a gateway into other 
dangerous and costly vices. Gambling, usually card or dice playing, and carousing with 
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lewd women existed as objects of particular concern in the records. To prove cruelty a 
wife had to demonstrate that her husband’s participation in these activities damaged a 
family’s financial stability. Women would do this by linking the vices together to show a 
pattern of poor choices on the part of the husband. For example, the mother-in-law of 
Charles Rossiter recalled how he was a regular in Milwaukee-area gambling houses. 
Even when his wife was home pregnant, Charles was out on the town. On a January 
evening in 1847 he returned home drunk and “very cross” after a losing night. As it 
turned out, he had gambled away the couple’s rent money. However, he refused to issue 
any apology, and when questioned by his wife he retorted that “he would do as he dam’d 
please.” In contrast to the lengthy Rossiter petition, other wives might simply list their 
husband’s vices to prove the point of cruel financial mismanagement.22 
 In addition to protesting wasteful spending on immoral vices, antebellum wives 
made the contention that drunkard husbands regularly destroyed and damaged items in 
the household. Their claims fell on sympathetic ears because it was common knowledge 
that individuals under the influence of alcohol could prove extremely dangerous to people 
and possessions. However, sympathy alone would not result in verdicts finding marital 
cruelty. So, women attempted to show how they suffered inordinately following the 
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ruinous drunken sprees of men. To begin with, inebriated men tended to concentrate their 
destructive potential on items within the home. Clothing, bedding, and personal trinkets 
were all fair game. A man “cutting up” or in a state of intoxication might even break 
“windows, tables, crockery.” He could target the stove and kick it over, scattering ashes 
everywhere. Thomas Dowling of Wisconsin would regularly arrive home intoxicated, 
strip the table bare, and throw everything in his reach into the fireplace. Despite the fact 
that Harriett Dowling was well aware of this ruinous pattern she, along with other wives, 
proved helpless to prevent its reoccurrence. To avoid a fiery death Harriett eventually 
fled the home.
23
 
 While Thomas’s destructive behaviors bordered on homicidal, other husbands let 
loose of all inhibitions by vomiting or urinating on items in the home. These men were 
not simply occasionally ill due to indulgence in spirits, but actually used their bodily 
fluids as weapons to inflict pain on their wives. Virginian William Waid, for example, 
took particular pleasure in “making water” on his sleeping wife. As a witness to multiple 
incidents, Waid’s son testified that his father, although intoxicated, would act deliberately 
by pulling the sheets off of the sleeping woman and standing over her during the process. 
If these disgusting actions took place with regularity, a case could be built upon them 
alone. This was the approach taken by Milwaukee County resident Sarah Roper in her 
1847 divorce petition to the Wisconsin Territorial Legislature. Sarah requested a 
separation on the basis of her husband’s inability to conduct the most basic business due 
to his constant state of inebriation. Although the majority of the incidents described in the 
petition took place in New York, the couple’s original residence, the details are still 
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relevant to this work as an example of the damage that bodily fluids could cause. William 
Roper’s alcohol-induced illness was so frequent that numerous members of the household 
commented on it. Servants of both genders recalled him staggering about the house and 
vomiting on any and every thing. As a result of this perpetual regurgitation, his breath 
grew so “offensive” that the servants would actually get “sick at the stomach” upon 
speaking with him. His stepfather, John Newell, castigated William’s actions in court. 
Newell stated that William would “vomit about the house on the carpet & in the bed & 
some times attend to the calls of nature, in the house, in so much as to render it almost 
insupportable to remain in the house, on account of his filthiness.” And, finally, Sarah 
herself recalled how she was forced to sleep on the floor in the parlor or on the couch in 
order to avoid her husband’s “loathsomeness” in the bedroom. However, she wanted the 
court to note that she did not escape entirely, or abdicate her domestic duties, as she 
would rise in the early morning and attempt to clean the items her husband had “fouled” 
the night before. In courts across the three states, Sarah and other wives presented the 
claim that their husband’s alcohol-fueled destructive behaviors should not be tolerated by 
society. The women had numerous reasons for focusing their bills primarily on the 
damage done to domestic items. To begin with, these possessions were considered part of 
a woman’s domain and, therefore, wives were the most qualified to assess the extent of 
the injuries. In addition, when men damaged common household items, they also crippled 
a woman’s ability to perform basic household tasks, laying the groundwork for additional 
economic problems. And, finally, historians have noted how antebellum women were 
particularly inclined to assert possessive rights over personal items in the home. In 
situations of cruelty and intemperance, the effected wives felt an even stronger desire to 
154 
 
protect their financial well-being by approaching the court and placing domestic property 
beyond the reach of irresponsible spouses.
24
  
The “reckless management” of family finances perpetrated by the husbands in 
question also opened the door for women to request increased property and earnings 
protections in the face of demonstrated patriarchal abuses. As discussed throughout this 
chapter, intoxication often hindered a husband’s ability to participate fully and properly 
in the market. A man’s potential incompetence placed a widow, in particular, in a 
difficult position. Yielding to the norms of traditional marriage and despite possible 
indications of incompetence on the part of their intended partners, widows would 
generally permit husbands to control their property accumulated prior to marriage. Of 
course, in numerous cases, male heads of household simply assumed responsibility over 
all possessions of both partners without any consideration of the opinion of their spouse. 
Regardless, the divorce records provide evidence of those women who later regretted 
these arrangements. Widows might appear in court to request a divorce along with a 
payment for properties squandered. Or, they wanted legal assistance to prevent their 
spouses from seizing and selling additional holdings acquired pre-marriage. Simply put, 
the waste of properties due to “imprudence intemperance and mismanagement” was 
unacceptable. Widows who married intemperate men often benefited from changing laws 
regarding the control of married women’s property. By the late antebellum period all 
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three states in this study adhered to constitutional precepts aimed at protecting the 
property rights of women. In particular, the states safeguarded the possessions that 
women brought into the marriage by treating them as separate property. When women 
appeared in court they were essentially, in the words of historian Victoria Bynum, 
appealing to other men (judges and juries) for assistance in the face of patriarchal abuses. 
As a result, the vulnerability of the women masked the potential challenges to the male-
headed household contained in their complaints. After all, the divorce records sustained 
the idea that expanded conceptions of marital cruelty and intemperance allowed wives to 
claim increased rights to the fruits of their own labors.
25
 
 The “greater combativeness” of wives especially emerged if inebriate husbands 
attempted to seize their wages. Wisconsin women, in particular, mounted fervent 
defenses as to their rights to their individual earnings. Their insistence, perhaps, was born 
out of a culture in which women frequently worked outside of the home to support their 
idle spouses. Susan Hull, for example, tried to tell the court how frustrated she felt when 
her husband, an idle inebriate, took the money she earned by working out in other’s 
kitchens and spent it on liquor. Another woman, Adelaide Klemo, eventually failed in her 
attempt to keep a boarding house due to the cruel spending habits of her husband. 
Thomas Klemo would search out her secreted business profits and would spend the 
monies on various vices. As a result, Adelaide could not continue to purchase the 
provisions required for operation. Marital cruelty, in this case, meant taking possession of 
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the other spouse’s property for purposes not beneficial to the couple overall. As such, the 
women’s complaints centered upon the failure of an anticipated labor partnership in 
marriage. They also argued that in those situations in which wives were forced by 
circumstances into outside labor, they alone should choose how to utilize the profits. 
According to this logic, inebriate and idle husbands behaved cruelly when they claimed 
the privileges of rule afforded to proper patriarchs when they no longer belonged to that 
group.
26
  
 Even if a wife experienced all of the problems discussed above, it was still quite 
possible for her to lose her case if she did not at least attempt to reform her husband. As 
the moral vessels in marriage, wives keenly felt the obligation to uplift all members of 
their households. In situations of intemperance, society expected women to address the 
issue in-house before requesting outside assistance. If they did not, they were viewed by 
the law as guilty of cruelty as well. As such, the vast majority of wives who petitioned 
under cruelty and intemperance made sure to include at least a statement expressing their 
hope for their husband’s “reformation.” It was also common for women to assert that 
their husbands’ multiple failed promises of reform constituted cruelty as well. They 
would describe how they fell into a pattern of reconciling with a repentant spouse only to 
realize that all claims of rehabilitation were untrue. These attempts at reuniting proved 
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particularly damaging if the inebriate used them as opportunities to seize additional 
monies and property.
27
  
When we think of intoxication and marital conflict today, the image that instantly 
springs to mind is that of the battered wife cowering under the hand of the out-of-control 
inebriate husband. Physical violence, rightfully, dominates our understanding of the 
relationship between problem marriages and addiction. However, this has not always 
been the case. As the chapter argues, in the antebellum period, the wives of inebriates 
pursued divorces for intemperance and cruelty based on arenas of conflict that appear 
mundane on the surface. They described how intemperate husbands fostered distorted 
gender roles by failing to satisfy proper labor expectations. The cruel effects of such 
shifts in duty particularly affected the frontier wives of Wisconsin and Texas who labored 
under already challenging conditions. As this chapter has shown, through their attacks on 
growing tavern culture and their emphasis on manly bodily control, these antebellum 
women revealed the extent to which they expected marriages built upon mutually 
beneficial labor partnerships. While the rhetoric of companionate marriage provided 
additional protections to wives, this utilitarian view of relationships reflected recognition 
of survival needs in the face of changing market conditions.
28
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 As the drinking patterns of men faced increasing scrutiny, the habits of the female 
inebriate remained cloaked in obscurity. In particular, historians have noted how the 
intoxicated woman disappeared from the majority of reformist writings after the 1830s. 
The author of the early-nineteenth-century moral tract The Drunkard’s Looking Glass, for 
instance, devoted the entire text to the problems caused by intoxicated men. After all, 
chronicling the accounts of the moral failings of woman drunkards failed to accord with a 
growing emphasis on woman’s moral supremacy. Mirroring the antebellum silences, only 
a small handful of historians have discussed female drinking at any length. The great 
majority of these treatments have taken place within examinations of reformist 
movements. As a result, their source materials have not allowed for an analysis of the 
relationship between alcohol and women at the individual level. This chapter addresses 
this gap in the historiography by exploring antebellum perceptions of the cruel female 
drunk.
29
  
Luckily for historians, divorce records from the period provide details that testify 
to the fact that a small percentage of women continued to imbibe and communities, as a 
whole, talked about the actions of these deviants. Although this study does not undertake 
a statistical analysis of alcohol patterns, it is clear that women were accused of drinking 
far less frequently than their male counterparts. When female drinking was addressed, the 
comments made within divorce proceedings centered upon the ways in which 
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intoxication prevented a wife from fulfilling her labor responsibilities within the home 
environment. The words of the plaintiffs, defendants, and deponents pointed to the 
importance of women’s productivity, especially in frontier settings. As such, this study 
finds that a woman inebriate was deemed cruel when her failure to live up to role 
expectations, particularly in labor, resulted in family suffering. A husband’s petition, 
therefore, focused attention on his wife’s drinking patterns as well as the effects of her 
actions. Men pursuing divorces in this period needed to establish a solid link between 
intemperance and cruelty because, out of the three states studied, only Wisconsin 
recognized female intemperance as a cause for separation.
30
  
To receive a divorce it was necessary for an aggrieved husband to demonstrate 
that his wife’s imbibing was an established habit and not the product of an occasional 
lapse in judgment. To do this he could point to the frequency of drinking, the type of 
alcohol consumed, and troubling physical and mental behaviors. Although there was no 
set definition for what constituted drunkenness in women, the failure of basic motor skills 
was a chief indicator. With wives often attempting to hide their addictions from their 
husbands, a practice discussed later in this chapter, third party witnesses frequently 
provided the most detailed accounts of a woman’s habit. Outsiders could go to great 
lengths to observe particular behaviors in order to verify their suspicions regarding a 
particular woman. Fueled by curiosity and community policing motives, Philip Devolt of 
Wisconsin appeared in court and testified against a fellow boarder, a Mrs. Winterminte. 
He claimed that Mrs. Winterminte lived in a state of perpetual inebriation and therefore 
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Mr. Winterminte was justified in seeking a legal separation. Devolt related to the court 
how he had been meticulous in gathering evidence regarding Mrs. Winterminte’s 
behavior. First, he carefully listened to local rumors stating that she was in the habit of 
using liquor. Second, he engaged her in conversation and found her to be so intoxicated 
“that she could not talk distinctly.” As Devolt’s testimony illustrates, the antebellum 
divorce court was one arena in which discussion of a woman’s body was not only 
sanctioned but encouraged and witnesses seemed to relish the opportunity. One man even 
described how he secretly followed a local married woman home in order to observe her 
walking abilities and to verify his suspicions regarding her conduct. These men and 
women related tales in which, as historian David Pugh states, “The female body was 
viewed as a limited system with a limited supply of energy.” Spending nights out 
drinking or indulging in alcohol at all would deplete a woman’s reserve of strength by 
fostering excitability. Following this line of reasoning, a wife would then approach her 
home life not only with an irritable temper but with an inability to complete the most 
basic of tasks.
31
 
A chief complaint made in the record was that wives would leave their families 
for extended periods of time on drinking binges and/or would be uninterested in working 
while at home. Husbands across all three states expressed clear expectations that their 
wives at least participate in the preparation of meals and maintain a clean and orderly 
house in accordance with the family’s level in society. Patrick Murphy, a Wisconsin 
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husband, was confident that his wife was “neglecting her household duties” by drinking 
liquor to excess and, as a result, being unable to serve his supper or breakfast on time. He 
would argue with her frequently on this account, but made little headway. In fact, he 
alleged that his wife grew violent when he questioned her behavior. During one 
confrontation, she took up an axe and threatened to “split his brains out” if he did not turn 
over three dollars for her to purchase liquor. At another time she threw a bottle at the 
back of his head, knocking him down and rendering him senseless for an undetermined 
number of hours. When he awoke he discovered that his face was injured from the fall, 
making it impossible for him to labor for nearly two months. He claimed to the court that, 
not only did his wife fail to perform her own duties, she prevented him from completing 
his as well. Simply put, she was a liability and not an asset. This belief accords with a 
comment made by numerous husbands that a wife who neglected her household duties 
was less of a woman as a result. Her husband, therefore, owed her little to no protection 
or care.
32
  
Community members and litigants reserved their most vehement criticisms for 
women who performed badly as mothers due to their attachment to alcohol. The late 
antebellum period still held to many of the ideals of republican motherhood. According to 
these precepts, mothers were to set proper examples for their offspring. They were to 
treat their children with the greatest of care as society considered motherhood the most 
important office a woman could hold. Therefore, women who perpetrated maternal 
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abuses were castigated not only for committing injury against a child but also society as a 
whole.
33
 Consider, for example, the case of Louise Schaeffner. Louise’s husband Edward 
filed for divorce, after over a decade of marriage, claiming that his wife had developed an 
affinity for liquor that had left her incapable of “discharging her duties.” He could 
tolerate her abusive language and personal violence, but he drew the line when she began 
to corrupt their thirteen-year-old son. She would force the child to consume whiskey and, 
as a result, permanently compromised the boy’s health. The testimony of the local tavern 
keeper further tarnished Louise’s maternal credibility. He claimed that she came in two to 
four times a week and “drank every kind of stuff” available. Charles, the son in question, 
also provided an accounting of maternal neglect. He described how his mother kept her 
whiskey underneath the bed. She would sometimes start drinking in the morning and not 
rise up all day. He also recalled how his mother would give him whiskey “very often” 
and as a reward when he went to fetch some for her.
34
  
 The conversation and controversy surrounding Louise’s maternal skills 
represented a textbook example of the criticisms leveled against mothers who partook of 
alcohol to excess. The concern was that these women set bad examples as they imbibed 
intoxicants and cruelly encouraged addiction within their households. By forcing their 
children to drink, they permanently damaged their offspring’s health and future 
possibilities. Family members in a handful of cases even expressed a fear that a woman 
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might kill her infant via the misapplication of rum for teething or other ailments.
35
 These 
concerned parties spoke on the belief that drinking suppressed a woman’s natural 
maternal sensibilities, thus making all of these horrors possible if not likely. This cruelty 
on a woman’s part then forced her husband to shoulder the heavy burden of childcare. An 
unprepared father usually appeared in a favorable light when compared with a potentially 
dangerous mother. The neighbors of one conflict-ridden Virginia couple echoed this 
sentiment. The Higgs family watched as Martin and Elizabeth Fogle grew apart over 
time. Elizabeth began staying out nights, interacting with bad sorts of people, and openly 
drinking whatever she was offered. When Martin filed for divorce, the Higgs stepped 
forward to testify. According to their observations, Elizabeth could no longer act as a 
proper guardian for her young child because she “gets drunk and mistreats it she dont 
dress it well nor keep it clean.” Generally, they argued, the woman can do better for a 
child “but in this case...the man can do better.”  Elizabeth’s maternal failures paved the 
way for additional accusations that eventually led to her being divorced and losing 
custody of her sole child. For our purposes the Higgs case was illustrative of how a man 
could connect a woman’s shortcomings in areas of maternal labor with alcohol abuse and 
thereby prove marital cruelty.
36
  
In addition to the womanly duties of household upkeep and childcare, wives often 
acted as the chief purchasers of goods consumed within the home. This responsibility 
involved determining which items in what amounts a household needed to function. On a 
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less utilitarian front, women also acquired those non-essential items that transformed a 
house into a home. Because of their purchasing power, a woman’s decisions could 
greatly impact a family’s finances for good or ill. In the case record, many of the 
criticisms leveled against wives focused on their tendency to excess. Antebellum society 
anticipated a certain degree of ‘womanly’ impulse spending, but this consumerism 
crossed into cruelty when alcohol use impaired a woman’s ability to make reasonably 
sound purchasing decisions. Husbands and witnesses argued that a parallel existed in 
which a woman who could not control her drinking was also more prone to engage in 
ruinous financial practices. “Extravagant” was the typical descriptor used for such a 
woman. She lived her life in an immoderate and excessive fashion with no attempt at 
impulse control.
37
 
A cruel extravagant woman might use all of her family’s valuable resources to 
purchase selfish and wasteful items, such as liquor and tobacco. Robert Ingraham’s wife, 
for instance, gave little thought to financial stability. Shortly after their marriage, Robert 
discovered his wife’s hopeless addiction to intemperance. She would spend any and all 
monies “in order to procure the means of intoxication.” And, when these funds dried up 
and she grew desperate, “she would sell whatever goods...she could lay her hands on.” As 
a result, the majority of his personal items went missing “without his [prior] knowledge 
or consent.” Robert filed for divorce because his wife made no scruples about ill using 
him. The choice of the phrase “ill usage” reveals the degree to which his wife’s actions 
injured his masculinity and turned him into someone who felt used, as opposed to 
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exhibiting mastery. After all, “ill usage” comments usually appeared in tandem with 
complaints relating to a man’s treatment of a woman.38  
Extravagant cruelty could also occur if alcohol removed all of a woman’s 
inhibitions and led to her purchasing items beyond her station in life. In these scenarios, 
women who enjoyed lenient spending habits could transform into real dangers to the 
household upon the introduction of intoxicants. A handful of men in the records blamed 
themselves for allowing inordinate luxury to initially enter their relationships as part of 
the courtship process. However, according to these men, they expected their wives to rein 
in spending as the relationship progressed. They argued that cruel women not only 
ignored the duty of frugality but elevated expenditures with alcohol-fueled purchases. In 
a typical petition of this sort, one man described how he spoiled his intended bride with a 
wide variety of items before their marriage with the expectation that she would make 
careful financial choices after their nuptials. He asked the court to imagine his surprise 
when he discovered that his new bride intended to liquidate his entire estate to fund her 
growing liquor habit. Unable to cope with her corruption of duty, he pursued a 
separation. Virginia husbands, in particular, complained about the ways in which existing 
systems of credit opened the door for abuse by opportunistic, alcoholic wives. The 
Virginian Washington Chiles, for example, downplayed his own complicity in his wife’s 
cruelties. He related to the court how a brief solo trip to the West spelled his financial 
ruin. Despite being well acquainted with the fact that his wife suffered from “disgusting 
excess” in drink and money, Chiles left her in their marital home with access to unlimited 
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credit under his name. When he returned, “he heard from all quarters of the continued 
extravagance of his wife.” He later learned that she had plunged him deep into debt.  
Even with the widespread existence of debt during this period, to be a debtor was still a 
blemish upon one’s character. Husbands spoke with one voice when they proclaimed that 
only a cruel wife would be complacent in shackling them to debt. In addition, many of 
the spouses in Texas and Wisconsin emphasized to the court how they had migrated to 
these locales out of a hope for financial prosperity. Under these circumstances a wife’s 
capricious spending proved even more harmful as it could render an entire migration 
meaningless.
39
 
As they brought their financial problems to court, husbands often faced a series of 
difficult questions as to why they did not interfere earlier, take action to prevent a wife’s 
drinking, and thereby ensure their household’s stability. Within their answers the men in 
question presented the image of marriages characterized by secrecy instead of 
companionate transparency. They claimed that they possessed no prior knowledge of 
their wife’s weakness for drink until it developed into a problematic habit. To make this 
point plausible and to sustain their reputation as patriarchs, they described various 
methods by which a woman might keep her affinity for alcohol a secret. One Wisconsin 
man recalled how his wife would obtain liquor secretly while he worked away from the 
house as a blacksmith. The art of deception seemed particularly well-suited to 
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housewives as husbands traced how their partners used a woman’s intimate knowledge of 
the household to hide items in places that others overlooked. Concealing alcohol from 
detection might simply involve emptying a bottle of one substance and refilling it with 
intoxicants. Unfortunately, this practice also increased the risk of household poisonings. 
This pattern of supposedly private, home-based indulgence in alcohol on the part of 
women is in accordance with historian Thomas Pegram’s description of late 1850s saloon 
behavior. When women would patronize these public establishments they would avoid 
the social “male drinking culture,” preferring instead to approach at the back door for 
beverages to go. A portable order in this case generally translated to mean a bottle of 
booze. All of these efforts at concealment revealed their hope that, by drinking within the 
boundaries of the home, they would minimize damage to their reputation. However, as 
Laura Edwards and others have shown, total privacy was a difficult thing to achieve, even 
in antebellum America. Local reports and rumors held immense credibility and usually 
focused on one-time private matters made public. It was quite often only a matter of time 
before a woman’s imbibing entered the realm of public knowledge.40  
As such, husbands who sought divorces might convincingly claim that they first 
learned of the habits of their wives through the intervention of neighbors and community 
members. According to these narratives, a wife could successfully hide her addiction for 
a significant period of time before her spouse grew concerned. These suspicions, often 
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focusing on a woman’s diminished labor productivity, would then be confirmed in the 
form of local reports. Armed with what they considered reliable community knowledge, 
husbands would then feel qualified to act. For example, Jonathan and Margaret Bridges 
married in New Jersey and then moved to Wisconsin by the late 1850s. Jonathan believed 
that his family’s new situation was ideal until his neighbors alerted him to a potential 
problem. They told Jonathan that Margaret was fond of drinking excessively in his 
absence. To test this information, Jonathan began coming home unexpectedly during the 
day and discovered, to his horror, that the community reports were correct. He frequently 
found his wife “so badly intoxicated that she scarcely knew anything.” Whereas he had 
previously believed that she was just a poor housekeeper, he now knew that her weakness 
for intoxicants was what made her unable to complete the most basic of household tasks. 
After a brief period of trying to persuade Margaret to cease in her negative behaviors, 
Jonathan gave up and approached the court requesting a divorce on the grounds of 
drunkenness, cruelty, and neglect.
41
 
Jonathan confronted a common dilemma faced by antebellum men in troubled 
marriages when he contemplated whether or not to attempt to reform his marital partner. 
As described by historian Scott Martin, the burden of reforming fallen drunkards usually 
fell to women, so men in this position ventured into uncharted territory. It was, therefore, 
not that surprising that husbands felt unsure as to how to proceed. As they described their 
actions to the court they would stress how they were not experts in moral arenas, but 
exerted great efforts to save their wives nonetheless. One Wisconsin man recalled how he 
destroyed gallons of liquor hidden by his wife, ordered the children and servants not to 
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fetch anymore for her, and did “everything in his power to reclaim” her from 
intemperance. It all failed, however, and she continued stockpiling alcohol in secret. 
Filing for divorce was his final attempt to reach her. Other men would adopt less physical 
measures and instead try to counsel their wives back to temperance. As heads of 
household they were accustomed to having their voices heard and acknowledged so they 
could only respond with shock when their wives “rejected & disregarded” their counsel. 
The divorce records provide numerous examples of how reform could prove a rocky road 
for husbands. But, it was a path that men had to take in order to meet the minimum 
qualifications for a divorce.
42
  
We find, therefore, that a handful of men attempted to implement a policy of 
containment when faced with inebriated wives who behaved cruelly. Containing a wife 
was a process by which husbands would isolate their partners out of a desire to minimize 
the damage caused by their drinking. The records most frequently mention men locking 
their spouses in particular rooms. If questions arose regarding this strategy, husbands 
proved ready with answers. They might, for example, comment that this practice kept a 
wife’s drunken sprees from disturbing the neighbors. In the words of a Wisconsin 
husband, shutting up his wife in a room until “she should become sober & quiet,” was not 
an ideal solution, but it did address her excessive noise level.  Although the racket caused 
by a drunkard might appear minimal in retrospect, antebellum men and women provided 
evidence as to how such disturbances could even compromise a family’s living 
arrangements. They could get thrown out of a house of boarders. In these situations the 
wife’s intoxicated actions proved costly as the family now had to pay a premium for 
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lodging, especially in a small community. In addition, a husband might attempt to contain 
his wife if she had tried on prior occasions to disrupt or destroy his potential to earn a 
living.  Numerous witnesses testified to the fact that having a drunken wife appear at 
one’s workplace could easily get a man fired. In general, a woman’s movements outside 
of the home could already prove problematic, but a wife who refused to recognize any 
boundaries was particularly threatening to family economic stability.
43
   
While not as widespread a problem as male alcoholism, the female drunk still 
served as the centerpiece of many heated divorce cases. Within these proceedings, 
community members and aggrieved spouses expressed their concerns about how a 
woman’s affinity for alcohol might pose a threat to her family’s financial stability and 
thereby constitute cruelty. In addition, female drinking proved problematic because it 
made plain the “artificiality of domesticity.”  It forced society to come to terms with the 
fact that not all women were capable of proper behavior. When women imbibed they 
perverted gender roles by exercising what was seen as a masculine prerogative. And they 
behaved cruelly by no longer occupying a submissive marital stance characterized by 
continual devotion to household enterprise. A bodily rebellion of this nature was 
troubling even if it was not intentional. As such, this chapter has shown that the 
conversations surrounding cruel and inebriate wives revealed society’s ambivalence 
regarding women’s changing economic roles. The destructive actions of intoxicated 
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wives demonstrated the degree to which husbands felt marked discomfort with their 
reliance upon their wives’ prowess in areas of production and consumption.44  
 Paying close attention to gender and region, this chapter has chronicled the 
attempts by antebellum men and women to give shape to the amorphous social ills of 
intemperance and marital cruelty. It has argued that the performance of labor 
responsibilities served as the primary determining factor as to whether or not a spouse’s 
intoxication shaded into cruelty. The inebriate husband could pose a threat to family 
stability in numerous ways. He might refuse to engage in any category of paid work, thus 
placing the burden of breadwinning on his spouse. Or, he could abdicate all responsibility 
for household upkeep, thereby exposing his marital partner to community censure and 
ridicule. The intoxicated wife, while appearing less frequently in the records, could prove 
equally dangerous to a family’s survival. She might ignore her domestic duties, including 
those of a maternal nature, thus forcing her husband to engage in tasks typically labeled 
feminine. Or, she could abuse her consumer prerogative by spending excessively, thereby 
indebting the household. Regardless of the gender of the person in question, frontier 
communities such as Wisconsin and Texas appeared to suffer inordinately from the 
intoxicated cruelties of residents. As witnesses to developing economies, men and 
women complained to the courts that struggling families paid the cost for thriving 
drinking cultures. An examination of intemperance and marital cruelty allows for an 
extended engagement with the ways in which understandings of marriage and the body 
intersected to redefine the nature of mutual spousal obligation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MARITAL INTERVENTIONS:  
COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED CRUELTY 
 
The Grinnin’s small Wisconsin home could not contain their domestic troubles. 
Rumors and reports about the conflicted couple trickled out into the community at a 
consistent pace from the date of their marriage in June 1843 until the veritable floodgates 
of scandal opened four years later when Mary Grinnin filed for divorce. She pursued an 
intriguing strategy in the courtroom by presenting her case with almost none of the 
rhetorical flourishes that were common during this period. In the bill, Michael Grinnin, 
Mary’s husband, comes across as an overbearing drunk who enjoyed tormenting his wife 
by burning her clothes and threatening her life at regular intervals. Further reading of the 
court documents reveals that detailed testimonies provided by neighbors and relatives of 
the couple served to corroborate Mary’s general statements. Hannah Dooley, Mary’s 
sister, who lived with the couple for “a while,” described how Michael would “drive her 
[Mary] about as he would a dog.” From Hannah’s statement, we are presented with the 
image of one sister watching the other one being abused without intervening or offering 
immediate assistance. It appears as if Hannah hoped that her very presence would lessen 
the degree of the conflict, and she felt that she could best help her sister by making a 
mental record of these supposedly private marital troubles.
1
   
In an unexpected twist in the case record, it was a nearby neighbor who served as 
Mary’s primary confidante and protector. Catharine Grogan, a local woman, tried to stay 
out of the Grinnin’s marital troubles but was drawn into the fray by Mary’s repeated 
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requests for assistance. After only a month of marriage, Mary arrived at Catharine’s 
house ostensibly on a social visit. However, when her neighbor managed to stay all day 
and began to relate stories of spousal abuse and dissipation, Catharine realized that 
Mary’s appearance at her doorstep was not mere happenstance. As night drew near, 
Catharine tried to convince her guest to return home only to have the troubled woman 
refuse to leave until Catharine agreed to serve as her escort. When they arrived at the 
Grinnin household, Catharine stayed a while and witnessed as Michael arrived home and 
“immediately commenced abusing the said Mary,” including attempting to pour scalding 
water on her from a coffee pot. He “would have succeeded” had Catharine not, with all 
her “energy, interfered and prevented him.” When she believed that everyone had calmed 
down, she finally returned home, only to be followed shortly by Mary, who had been 
thrown out of the house. Mary would continue to seek refuge with her neighbor-protector 
for years. For her part, Catharine grew increasingly aggressive in protecting the abused 
woman. In one instance when Michael attempted to hit his wife with a chair, Catharine 
“by force beat him off with a stick of wood.” As such, when she learned of the impending 
divorce, Catharine could feel justified in breathing a veritable sigh of relief that her 
household would no longer be disrupted by the Grinnins’ troubles.2 
This chapter explores how third parties, such as Catharine, in communities and 
households across antebellum Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin, reacted and responded 
when faced with possible situations of marital cruelty. Divorce records from this period 
again and again reveal outsiders being forced to make a series of moral choices when 
confronted with marital discord. As such, if we turn again to the Grinnin divorce case, we 
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can ascertain a sequence of the choices made by third-party witnesses. Hannah 
determined whether or not to intervene after witnessing Michael abusing her sister. After 
listening to Mary’s accusations, Catharine considered if she should let Mary stay the 
night on that initial visit or send her home. Her decision to mix activism with restraint 
would set the tone for her approach to similar moral dilemmas. In particular, she would 
later choose to meet Michael’s use of violence with her own in order to protect Mary, 
who she perceived as a victim. This chapter explores how the involvement of third parties 
in situations of marital discord was determined by their understandings of proper 
domestic relations as well as their beliefs in domestic privacy. To begin with, these men 
and women assessed whether or not they thought that cruelties were actually occurring. 
Then, their perspective on public/private divides shaped whether or not they took any 
actions and in what manner they responded.
3
  
Social responses to scenarios of domestic violence occurred in differing ways 
across the three states examined within this study. In Virginia, well-entrenched 
community networks of report and rumor moved household conflicts into the realm of 
public discussion and commentary. Armed with this information, community members 
intervened in marriages that disrupted the peace, exercising care to frame their actions in 
ways that would not lead to retaliation on the part of a violent spouse. Their hesitance to 
resort to physical confrontation suggests that southern society condoned violence only 
against certain bodies, particularly slaves, and made concerted efforts to categorize the 
white household as a space free from cruelty against whites. This finding is significant in 
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that it gives further credence to this dissertation’s contention that Virginia society was not 
universally bloodthirsty but instead carefully policed the practice of marital cruelties in 
order to present the image of an orderly, composed, benevolent southern domestic 
culture. In contrast, the community responses in Texas reflected its existence as a hybrid 
southern frontier society. Embryonic understandings of community combined with 
fragmentary communication networks led to outsider involvement characterized by 
spontaneity and immediate information gathering, as opposed to carefully planned 
mediations based on long-term knowledge of abuses. The evidence suggests that Texans 
would have implemented the strategies employed by Virginians but were prevented from 
doing so by the presence of frontier conditions.  
Finally, Wisconsin residents demonstrated a willingness to engage in physical 
conflicts in order to curb marital cruelties. They would attempt only limited mediation up 
until the point at which the discord in question reached a level of perceived near lethality. 
When this threshold was reached, third parties of both genders would intervene violently 
in order to establish local peace. Countering brutality with brutality, the actions of these 
third parties betrayed the impossibility of looking to formal, or even local, legal cultures 
for assistance in this frontier environment. It can be concluded, therefore, that the 
proximity to frontier conditions shaped the pattern of interference adopted by third 
parties. Men and women in established communities, such as Virginia, relied upon local 
resources which, in turn, pushed them towards nonviolent solutions. In contrast, men and 
women in frontier environments had limited community and communication networks 
and, as a result, emphasized violent solutions to violent problems.  
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 Although they might engage in disparate approaches to intervention, the majority 
of third parties tried to behave in ways that were innately conservative. Essentially, 
citizens in all three states did not categorize their actions or intentions in terms of 
dismantling marriages or directly challenging accepted marital norms. Rather, these third 
parties represented a general public desire to perfect the marriage script in a time of 
perceived national marital crisis. Across regional lines, men and women attempted to 
maintain the “peace.” Borrowing my definition from Laura Edwards’s recent work, the 
“peace” was “a well-established Anglo-American concept that expressed the ideal order 
of the metaphorical public body.” Edwards continues on to describe how localized law 
was critical to the keeping of the “peace” as it gave primacy to local factors and 
knowledge and, in limited ways, recognized the contributions of legal nonentities to the 
peace process. However, as Edwards focuses on North Carolina and South Carolina 
exclusively, the question remains as to how understandings of the peace were shaped by 
regional concerns. Taking a comparative perspective beyond established southern states 
is significant in that it shows that while the peace was a goal in a wide range of locales, it 
was not the same in all areas. A national approach also suggests how violence was 
viewed in relation to the peace and how cruelties were understood by the general 
populace.
4
 
 The moral choices faced by third parties witnessing cruelties sheds additional 
light on mid-nineteenth-century struggles to define the degree to which family and 
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marriage relations belonged in the realm of private or public affairs. Historians have 
described how this period marked a “crucial transition” in the relationship of the family 
to the state and to the public sphere. According to the standard historical narrative, as 
traditional rights of chastisement waned, cruel husbands voiced their desire to maintain 
domestic spaces no longer policed by outsiders. At the same time, states across the 
country were passing divorce laws that increasingly intervened within the home for the 
sake of community peace. These tensions persist well into our modern period where 
domestic privacy continues to be interpreted by scholars as code language ‘for the right to 
beat one’s spouse without recourse.’ Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and 
historians have all created works that examine the connections between the development 
of public policy focusing on domestic violence and understandings of privacy. One 
conclusion is that, “when an event is privatized, it is also depoliticized.” Therefore, a 
grasp of these struggles in antebellum society holds real import for our modern-day 
discussions of abuse.
5
  
 Although this chapter relies upon divorce records, it does not attempt to 
demonstrate that divorce as a form of third-party intervention characterized the norm. 
Instead, it will discuss how local communities participated in the marital conversations 
that led to the creation of divorce cases. Legal separations quite often resulted from 
complex, occasionally long, processes of social negotiations that traversed many 
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understandings of the public/private divide. As such, the chapter is organized to mimic 
the process of discovery and possible action that each outsider went through. It starts 
within the household itself by exploring how marital troubles could become an 
unfortunate fact-of-life for children, boarders, and slaves/servants. Then, it turns attention 
to the ways in which this information spread from the supposedly private home sphere 
out into public spaces and how that process differed from state to state. Finally, the 
analysis then delves into the variety of ways in which outsiders responded when faced 
with cruel spouses. The chapter presents a series of moral choices and scenarios in which 
third parties faced a constantly heightening sense of the possibility of bodily harm to 
them or others as a result of their decisions.
6
  
 Not surprisingly, the individuals who lived with a discordant couple were 
generally the first persons to notice that something was ‘off’ in the relationship. Even 
when disputes took place behind closed doors, the presence of thins walls and poorly 
partitioned rooms virtually guaranteed that other inhabitants would be privy to all 
categories of supposedly private activity. Children, in particular, related stories to the 
divorce courts focusing on the difficulties inherent in being tied to a conflicted household 
with few means of escape.
7
 In addition, servants, slaves, and boarders might witness 
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marital disputes while living in other’s households. Legal prescriptions generally barred 
slaves from providing testimony in divorce cases in southern courts, so boarders 
comprise our primary source base from the list above.
8
 Often treated as invisible by the 
warring parties and not labeled as guests, boarders did not benefit from the ideals of 
public restraint that might have prevented couples from placing them in the midst of 
uncomfortable situations of domestic conflict. Boarding, as historian Kathleen Conzen 
observes for Wisconsin, was intended as a way to integrate single men and women into 
family situations. A boarder received varying degrees of food and lodging in return for 
labor performed or monies paid. These arrangements were driven by a society’s basic 
needs but also provided an avenue through which to regulate supposedly dangerous solo 
individuals. Ironically, boarders could be the ones to call for increased controls on the 
men and women who ran boarding houses.
9
  
 Long-term boarders generally provided the courts with the most useful and 
detailed accounts, but this information came at a cost. Forced to be conciliatory or lose 
their lodgings, boarders could be pressured to serve as a confidante for one or both of the 
marital partners. James Bailey, a boarder of Virginia couple Frances and James Jones, 
was burdened by the knowledge that Mr. Jones had contracted a venereal disease as a 
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result of committing adultery. Jones not only asked Bailey what he should do to cure the 
illness but actually bought medicines and kept them in the boarder’s room so as to avoid 
detection by his wife. This, of course, created an extremely awkward situation for Bailey 
that culminated in his testifying for Mrs. Jones in the divorce hearing. Instances such as 
these reminded boarders that they lived as members of the household but possessed no 
connected rights to privacy. Other household inhabitants could invade a boarder’s 
physical space and mental energies at a moment’s notice. Refusing to listen to such 
information was always an option, albeit with the cost of potentially losing one’s lodging 
locale. There was really no winning position in these scenarios for boarders, therefore it 
is not that surprising that they generally did not feel as if they were responsible for 
keeping these cruelties safely contained within the domestic sphere.
10
 
 The question then becomes, how did these stories make their way into the public 
domain? Outsiders needed to become aware that a problem existed before they could 
decide whether or not to act. Not surprisingly, this process of information transfer took 
different forms across the three states. In Virginia, complicated community networks 
ensured that local men and women were well aware of a marriage in trouble before they 
actually witnessed any direct evidence of cruelty. Informal information systems served as 
the primary means for spreading gossip and news. The significance of these flows of fact 
and rumor cannot be overlooked by historians of the South or, I would argue, of the 
United States. Much like the modern-day telephone game, a single incident might spark 
the initial set of rumors, but the conversations quickly took on a life of their own. All 
members of society were allowed to participate, to varying degrees, in this spread of 
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information. Therefore, as a handful of historians have argued, these community reports 
provided avenues through which legally marginalized groups could establish a socially 
respected and recognized dialogue. These conversations, in turn, were of no small 
importance because they served, in part, to regulate social norms and to keep the peace 
intact.
11
  
 The passage of knowledge into the public sphere also mirrored the movement of 
bodies from one space into another. Communication networks thrived in environments in 
which a high degree of visiting and socializing took place. Virginians possessed the 
opportunity to reside in established communities more frequently than persons in 
Wisconsin or Texas did. As such, Virginia residents lived in areas long enough for the 
boundaries protecting domestic privacy to erode under the pressures of community 
policing needs. The network drew all members of the community into its folds, and 
household members such as slaves—often referred to as “servants” in the records—who 
were unable to appear in court, nonetheless contributed to the spread of rumors regarding 
dysfunctional marriages between whites. William Matthews Blackford, a Virginia 
resident of the 1850s, was able to write in his diary about the troubles in the neighboring 
Dabney household because it had become the “town talk.” The Dabneys’ servants/slaves 
witnessed the supposed culmination of the “domestic feud...in the midst of a storm last 
Sunday” and provided the “town” with varying versions of the squabble. Now, armed 
with stories passed along by others, Blackford was able to sit in his study and note in his 
diary that the Dabneys were headed for a separation. The community reports gave him 
the opportunity to form an opinion about a matter that really did not impact him directly. 
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Or did it? Reports in the South helped to shore up the belief that individual failures to 
uphold proper hierarchies contributed to the possible destruction of southern society as a 
whole. When chaos reigned in one household, it could spread to others like a contagion. 
Accordingly, Blackford may have felt as if he was performing some form of policing for 
the public good by being aware of and by commenting, even privately, on the Dabneys’ 
marital troubles.
12
 
 Community reports escalated in importance if a couple entered into divorce 
proceedings. Local judges and juries, as inhabitants of the area, wanted to know what 
other people had heard about the couple. Presenting community reports in courtrooms 
really reached the level of performance art in Virginia. Witnesses generally would cite 
“public rumors” or “prejudicial reports” or “common reports” or “common beliefs” as the 
source of their knowledge on the domestic relations of others.
13
 Language is important 
here. The use of “common” implied that this information belonged to everyone while 
simultaneously indicating that these reports were somehow below the moral threshold of 
the witness. Virginians repeatedly expressed their ambivalence about local reports, yet 
they relied on them incessantly. While testifying regarding the troubles of two of his 
long-term family friends, William Sambeth recalled that it was the “common belief in the 
neighborhood” that the man treated the woman cruelly. However, Sambeth then backed 
off his initial statement, somewhat, by adding, “This I do not know for it is the opinion of 
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the neighborhood and I have reason to believe it is so.”14  So, why would Sambeth affirm 
the accuracy of the report while also casting doubt on its truthfulness? This was a 
widespread practice, in part, because witnesses wanted to protect their own bodily 
integrity by not straying too far into the realm of slander. Prefacing statements with an “I 
heard...” or “people know” allowed a witness to take the pressure of validity off of his/her 
shoulders and place it on the community system. These verbal maneuvers possessed the 
additional effect of making witnesses appear far more neutral than they actually were in 
fact. Community members could, and did, pass along their personal opinions to the court 
under the cloak of recounting rumors and reports.
15
  
Virginians would invest tidbits of rumor with great import, even if they 
downplayed this reliance to the court. The example of Mary Higman is instructive. She 
witnessed her father abusing her mother on a daily basis until Mary finally escaped the 
household and moved to a neighboring area. Unable to maintain consistent 
communication with her mother following the move, Mary worried greatly for her safety. 
When they reunited in court during the Higman’s divorce proceeding, Mary told her 
mother that, “I was looking every week to here [sic] of his killing you.” She relied on, 
and expected, local reporting networks to traverse the distance and inform her of her 
mother’s death with speedy accuracy, if the occasion arose. Mary’s actions accord with 
what historian Joshua Rothman has observed for antebellum Richmond. He found that 
women placed enough faith in local communication networks that they were willing to 
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risk interpersonal confrontation based upon rumors of sexual infidelities. During this 
period a community report contained the validity of actionable knowledge.
16
    
In addition to community networks, in order to understand the context in which 
Virginians made their decisions to intervene, or not, we must also briefly explore the 
commonly held beliefs regarding honor in the South. Southern honor, according to 
Bertram Wyatt-Brown, dictated the ways in which southerners interacted with one 
another. As such, it was not one’s actual character that mattered so much as the public 
perceptions attached to one’s person. Being honorable meant being perceived by the 
community as embodying the ideals of honor. In theory, honor contributed to 
southerners’ erecting proverbial walls between the public and private spheres. In practice 
this was not the case, as the degree to which local opinion was valued above all else led 
to the establishment of complex community policing systems. For the sake of general 
societal well-being and for the protection of the peace, individuals were encouraged to 
violate privacy norms and to feed information into rumor and report networks.
17
 It is 
important to note, however, that participating in these conversations was not without a 
cost, and witnesses regularly walked a fine line between assisting in maintaining the 
peace and becoming the target of retaliatory violence. A local report held the potential to 
ruin a person’s standing in a close-knit community and could sink all hopes of personal 
or economic success, leaving him/her with vengeance on the mind. One man wrote a 
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letter to an acquaintance describing how any possibility for a better life was “gone 
forever” due to the gradual “creeping on” of reports and rumors. Aside from being 
accused locally of “trying to get up an insurrection of the negroes,” he was also rumored 
to have been “abusive” to his family. Partially admitting the familial abuse, he lamented 
that he “would to god” that he could manage his family more effectively and asked for 
his friend’s advice and assistance. At the same time, he offered to “meet justice” with the 
rumor-mongers, a coded phrase for offering violence to their persons. Again, by their 
very participation in local communication networks, individuals entered a realm where 
retribution was a very real possibility.
18
  
Let us turn our attention for a moment to explore the context in which Texas 
residents made their decisions whether or not to intervene in situations of marital discord. 
Texas, as a state populated mainly by southerners during this period, could be expected to 
possess community networks that mimicked those found in Virginia, but the records do 
not reflect this perception. Only a handful of the divorce records used in this study 
reference reports or rumors. This absence is especially striking when one examines the 
Texas files in comparison to those in Virginia over the same time span. Why the disparity 
between the two states? To begin with, my work supports the argument made by Carolyn 
Earle Billingsley that families comprised much of the migrant antebellum Texas 
population. However, these groups could not directly transplant their ‘home’ cultures into 
their new environment, no matter how hard they might have tried. Visiting, for example, 
often fell by the wayside in Texas because settlement was scattered, the roads were in 
generally horrendous conditions, and travelling could prove quite hazardous.  Without 
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this interconnectedness in terms of the movement of bodies between households, the 
initial information upon which reports were built could not be gathered. In addition, 
Texas husbands made the claim that interventions by outsiders weakened already 
unstable gender roles and threatened to throw even peaceful households into chaos. Male 
household heads, therefore, fostered an environment in which third party interveners 
were more likely to be castigated by broader society as meddlesome troublemakers than 
social saviors. All of these factors resulted in weak rumor networks fueled by chance 
intrusions into private marital conflicts and hence fewer opportunities for local reports to 
enter into formal legal consideration.
19
   
Antebellum Wisconsin shared many of the frontier characteristics found within 
Texas, so it could be expected that local residents would place less importance on gossip 
and rumor than did residents of Virginia. This assumption proves true, to a limited extent. 
Wisconsin inhabitants appeared to create spontaneous pathways of information when 
faced with situations of extreme brutality that they believed required a response in kind. 
They did not use local reports as the basis for long-term mediation but would come 
together as a community to share their concerns in only the most extreme of 
circumstances. For example, when Thomas Davey struck his wife with an axe, one 
witness commented that “it was understood in the neighborhood” that he had done so. 
Other witnesses said that they “heard” about the incident and came to the house to 
examine Davey’s wife as she lay bleeding with a partially severed arm. Wisconsin 
residents knew a great deal about one another from the daily contact necessary in an 
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interconnected agricultural society, but they did not put these insights into practice 
without an assurance that the violation of privacy could potentially protect a life. Even 
with this high threshold for intervention, the frequency of their interventions testifies to 
the degree to which Wisconsin society was conflicted and violent.
20
  
Before this chapter heads into a discussion of the various tactics used by third 
parties to intervene in problem marriages, from mediation to charivaris, it is important to 
briefly examine another avenue through which men and women learned of these 
situations of discord. Again, they had to become informed before they could choose to 
act. Communities, particularly in Virginia, could encounter the evidence of marital 
cruelty via a public display of injuries sustained by the victim. In a similar fashion as 
today, the majority of those men and women who were targets of spousal abuse would 
choose to hide their marks and bruises by employing carefully placed clothing items or 
by isolating themselves throughout the healing process. A small Wisconsin boy told the 
court that his mother would “hide the marks” left on her throat from her father’s choking 
attack on her by wearing “a handkerchief on her neck for several days after.”21  
However, in Virginia a phenomenon developed alongside the growth of local 
reporting networks, that of showing wounds and scars to community members. Women, 
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in particular, would display the marks from the cruelties that they sustained at the hands 
of their spouses. On occasion, these body examinations would occur in the home of the 
victim, generally in a room separate from the abuser. These interactions were informal, 
and often secretive, affairs as women or men crept off to what they deemed a private 
space to view the victim’s body. A short while after James Fulford whipped his wife and 
dragged her from room to room, a witness and boarder, Mary Rayner, approached Rosina 
Fulford in an effort to view her injuries. As Rayner describes, “I examined her the same 
night and found marks upon her person.”  Rayner concluded her testimony by stating 
that, “I do not regard him [James Fulford] with respect.” In actuality, the type of bodily 
display made by Rosina Fulford has a long history within Virginia. Back into the colonial 
period, community members and local authorities investigating crimes such as infanticide 
would perform a ‘reading of the body’ to determine cause of death and other information. 
Everything from bruises to blood patterns would be explored and described in detail for 
the records. In a way, Rayner was conducting a live autopsy on Mary Fulford. Through 
this macabre practice she was examining the body in order to piece together a more 
complete picture of the entire marriage. The principal difference being, of course, that 
Mary was alive during the exam, but that, of course, could change if the cruelties 
continued, and both women knew this.
22
  
 The ease of movement in Virginia also led to body viewings taking place while 
the victim visited another person’s house. The social call could be made with this express 
intention on the part of the woman, or the display could develop as part of the interaction. 
When Anne Souther went over to the house of Patsey Wyatt, she showed Wyatt the 
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injuries that she sustained from a whipping twelve days earlier. After Wyatt had looked 
over Souther’s body, she came to the determination that the bruises “looked very dark 
indeed.” Why did Souther go to the trouble of visiting Wyatt and displaying her body? 
Souther approached the other woman because she wanted the community to be aware of 
her sufferings, to make note of them in the event of a divorce, and perhaps to render 
immediate assistance. In a way, Souther was making a case before the community court 
of report and opinion, and her body served as her evidence. Local reports fed off of and 
were sustained by such displays. A victim could get an immediate read on the perspective 
of the neighborhood based upon whether or not an outsider would even consent to the 
viewing procedure. If met with a positive reaction, sympathy, a victim would often put 
their injuries on display numerous times for different community members. Sarah 
Womack, for example, showed her bruises to Mary C. Carlton, William Webb, and 
others.
23
   
 These displays appear to fly in the face of accepted and proper body interactions. 
Modesty and substantial clothing coverage was the sign of a lady in southern society. 
However, historian Charlene Boyer Lewis asserted in her work on Virginia’s planter 
interactions at the natural springs that “the public discussion of one’s body,” normally a 
social taboo, was accepted at the springs because of the connections to health and well-
being. In a similar fashion, nudity could even be seen as permissible if it took place as 
part of a community investigation into cruelties. The historical records contain 
information on women who bared all to make their cases in the court of public opinion. A 
Mecklenberg County, Virginia, wife took off all of her clothes and showed her neighbor 
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the “great many marks of violence” on her person. In another county, two women 
enjoyed an evening together until the conversation turned to the constant beatings that 
one of the parties suffered at the hands of her husband. As the abused woman rose to 
leave, she turned around in the yard and raised her dress up high to show all of her 
person, including the stripes and bruises across her flesh. From her position on the porch, 
the female companion and confidante made a mental note of the placement and depth of 
the lash marks.
24
  
 On the other hand, the practice of displaying injuries was not as well-established 
in either Texas or Wisconsin. Texas settlers, as mentioned earlier, simply did not have the 
travelling abilities necessary to visit others to show their bruises and scars. Deponents 
would mention seeing evidences of cruelties on the victim’s bodies, but the entire process 
was not nearly as ritualized as in Virginia. This was a problem that fed itself. Men and 
women did not show their injuries to others because they could not rely on established 
networks to pass along these scenes. At the same time, local systems of reporting could 
only be built with information provided, in part, by such displays. In the case of 
Wisconsin, witnesses would recall seeing bruises or injuries in visiting scenarios, but the 
process of display was, again, not in evidence.
25
 
 Even when confronted with a victim’s battered and bruised body, the community 
impulse in all three states was, again, geared towards fixing the marriage in question and 
not dissolving it. However, the methods that outsiders used to achieve these aims varied 
greatly from state to state. As this chapter contends, interventions made by third parties 
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were guided by their particular understandings of what domestic privacy meant as well as 
what constituted marital cruelty. In the preceding pages we have laid the groundwork for 
how community members might learn of abuses through local reports or bodily displays. 
This chapter will now turn its attention to the various approaches employed by outsiders 
dealing with marital discord, beginning with a discussion of rendering assistance on the 
most basic level and moving to more aggressive approaches, such as community shaming 
rituals.  
 Instead of intervening during the actual perpetration of a marital assault, many 
outsiders would lie in wait and try to help injured husbands and wives recover following 
attacks. Those third parties who chose to provide aid in this way could have been trying 
to speed along the healing process or perhaps simply hoping to ensure the survival of the 
victim. Not trivial, these neighborly practices could save lives as physical marital 
confrontations could leave one or both spouses with critical or crippling injuries, as 
described in a previous chapter. The example of Philip Miller is instructive. He lived with 
his sister and her husband. One evening he returned home to find his sister lying on the 
floor following a beating at the hands of her husband. Acting quickly, Philip “took her up 
& carried her up stairs & put her to bed.” Philip also noted that his course of action was 
rendered even more necessary as “she was in a family way” at the time. His deposition 
provides no other commentary on the incident except to mention that his brother-in-law 
tended to get drunk, making the incident not overly surprising to him. Philip’s 
intervention was victim-focused; he did not dwell on the actions of the husband because 
what mattered at the moment, and what he could fix, revolved around his sister. His 
reticence to castigate the husband perhaps reveals his hesitance to interfere in what he 
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viewed as a private domestic situation. However, he could not refrain from action when 
presented with his sister in a potentially mortal state of health. His perception of her 
condition temporarily overcame his loyalty to household privacy.
26
   
  Marital outsiders could also render assistance during times of sickness or ill 
health. If a cruel partner refused to allow for any type of medical care for their ailing 
spouse, third parties might sneak, or force, a doctor into the household in question. 
Numerous cases appear within the records that describe children retrieving medical help 
and then finding various ways to get this avenue of assistance to their desperate 
mother/father. On the other hand, a marital partner could promise to provide aid and then 
never do so, leaving the community to look out for the victimized spouse. A state of 
perpetual intoxication prevented one man from bringing a doctor to help his wife. She 
was critically ill and he left twice to retrieve a physician, but he “got so drunk as to forget 
the business he went upon.” The woman eventually relied upon friends to complete the 
aforesaid task and place her on the road to recovery. However, this incident represented 
the final straw in her marriage and, in the midst of her convalescence, she informed her 
husband that she wanted a divorce.
27
   
 Women who faced marital cruelties during bouts of pregnancy, sickness, or child 
delivery particularly relied upon the kindness of third parties in order to survive. The 
regular pattern of visiting could reveal a woman in distress or left alone in a state of 
“confinement” preparing for childbirth. Women suffered through this process alone for a 
                                                          
26
 Eliza Miller v. Daniel Miller (1858), LVA-No (all quotes). In Wisconsin, two young boys tossed water 
on their mother’s face after she passed out when her husband threw a butcher knife at her while at the 
dining table. See, Harriett Castle v. Horatio Castle (1860), OSH-WC.  
27
 Louisa Bridwell v. Frederick Bridwell (1862), PLAT-GC (quote). See also, Nancy Weatherford v. Henry 
Weatherford (1843), LVA-Me; Francis Neuman v. A. J. Neuman (1854), DCTX-KC; Hannah Kohlmann v. 
Henry Kohlmann (1856), WHS-DC; Ida Schmidmeyer v. Francis Schmidmeyer (1861), EC-EC; Eliza Ann 
Pierce v. Stephen Pierce (1848), DCTX-HC.  
193 
 
variety of reasons, including abandonment by a spouse or sheer geographic isolation. As 
documented by Robert Griswold in his study of divorce in early California, women in 
vulnerable states of health often looked to other women for support and comfort. One of 
the more extended visiting patterns that is found within the Texas records focuses on an 
interaction in which a group of local women supervised the post-natal care of another 
woman, the victim of spousal cruelty at all stages of her pregnancy. These women had 
asked the husband if his wife was doing okay after the birth, and he had assured them that 
she was doing fine. But they did not believe this and set out to visit the woman in 
question. Upon arrival at the household, they found her unable to turn in bed and without 
the necessary provisions, including sugar, which greatly disturbed these local observers. 
To ease her suffering they lent her some laudanum, even though one expressed concern 
that is might be “improperly used” by the victim. Emboldened by their numbers, these 
Texas women took group action to investigate a domestic situation that they suspected 
was improper. However, it is important to note that their ideas about privacy restricted 
them from removing the woman from the household or even confronting the husband 
directly.
28
   
 Helping victimized women in various states of pregnancy was not an action 
gendered female as men also participated and rendered assistance. Often kept out of 
delivery rooms and not privy to women’s private medical discussions, men may not have 
possessed the same degree of specialized knowledge regarding pregnancy as local 
women did, but they did enjoy a freedom of mobility that allowed them to reach out to 
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women inaccessible to others. William Graham, a Wisconsin man, travelled three miles 
to visit a woman that he believed was ill-provided for by her husband. Although the road 
was “dangerous,” he hitched up his teams and made the journey only to find her very sick 
with nothing to eat. In an interval when the husband was not noticing, William managed 
to leave some provisions behind for the woman. He had to act in this secret way because, 
as he noted in his deposition, the husband would not accept the food, no matter how 
much the household needed it. The maneuvers made by William hint at the fact that even 
rendering the most basic assistance could be interpreted as meddlesome by one or both of 
the marital partners in question. Victims did not always appreciate the help of others, no 
matter how well intentioned. Husbands, in particular, could feel threatened if outsiders, 
especially other men, entered their households and tried to provide any form of charity.  
This perceived threat to household autonomy would, of course, increase with more direct 
interventions by outsiders.
29
 
 In addition, community members would make attempts to engage in mediation 
with problem couples. Mediators wanted to reconcile the parties to perform marriage in 
the proper manner, in accordance with local ideas of the peace. My research shows that 
these men and women were trying to keep couples together, not apart, a finding that 
coincides with Cornelia Hughes Dayton’s study of law and society in early Connecticut. 
As Dayton states, “reconciliation rather than divorce was seen as the response that would 
preserve the social order.”30 Across all three states, men and women from the community 
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would approach the spouses in question, usually in the couple’s household. These 
interactions would often take the form of informal hearings, with both spouses stating 
their cases and then the outsider(s) offering suggestions for future peaceful living. 
Clearly, the mediators that appear within the divorce records met with frustration in their 
efforts, yet they relate stories describing first-hand the gradual destruction of antebellum 
marriages. One man recalled that he “frequently endeavored to reconcile” a trouble 
couple in his neighborhood, but all to no avail. In another case, Addison Turner described 
how he went over and sat between a husband and a wife as they fought. Then, they each 
got a chance to state their side of the story at which point Addison told them to “live in 
peace and quiet.” His deposition encapsulated a journey from hope to failure in a matter 
of sentences. On occasion an attempt at mediation might end in one partner admitting that 
they might “try to do better” in the future, although a more likely response was continued 
conflict. A. B. Adams tried, along with a group of neighbors, to stage a marital 
intervention with one Wisconsin couple, but the entire exercise failed miserably. The 
meeting ended when the wife triumphantly declared that she had put her husband’s tools 
“in the privy and he might go there and get them if he wanted them.” The neighbors 
retreated at this point and waited for the official dissolution of the marriage. The divorce 
was granted in December 1858.
31
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 One of the specific goals pursued by mediators, however unsuccessfully, was 
renewed cohabitation. Marriage during the antebellum period was not understood 
separate from a combined living arrangement. Simply put, there was a fear that a couple 
living apart was not very much of a couple at all. So, mediation and reconciliation efforts 
often focused on reuniting the couple under one roof. Community members might seek 
out the absent spouse, if he/she was staying in the area, and request him/her to return 
home. These encounters were anything but quick and simple as the mediator could be 
drawn into a spouse’s long story of woe, placing the outsider in what can only be 
described as an awkward situation. Or, a husband or wife could convey their refusal to 
return in brief terms, referencing their inability to “live together agreeably.” However, 
from the records it appears as if mediators did enjoy some fleeting successes in 
convincing wayward spouses to return home. Although direct community pressure 
clearly influenced these decisions, a spouse might also take other outside opinions under 
advisement. For example, family members might have already pressured a woman to 
return, thus making the arrival of a mediator a timely and convenient avenue to 
reconciliation. When Eveline Evans fled from her husband after he inflicted stripes on her 
with an ox whip, she assumed the move would be permanent. But after Jackson Evans, 
her husband, apologized, she decided to return and live with him again. Her mother 
would later write a letter to Nancy applauding her decision and commenting that the 
couple could be truly happy, “if you and Jack will both try it is very easy for any person 
to make themselves miserable, and it is almost as easy to make themselves happy.” In the 
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end, the reconciliation did not work out, and Nancy filed for divorce only months after 
her mother’s letter was received.32  
 Nancy was not alone in facing community pressure to reconcile with her partner 
because women, whether victims or not, were generally viewed as the ones responsible 
for keeping marriages intact. As Anya Jabour found in her study of one companionate 
marriage, “Wives, with the most invested in marriage, were assigned the task of ensuring 
the couple’s success.” Therefore, it should be relatively unsurprising that much of the 
reconciliation efforts of community members focused on instructing women on the 
mechanics of setting aside their victimization in order to achieve the higher goal of 
marriage once again. While visiting a household in crisis, one Virginia man suggested to 
the wife that she should “be as kind as she could to her husband notwithstanding his bad 
treatment of her.” So, despite the fact that her husband whipped her until the point at 
which her health collapsed, this outsider advised reconciliation, despite the possible cost 
to this woman’s own body and person. Although shocking to our modern sensibilities, 
this man’s advice conformed very much to the overall goals espoused by community 
marital mediators. Keeping a marriage intact was what mattered, unless the couple 
threatened to destroy the institution or societal hierarchies through their actions.
33
   
 As hinted at through the above examples, spouses did not always embrace the 
efforts of community mediators. In fact, many husbands and wives felt as if these 
individuals were, at best, meddlesome and, at worst, direct competitors for household 
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authority. Although this strategy of mediation remains one of the most innocuous 
approaches for addressing cruelties in marriage, couples could still bristle at attempts to 
fix the potentially unfixable. In the records mediators would describe how they paired 
their advice with statements demonstrating their peaceful, and passive, intentions. A 
proclamation of “I did not come to quarrel,” could signal to all parties that the outsider 
did not wish to participate in the fray, except as counsel. However, community members 
could not manage all levels of action, and at some point they had to admit that they were 
entering a sphere in which they possessed few immediate controls. Hoping to get a 
couple to commit to reconciliation might involve some sacrifice on the part of the 
outsider. When William Hays came over for dinner at the Risk household, he no doubt 
expected a pleasant evening with general conversation. Instead, the couple immediately 
began quarreling, which prompted Hays to counsel them on amicable living. To prove his 
point and to keep the peace, he slept that night between the feuding couple. Despite his 
best intentions, events quickly unfolded that were beyond his control as the husband, 
armed with a dirk and pistol while lying in bed, tried to reach over Hays to stab his wife 
with the dirk but in the process thrust the weapon through Hays’s finger. Needless to 
recount, Hays no longer attempted to solve or even suppress this couple’s marital 
problems.
34
  
  If outsiders could not convince a couple to reconcile via peaceful negotiations, 
then they might alter their strategy and pursue a more aggressive verbal approach 
focusing on shaming and confrontation. Openly questioning the actions of the cruel 
spouse, they would apply pressure in order to force a change in behavior. These 
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confrontations could range from the relatively informal to involving the entire 
community, lasting for hours, and taking place in a courtroom-like setting. Embodying 
the spirit of court proceedings in that all parties adopted an adversarial stance, this 
strategy represented a moving away from the mutual understanding and peaceful tone 
that characterized mediation. After a Wisconsin man learned about the injuries that his 
sister sustained at the hands of her husband, he went over to the house and proceeded to 
engage his brother-in-law in a debate about the morality of wife abuse. At the end of their 
talk, the husband “promised that he would not do it again,” a vow which he later violated. 
Many awkward conversations related by deponents ended in a statement of apology and a 
promise to reform by the offending party. For example, Peter Julien pledged numerous 
times to his mother-in-law that he would no longer bring home, and infect, her daughter 
with venereal diseases caught during his time out at sea. His continued violation of this 
bond is unsurprising, but the consequences were fatal when his wife gave birth to a child 
who died due to venereal infection.
35
  
At the most basic level these verbal interventions followed similar patterns across 
all three states studied, but the records reveal subtle differences in approaches and results. 
In antebellum Virginia these verbal interactions were influenced by the widely held belief 
that all members of society should play their part to uphold societal hierarchies and social 
order. According to precepts of honor, if a man practiced his mastery in an inept way, 
other members of society were then obligated to intervene and correct him. As the 
possession of an honorable character depended very heavily on public performance and 
perception, one of the most effective tools in a community’s arsenal against deviants 
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were shaming rituals. Shaming exercises reveal a great deal about what antebellum 
Virginians believed about domestic privacy. To begin with, both men and women 
appeared within the records engaging in these rituals, suggesting that all members of 
community argued for their right to participate in moral policing. This interpretation 
coincides with Laura Edward’s findings for informal and formal means of community 
justice. Shaming was one step within a dance performed by Virginians as they struggled 
to respect domestic privacy while also maintaining order in their society. Therefore, these 
confrontations contained within them an unstated threat that if the marital violations 
continued, the privacy violations would escalate in kind. In the words of one divorce 
plaintiff, if an individual chose to “become an outcast from society—acknowledging no 
legal or moral restraints,” then any remnants of privacy were moved aside to 
accommodate public scrutiny.
36
 
Of course, even when faced with verbal accusations, Virginia’s cruel husbands 
rarely relinquished their domestic rights without a fight. Requests made by community 
members often fell on deaf ears as abusive men would still attempt to behave as they 
wished. If, for instance, it was pointed out to a cruel husband that it was “two 
scandalous” for him to whip his wife, the man still might choose to do so, thereby 
escalating his conflict with the community. Or, he might make an argument that the 
treatment was justified as he “had had to cook his own victuals for a week.” If the 
outsider pushed the issue, then a battle over household authority might erupt, even though 
the third party might have only verbally questioned the alleged abuser. The very 
questioning of authority was enough to make a Virginia household head feel the need to 
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defend his authority in a violent way. A local man described how a neighbor purchased a 
pistol to use on another resident if he continued to interfere in his household management 
by pointing out that cowhiding was not proper chastisement for a wife, and so on. In the 
end, community members engaging in verbal interventions in Virginia proceeded 
carefully while also realizing that they possessed a long heritage of public scrutiny that 
informed, and supported, their activities.
37
  
The practice of direct shaming is almost absent within the Texas records; but 
when verbal confrontations erupted, they held the potential for substantial violence. As 
described in a previous chapter and in the first portion of this one, Texans simply did not 
possess sophisticated communications networks during the early settlement period. In 
addition, the southern influence led to an emphasis on public interpretations of character 
and honor. These factors combined to make any public information regarding household 
infractions of great import and interest. One example is instructive with regards to the 
culture of antebellum Texas. Joseph Dye, a boarder with a Texas couple, after 
overhearing the husband speak poorly of the character of the wife, decided to verbally 
intervene. He made a moral choice. Telling the husband that he “would have the last drop 
of your [the abusive husbands] heart’s blood” if he was related to the woman in question, 
Dye then cautioned the man to provide witnesses before slandering others. In Texas these 
conflicts were driven by moments of spontaneity and did not proceed within an 
established network of social relations. While men and women might violently defend 
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their rights to domestic privacy, they also operated within a culture that condoned 
interference, albeit in a haphazard fashion.
38
 
 In Wisconsin the efforts of outsiders to verbally confront and shame cruel spouses 
took an aggressive turn. As described in earlier chapters, cruel husbands and wives in this 
state repeatedly made claims to absolute domestic privacy and total body ownership of 
domestic partners. These assertions, and the dangerous nature of cruelties in the state, 
indicated that spouses felt as if the frontier environment bred uncertainties in marital 
roles that could only be countered by isolating the household and policing its inhabitants 
using the most extreme measures.  Therefore, the interest of third parties in the marriages 
of other community members was often seen by the spouses in question as adding to the 
external factors threatening to destroy the institution of marriage itself. To critics, these 
interlopers into the ‘private’ realm of marriage could symbolize all that was dysfunctional 
in early Wisconsin society. In a worst case scenario, even broaching the subject of 
abnormal household relations could lead the targeted husband or wife to commit 
retaliatory physical violence against the offending third party. When Bridget Galvin, a 
Wisconsin wife, took too long to rise out of bed due to injury, her husband jumped on the 
bed, kicking and beating her. Witnessing this attack, Bridget’s father “remonstrated” with 
his son-in-law to stop the attack, at which point the man turned his focus on the father 
and threatened to beat him for interfering. Verbal confrontations unfolded with a high 
level of stress, in part, because cruel spouses felt as if they were not only battling, and 
being judged by, the single outsider, but the entire system of their society as well.
39
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 However, despite this threat of violence, Wisconsin’s third parties continued to 
interfere in marriages, and they met with fewer overall successes than did their 
counterparts in other states. Outsiders in Virginia and Texas could, at minimum, claim 
that they provided the impetus for temporary behavioral changes, even if the marriages in 
question ended in failure over the long term. Wisconsin community members could point 
to few such fleeting victories. Instead of apologetic crocodile tears, they would encounter 
outright denials of cruelties. Or, if an admission was made, it would be accompanied by 
no promises of an amelioration of future treatment of the victimized spouse. Andres 
Kupfer was “one of the most dirty & disgusting fellows imaginable,” according to his 
wife Fredericke. He would force her to engage in sexual intercourse “seven or eight times 
in a single night.” Worse still, his private parts were infested with “crabs or crab-lice,” 
which he would pick off and then use force to “compel her [his wife] to swallow them.” 
Milwaukee policemen agreed that Andres was an exceptionally disturbed man, a frequent 
visitor to the bawdy houses found within the city. Finally, Fredericke’s mother stepped in 
to put an end to Andres’s cruelties. She cornered him one day and pointed out the myriad 
ways in which he had violated his marriage bonds, concluding, “You must use her like a 
man, and not like a beast.” Note that she referenced the term “use” to reflect that wives 
could be “used,” the issue being proper versus improper usage. Andres responded to her 
concern by stating that if he could not have sexual intercourse in the ways in which he 
wished it at home, he would continue to go elsewhere. Intentionally or not, he missed the 
point, and the verbal intervention dissolved into nothingness, as the marriage would 
months later. Even as outsiders were forced to resort to more aggressive patterns of 
verbal confrontations, they also faced spouses very much wedded to ideals of domestic 
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privacy and few limits to marital cruelties. These conversations took place on a plane in 
which violence was an ever-present possibility and a primary mode of communication, 
thus offering an indication that violent conflict was expected, not avoided, in the state of 
Wisconsin.
40
   
 Across all three states the presence of family served both to ameliorate and to 
exacerbate marital relationships. As described below, relatives living nearby could 
provide essential shelter or physical protection in cases of domestic attack. However, 
mixed households in which a husband and wife lived with one set of parents and/or other 
relatives appeared to be a recipe for disaster. In times of disagreement, the spouses would 
look to their blood relatives to support their stance. This behavior led to an “us versus 
them” mentality that could quickly deconstruct a marital unit. Family members could also 
feel the need to step in, even when not asked, to prevent violence between the partners. 
These interventions could be interpreted as unwelcome interference or as claiming/taking 
proper domestic authority away from a husband. Authority battles often revolved around 
the actions of father-in-laws. The women at the center of these disputes were essentially 
being asked to choose which male figure they wanted to align themselves with. While she 
was living in her father’s house, Martha Jane Rector’s husband and father got into a 
verbal dispute and her husband asked her to leave with him and go settle elsewhere. She 
refused to follow her spouse and proclaimed that she did not intend “to put her foot out of 
her fathers house.” This split led to the eventual dissolution of her marriage, as her 
husband stated that he should not be legally responsible for a woman who chose to seek 
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the protection of another man. It is clear that living with parents could corrupt what 
antebellum society considered the natural process of transferring authority from father to 
husband. As one Methodist minister cautioned his daughter upon her marriage, “you have 
now changed guardians & passed from under the immediate care & protection of a father 
to that of a husband.”  Therefore, certain living arrangements could lay the groundwork 
for situations in which technical outsiders became part of actual marriages, which 
increased their ability to intervene as well as the potential for problems.
41
  
 So far in this chapter we have discussed situations of mediation and verbal 
confrontation in which community members had time to contemplate whether or not to 
intervene and in what ways they would do so. Now, we will turn our attention to a more 
direct form of intervention in which third parties had only moments to make a moral 
choice, the offering of shelter to a victim of marital cruelty. Because most outsiders 
would not take the initiative to offer shelter on their own, this was a form of intervention 
generally spearheaded by the injured party, thereby thrusting the community member into 
a potentially dangerous position. Again, the practice of sheltering reflected local 
involvement in supposedly private situations. Husbands and wives, across all three states, 
tended to request assistance from their neighbors before approaching legal, even local, 
authorities. As this chapter argues, whether or not third parties offered a husband or wife 
shelter depended on their ideas regarding domestic privacy and their perception as to 
whether or not cruelty had occurred. The privacy question was lessened by the arrival of 
domestic conflict, in the form of a supplicant, on another’s doorstep. However, third 
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parties still tried to balance concerns over privacy with concerns over the person’s, and 
their own, welfare. When they accepted a victim into their house, they were not hoping to 
speed along the dissolution of the other’s marriage but rather desiring to provide a safety 
valve of sorts, a space to let off some steam. As described later, a non-relative providing 
any form of permanent sheltering was looked upon by most communities as a distasteful 
last resort because it often led to the victim becoming a financial burden on the local 
society.
42
 
  Situations resulting in requests for outside shelter usually stemmed from a marital 
partner either escaping or being driven from his/her household. The great majority of 
spouses who left were women, although a handful of men appear within the records as 
well. Leaving the home was generally a traumatic affair that could serve as the 
culmination of years of problems or occur after a seemingly spontaneous violent conflict. 
An abused woman could create and execute an elaborate escape plan, such as when a 
Virginia wife fled in the middle of the night as her husband was distracted with writing. 
Or, a woman could leave without a moment’s notice or preparation, as another Virginia 
woman did when she ran off in the rain and “did not even take any clothing with her.” 
Similarly, cruel husbands gradually drove women away with tortures over time or by 
immediate threats of death. Of course, the more dramatic scenes received additional 
explanation within the divorce bills. A husband ordering a wife away while brandishing a 
pistol was simply more interesting than a man making a single declaration to his wife to 
leave the premises.
43
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 A handful of patterns of flight can be discerned from a close reading of the 
documentary archive. To begin with, a woman was most likely to leave, whether by 
choice or force, during nighttime hours. As described in previous chapters, this timing 
coincides with the prevalence of night attacks within the records. Night was a particularly 
ripe period for discord in marriages. Few distractions were present, and the house space 
generally closed in on itself with temporary visitors leaving before nightfall. Of course, 
night escapes also contributed to the danger and drama found within petitioners’ 
accounts. Leaving one’s house under the cover of dark allowed for a secret escape but 
also posed numerous challenges to personal safety. Making a decision to take along one’s 
children presented another obstacle to a successful departure. The majority of women 
were simply not able to take along all of their small children on these frantic, often 
spontaneous trips. They would generally choose to save the youngest child, the one they 
deemed most in need of their particular maternal care. When Johannette Lange left her 
abusive husband August, as described earlier in this chapter, she fled with only her one-
and-a-half-year old, leaving her four other children behind.
44
  
 Once these hard choices were made, the journey itself generally presented its own 
challenges. In some cases, a husband would chase after a wife, forcing the woman to 
travel with great haste at night and in treacherous territory. The ramifications for not 
moving quickly enough or evading capture could be great. One Texas woman fled in the 
middle of night hoping to reach “a place of safety.” Unfortunately, her husband overtook 
her and “draged her about by the hair for the half a mile back home.” Texas women, in 
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particular, suffered the consequences of distance and relative isolation when they 
attempted to flee from situations of domestic cruelty. As stated earlier, households in 
early Texas could be spread out at great distances, making it difficult to reach other areas 
even in ideal conditions and in daylight.
45
 Joan Cashin, in her work on the Texas frontier, 
describes how “geographic isolation” presented a great problem for women hoping to 
rely upon outsider interventions for protection. I disagree with Cashin’s argument that 
family connections collapsed under such conditions, but they were definitely strained by 
common living conditions. For example, when Rebecca Harper ran from her Texas home 
in the dark, she had to travel three miles on foot and in the rain before she arrived at her 
father’s house. The trip broke her constitution, and she stayed sick until the time she filed 
for divorce. Other women complained that even after an arduous journey of escape, they 
could only reach the locations where “strangers” resided. In the end, the difficulties 
women faced when fleeing were created out of the general environment of isolation that 
characterized life in early Texas.
46
   
 Now that we have established that these women often left their homes in frantic 
ways, let us try to discern the image that might have met a neighbor who opened his, or 
her, door to discover such a refugee. By candlelight, the person might observe that their 
neighbor was soaked from head to toe from the rain or even covered in bruises with their 
clothes partially ripped off. Or, perhaps the woman would be missing a chunk of hair 
from her scalp. She might not be wearing shoes, even in snowy, winter conditions. An 
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outsider would have to take in all of this information quickly, as it was not proper to 
leave a person standing on the doorstep. After an initial survey of the supplicant, this 
third party would then begin to make a sequence of moral decisions that could impact the 
welfare of all involved. Of course, to begin with, a person might not have opened the 
door to prevent being placed in this position. For obvious reasons, individuals who 
‘pretended to not be home’ do not appear within the record. As this chapter argues, those 
people who did open the door would first try to evaluate whether or not cruelties had 
actually occurred. They would quickly look over the woman’s appearance to assess the 
degree of visible damages. The likelihood of shelter being offered correlated with the 
perceived extent of injuries. If a woman was “very much bruised” or appeared to be not 
physically able to make it back home, then shelter was highly likely. However, by fleeing 
their homes the abused women were protesting marital cruelties through the bodily act of 
relocation, so privacy concerns weighed heavily in the decisions made by outsiders. 
Accepting a woman into one’s home represented a willingness to involve oneself in the 
marital affairs of others. Therefore, some community members would try to deflect 
responsibility by telling the woman to go back home or by even escorting her home 
themselves.
47
  
 What occurred after a neighbor/relative opened the door and allowed the injured 
woman to enter? In countless cases, many of which never made it into the record, nothing 
of particular note happened at all. The woman could stay the night or for a few hours and 
then return home, perhaps to repeat the pattern again at another time. However, not all 
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sheltering situations proceeded in such placid ways. Whether a man kicked his wife out 
of doors or she fled on her own, a husband could still feel the need to track his wife down 
and demonstrate his mastery before a public audience. His ultimate goal was to regain 
possession of her body, which she had placed momentarily beyond his control; he would 
thereby reassert his manhood, even if it was flawed in practice. In all three states, to 
allow a wife to become a dependent in another’s household, even momentarily, 
commented negatively on a man’s ability to manage his affairs. The records describe 
husbands arriving at the houses of the third parties determined to take back into their 
possession what they believed to be theirs, their wife.
48
 Once an angry husband arrived at 
the doorstep, the neighbor was faced, again, with a moral decision. Do they continue to 
provide shelter? At what point is the potential for danger just too great? Do they turn over 
the woman and hope for the best? Although it is difficult to believe, many community 
members chose to allow the husband to seize the wife, even if she was clearly in hiding. 
One such man, Jefferson Arthur, described how a feuding husband chased his injured 
wife up Arthur’s stairs, picked her up, and left with the woman in tow. These events, 
while shocking, are not overly surprising. After all, images of husbands “hunting” wives 
abound within the divorce records. The natural conclusion of the hunt was to find the 
wife and bring her back to the marital home. Husbands on these types of missions, with 
gun or knife in hand, also held the potential to inflict violence on anyone they 
encountered.
49
  
 When faced with an irate husband, a third party could also refuse to allow the man 
to enter the dwelling. This decision was usually made in an effort to avoid conflict and to 
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allow everyone to calm their nerves, but it often backfired. Left outside with nothing but 
his anger, a spurned husband could become even more dangerous and desperate to assert 
his dominance in the situation. In a Virginia domestic dispute, an intoxicated man 
followed his wife to her father’s dwelling, where he was refused entry. He then 
proceeded to stumble around outside, yelling and threatening to storm the house and take 
her away by force. In other scenarios, a spurned man might attempt to make his way 
inside the dwelling in question through the use of force. Wielding dangerous weapons 
and willing to risk serious injury to accomplish their goals, these men were difficult to 
subdue. Power struggles of this sort could take hours as the residents of the shelter 
household maintained vigilance and the husband tested the limits of their guard. On the 
heels of a particularly brutal whipping, Hariet Mallory fled and was offered shelter by her 
sister Julia Hill. The arrangement worked out smoothly until Mr. Mallory arrived, with 
pistol in pocket, to ‘visit’ his wife. When Julia would not allow him entry, he drew his 
pistol and attempted to break down the door. When that strategy proved unsuccessful, he 
waited on the porch for an opportunity when one of the women would step near a 
window, providing a clear shot. Thinking quickly, Julia managed to sneak a slave out to 
go and fetch the local lawmen, who later managed to take Mr. Mallory away. The above 
story supports, in part, what Nancy Tomes found to be true for mid-nineteenth-century 
London. Outsiders would demonstrate a marked hesitance to become involved in 
domestic conflicts because they understood that “such intervention entailed serious risks, 
since the husband’s rage was often turned on the person attempting to aid his wife.” 
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Extending shelter to a woman in need could carry with it potentially deadly 
consequences.
50
  
 On the surface it appears as if these conflicts were built upon quarrels between 
competing masculine authorities; however, the presence of women offering shelter 
complicates that interpretation. Victoria Bynum, Stephanie McCurry, and other noted 
historians have argued that fleeing women essentially “invoked the authority of one set of 
men” against their husbands by taking shelter under a new masculine roof.51 This 
category of power struggle played out most prominently in Virginia, as the majority of 
individuals who appeared in the records as offering shelter were men. This absence of 
women could reflect an inherent bias in the records, as women who openly challenged 
men may not have felt comfortable recalling their actions in court. Violating gender 
norms during a heated one-on-one interaction was quite different from declaring one’s 
actions to the community at large. A story from an antebellum Richmond newspaper 
provides a window into what could happen when women helped women in this way. The 
paper recounts how a man, Joseph Nelton, hit a woman because she was allegedly 
sheltering his wife and children after he had driven them from the house. So, women who 
offered assistance were not immune from facing violent penalties for their actions. 
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Wisconsin women, in particular, appeared quite willing to engage in sheltering and to 
retaliate in physical ways if the thresholds of their households were breached by cruel 
men. When John Lewis pursued his wife into Mary Ulrich’s home, she forced him from 
the premises and stated that she “did not want any fighting” in her house. Despite Lewis’s 
threat that he would “knock” a hoe into Ulrich’s head, she still won the day and he left 
sans wife. This is not to argue that Wisconsin women were naturally violent individuals 
but rather that the culture of the area allowed for interactions to take place on a violent 
plane. Keeping the peace of a household might require a woman to respond violently, just 
as sustaining the peace of the community required aggressive action. Again, the 
community in Wisconsin made a claim that domestic privacy was a privilege and not a 
right. Of course, husbands across all three states reacted with varying degrees of shock to 
these assertions. As stated in previous chapters, men were faced with varying degrees and 
types of community challenges to their perceived patriarchal rights of chastisement, and 
the offering of shelter to abused women served to only agitate these concerns. Even a 
husband’s pleas to the community to refuse shelter to a wayward wife would be regularly 
ignored by the local citizens who could instead choose to make an independent decision 
regarding the woman’s welfare.52     
 Much to the chagrin of well-wishers, a temporary extension of shelter to a 
desperate woman could eventually turn into a permanent living arrangement. A transition 
period usually took place where a woman would be induced to return to her marital home 
only to suffer cruel treatment again and to repeat the process of fleeing. Because of the 
conservative impulse of the third parties to try to keep the marriage intact, victimized 
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women were forced to engage in these maneuvers even if they truly only wished to 
establish a new permanent residence. After numerous attempts at physical reconciliation, 
a woman was most likely to settle in with relatives to begin the long-term healing 
process. Fathers, brothers, sons, sons-in-law, daughters, mothers, and even mothers-in-
law could all provide alternative permanent living arrangements to a relative in need. 
Returning to a parent was a gendered remedy available solely to wives, as injured 
husbands were generally not known to move into their father’s households. In her study 
of early Connecticut, Cornelia Hughes Dayton describes how rejecting the shelter 
provided by a marital partner could prove costly in numerous ways for women. In 
particular, the economic consequences of their decision would weigh upon the 
community as it now had another helpless dependent to support out of the group fodder. 
Complaints about these burdens surfaced in the records in those areas in which resources 
were scarcest and survival most difficult. As such, Wisconsin residents would frequently 
mention how they wanted to help a victimized woman but could not do so due to 
financial concerns. Economic stresses would occasionally transform a permanent living 
situation into a temporary one overnight, forcing the woman to go elsewhere again.
53
    
 As the above pages demonstrate, third parties could be forced into a moral 
dilemma due to a request for shelter, but they also could be drawn into conflict by what I 
label as “the noises of violence.” I include within this phrase any and all audible 
emanations associated with marital discord. Of course, these vocalizations were not 
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intentional in the majority of conflicts, but they still represented an active beckoning of 
third parties. The degree to which domestic strife is characterized by sound is a subject 
that has yet to be the focus of serious exploration by historians. However, as 
contemporary horror films demonstrate, incidents that are witnessed without an 
accompanying visual script are often the most terrifying. It is possible to contend that to 
fully understand domestic violence, we must approach it from a variety of sensory 
perspectives. In some circumstances community members only had their hearing to 
determine whether or not, and how to, intervene in a conflict. Let us explore how these 
men and women used this limited information to address the questions of privacy and to 
determine the extent of cruelties taking place.  
 In what situations might a third party hear the noises of violence? The most 
obvious answer to this question is that those individuals who resided under the same roof 
possessed the highest likelihood of hearing conflicts. The information provided by 
children and boarders reflects the fact that some of the noises were practically 
inescapable within dwellings. Again, thin walls and shoddy construction in houses across 
all three states made the transmission of sound practically unavoidable. The witnesses 
would recall hearing general noises as well as specific terms and words. In some 
situations their recollections could even be quite humorous, in retrospect. One boarder 
recalled listening to a couple quarreling during the night. He heard the man step toward 
the woman and she screamed at him not to shoot her. He then heard the man reply, “you 
damn fool I am only going to take a chew of tobacco.” However, the majority of listeners 
suffered from loss of sleep due to these loud conflicts and found little to laugh about. 
Hearing a person getting kicked out of bed could wake a person up. Hearing “screaming 
216 
 
and hallowing” could wake a person up. On these occasions even children would take 
action to restore the silence of the household, as a Wisconsin girl did when she went to 
her parents’ “bed to quiet them.” Other people would just suffer in silence listening to the 
noises of husbands and wives in turmoil. A Texas boarder recalled how “many a night I 
was very much annoyed” from the sounds of violence, “so much so that I could not 
sleep.”54  
 Moreover, the noises of violence were not confined within domestic spaces, but 
could cover miles and travel to the ears of neighbors and community members passing by 
the households in question. Christine Stansell is one of the only historians to briefly 
describe the ways in which the sounds of conflict could travel from place to place. In her 
article Stansell focuses on the New York City tenements, a compressed urban space; 
however, this phenomenon occurred in all settings, including rural Wisconsin, Texas, and 
Virginia. Witnesses would relate how they heard the sounds of conflict while attending to 
their daily tasks. They would assert that they could not avoid listening to these noises no 
matter how much they tried to stay away from the location in question. A Virginia man 
recalled how he used water from the same spring as a troubled couple, and that he 
constantly overheard them arguing from across the stream. As described earlier, houses in 
rural Wisconsin were spaced at quite a distance from one another due to farming needs, 
therefore posing a challenge to travel. It could be assumed that this distance would 
prevent the spread of noises, but Wisconsin neighbors stated to the court that audible 
indications of violence could easily cross many yards or even miles of quiet countryside. 
Samuel Young would hear his neighbor “swear and scold” at his wife while everyone 
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was in the fields. In another case, a Wisconsin man asserted that, although he lived “forty 
rods [600 feet] from the parties,” he still “often heard” the noises associated with their 
feuds.
55
  
 The question then becomes, if a third party was presented with audible or visible 
evidence of a marital conflict in progress, how did he/she decide when/if to intervene? 
How did these moral choices play out? To begin with, as this chapter argues, questions of 
privacy were addressed but these became less important if the witness was seeing the 
cruelties occur on a face-to-face level. The real focus was whether or not marital cruelty 
was in progress and needed to be stopped. This dissertation agrees with Marylynn 
Salmon and other historians that the wives and husbands across all three states did have 
to tolerate a degree of cruelty, so the issue, again, was where to draw the line. After 
initially learning about a conflict, the witness would usually try to gather additional 
information with which to make their decision. If they were a neighbor “attracted by the 
cries” of a marital victim, they might head over to the location to see everything in 
person. If they were outside when the attack occurred, they might rush inside. Of course, 
it would be untrue to assert that all third parties chose to intervene after gathering more 
information. Some individuals still made the decision to remain on the sidelines during 
the conflict. For example, one Milwaukee woman watched from her doorstep in the 
Eighth Ward as her neighbor beat his wife over the head with a chair.
56
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 As Stansell describes, those community members who chose to physically 
intervene were restricted to a “patterned series of moves and countermoves,” a dance that 
was fully recognized by all involved. This, of course, is not to downplay individual 
agency, but third parties were very aware that their choices would be scrutinized in terms 
of local social mores. Divorce petitioners related countless stories of the miraculous 
outsider saving them from a brutal death at the hands of their spouses; however, the 
incidents related by the third parties themselves are much more informative for our 
purposes. From their accounts it can be determined that third parties across all states 
believed that, at a minimum, a threat against a person’s life permitted a community 
member to intervene in a physical way. The issue was determining exactly when a 
marital conflict escalated to the point of life threatening for either spouse. That is one 
reason why outsiders were very willing to respond to cries of “murder,” taking these 
proclamations to be serious indicators of a deadly struggle in progress. In her study of 
early London, Tomes supports this assertion by stating, “The community drew the line at 
murder; the fear of murder prompted action.” Across all three states in this analysis, 
wives mostly, and a few husbands, resorted to calling out for assistance. “Murder” yells 
appear to have been particularly effective in Wisconsin, as they were mentioned 
frequently within the records and they almost always prompted a neighbor to leave 
immediately to render aid to the afflicted. This could be the case because community 
members in this state were well aware of the level of violence found within homes and 
possessed ample evidence from their daily lives that domestic murders could, and did, 
take place. This type of violence was almost expected, if not condoned. In addition, the 
records indicate that, despite the prevalence in the archive, Wisconsin wives resorted to 
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this measure sparingly, perhaps attempting to resolve the problem on their own, maybe 
even in a physical way, before ‘calling in the cavalry’ so to speak. For example, the small 
daughter of Delia and Lyman Tubbs told the court that, “Mother does not hallow unless 
she is in great danger.” Of course, a woman who cried wolf too often ran the risk of being 
ignored when she really required the assistance of others.
57
 
Once a third party arrived at the scene of the conflict, the records indicate that a 
variety of factors continued to influence the manner of their intervention. In particular, 
the use of weapons by one spouse against another often led to a physical intervention due 
to the escalated risk of serious injury by the parties. Historian Pamela Haag, in her study 
of nineteenth-century New York, finds that weapons use was perceived by witnesses as a 
“transgression” of the “tacitly recognized boundaries of ‘tolerable’ domestic abuse.” 
Therefore, as this chapter contends, cruelties of this kind satisfied one of the requirements 
necessary for action by third parties. The most common response was to prevent the cruel 
spouse from carrying out his/her intentions by grabbing or blocking the chosen weapon. 
Again, Wisconsin community members regularly engaged in these types of interventions. 
Both male and female observers would put their own bodies at risk to prevent the use of a 
weapon against a person who they perceived as a victim. Whether it was grabbing a chair 
from an irate husband or taking fire tongs from an angry wife, Wisconsin residents 
appeared to feel as if they were obligated to meet force with force. The descriptions of 
these interventions drip with physicality, with men and women springing to action. They 
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would even put their bodies at risk in the heat of the moment, blocking a thrown item 
before they had even identified the object. However, spontaneous decisions could prove 
costly if the lobbed item was a butcher knife. In contrast, Texas and Virginia community 
members appeared to have been less willing to resort to physical measures of 
intervention.
58
   
This marked difference between the three states continues as the analysis shifts to 
include circumstances in which third parties grabbed the abuser and restrained him/her. 
Wisconsin citizens engaged in all manners of preventative grappling, including seizing 
the arms, legs, or even the torso of the offending party. One guy and “two others” jumped 
on William Garrick as he pounded his wife with his fists. Many of these witnesses would 
categorize their actions as interference when testifying in court, but they maintained their 
right to do so. When recounting his efforts to break up a feuding couple, George Smart 
recalled, “I then interfered and took him from her by force.” Smart’s account both 
celebrated his course of action while also emphasizing the necessity of using physical 
methods. In Texas, moments of physical confrontation generally unfolded in more 
seemingly random scenarios, such as when two travelers came into a house to stop a man 
from throwing household items at his wife. In this state the physical fragmentation of 
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society combined with the push by cruel husbands to retain domestic privacy led to a 
community attitude less prone to physical prevention.
59
  
The organization of this chapter has emphasized an escalating sense of urgency on 
the part of third parties as well as an increased sense of danger for all involved in marital 
conflicts. As such, after individual attempts at intervention and mediation failed, or if a 
couple’s problems proved simply too offensive for toleration, the entire community could 
engage in general censure of the cruel husband or wife. Essentially, they would join 
together to target the person who was flaunting their supposed independence from 
societal restraints. Then, the group would use a variety of shaming techniques to 
demonstrate the extent to which this person was indeed still very much under local 
control and could not hide, even behind the rhetoric of domestic privacy. It is important 
to note that these efforts were still preventative and not intentionally destructive of 
marriages, according to historian Nancy Cott. The community did not seek to destroy 
marriages but rather to “prevent negative behaviors” from gaining a permanent foothold 
and creating an environment of general social disruption. They were also extraordinary in 
nature and did not reflect the norm in any sense. However, these situations are important 
to study because members of these shaming rituals clearly communicated their 
understandings of acceptable marital behaviors through the choice and timing of their 
actions.
60
 
 It is relatively unsurprising that Virginia emerges as the state in which, out of the 
three studied, community actions appeared to play the most significant part in overall 
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culture. The handful of historians who have studied these rituals of regulation have 
argued that extralegal measures sprung up as a partial response to an ineffective formal 
legal system. As this argument goes, individuals frustrated by or untrustful of the “law” 
would fashion their own law in order to address community problems. My disagreement 
with this interpretation lies in its oversimplification of local authority systems. In 
Virginia, as with other southern states, the local and formal law intertwined at their cores, 
as Laura Edwards finds for the Carolinas. Therefore, it is possible to contrast types of 
local authority, but it is impossible to extract local influence from southern legal 
practices. Virginians would not have seen community action or legal action as a choice 
between two radically different approaches. Other historians have argued that extralegal 
measures reflected the influence of southern honor as well as a regionally distinctive 
willingness to resort to violence to resolve conflicts. However, this study refutes these 
claims in that citizens in Texas, and Wisconsin in particular, demonstrated more reliance 
on violence as a means of communication. And, again, these actions were conservative in 
their aims, not hoping to unleash unregulated violence on a population.
61
   
We will examine two categories of community censure: church-based and 
charavaris. It is an understatement of massive proportions to say that evangelical 
churches influenced the development of culture and society in the U.S. South. As such, 
churches were one of the few institutions granted the power to peer behind closed doors 
and to evaluate the private lives of parishioners. During disciplinary hearings, church 
members would be asked to place their behaviors in front of a “court of their peers.” 
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Stephanie McCurry asserts that these courts provided one of the only effective checks 
against wife abuse as they “invoked the authority of one set of men” against another.62 As 
this study does not rely on evidence from church records, quite possibly a very rich 
source of information of marital conflicts, one example that was found within a personal 
papers collection will have to suffice. Robert Saunders, a Virginia resident, in a letter to 
his wife recalled how Richmond was abuzz with rumors following the death of the wife 
of John Caskie “formerly of Congress.” The streets were “ringing with accounts of his 
brutal treatment,” as she had died with “marks” on her body. Saunders did not attend the 
funeral, but he heard that the pastor made it quite clear that he “regarded the accounts as 
generally true.”  During the sermon the pastor said that “he would say no more of the 
departed than that no friend of hers should do otherwise than rejoice that she was gone... 
and that he would not cover up or draw attention from the vices and wrongs of the living 
by a eulogy upon the dead.” As this brief anecdote demonstrates, church members and 
pastors in the South could use their considerable influence to shape supposedly private 
behaviors.
63
   
In addition, community intervention against cruel spouses could take the form of 
charivaris, or group-based shaming rituals. A charivari, also referred to as a skimmington 
or “rough music,” occurred when a number of community members gathered together to 
humiliate or conduct violence against another person with the goal of pressuring the 
deviant in question to conform to societal ideals of behavior. The occurrence of charivaris 
has a long history, stretching back to the colonial period in the U.S and far earlier in 
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European nations. Historians have described how Quakers and Puritans policed their 
societies by relying, in part, on such rituals. Brenda Stevenson notes, for the Quakers, 
“Neighborhood leaders assessed the situation, decided on a course of action, and then 
carried it out.” In the case of one man, “They dragged him out of bed, beat him severely, 
placed him in a shallow grave, and then proceeded to cover him up with wooden boards.” 
He later escaped, filed a suit for kidnapping and assault, but, unsurprisingly, no one 
appeared for him.
64
 The pattern of these attacks changed very little over the next century 
or two. In the antebellum period the surprise assault followed by threats to leave town 
was still the preferred method. Group action required that many individuals acquired a 
shared base of information that they believed was correct and actionable. This 
information also had to elicit an emotional response, enough to justify a reaction beyond 
mediation or shaming. Newspaper articles were known to both announce the possibility 
of charivaris as well as to inspire them. For example, a small mention in the Richmond 
Dispatch that James Hamilton was convicted of beating his wife could have been enough 
to create a mob action had the Hamiltons not been free blacks. In 1858 the Richmond 
Enquirer related how a local man had killed his wife via poisoned lemonade. The paper 
also commented that the community has been stirred to “great excitement” by the crime 
and that “Lynch law will be put in execution.”65 
The targets of charivaris were generally so embarrassed by the experience that we 
have very few materials with which we can reconstruct their perspectives of the events. 
The 1857 account of R. D. Addington, which he published out of an effort to clear his 
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character, describes how a man could become the target of general community distaste. 
According to the work, Addington made an ill-match when he wed Hannah Weed, the 
daughter of a local family in severe financial constraints. Shortly after the marriage, 
Addington believed that the Weed family began to create schemes to swindle him out of 
his money. One of these schemes involved spreading a report that Addington had 
whipped his wife, forcing her to leave him and file for divorce. This information moved 
quickly throughout the community, and one night he returned to his office to find his 
door “daubed with gas-tar, and sprinkled with feathers.” A crowd gathered demanding his 
attention at which point he donned a bonnet and shawl and escaped out the back door. 
The local newspapers advertised that he should leave Richmond quickly or he would be 
wearing a suit of tar and feathers. Addington took refuge in Norfolk only to hear that a 
“storm is brewing” in the city to match the one in Richmond. Addington had to fly again. 
Addington’s experience relates to the argument of this chapter in that charivari 
participants followed the same questioning process as those involved in individual action. 
The group had to determine that a violation had taken place. Then, if enough people 
thought that they knew about the cruelties, the men and women involved would overrule 
any claims to privacy for the deviant in question and proceed as they desired. As such, 
Addington could not hide behind domestic privacy because the time for that plea passed 
when the newspapers became involved and transformed his marriage into a matter for 
public consumption. The local information networks described earlier in this chapter 
made sure that Addington could not escape this stigma even by removing to another city. 
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Although charivaris were rare, they symbolized the leverage of extreme force to counter 
what the community perceived as an extreme problem.
66
  
Finally, if individual and group-based interventions failed to successfully 
integrate the problem couple back into the community, then legal remedies were 
available as a last resort. Across all three states, it is vital to note that even legal 
authorities, such as magistrates or sheriffs, were not divorced from the earlier events 
described in this chapter. As individuals in communities, they were very much enmeshed 
in local systems of reporting and informal law. In fact, these same men might have 
attempted to mediate with the couple prior to being called to intervene as a representative 
of formal law. I refer to these interventions in masculine terms because formal legal 
authorities in antebellum America were men and not women. It appeared as if local 
magistrates spent a fair amount of their time gathering evidence for peace warrants 
against troubled men and women in the community. A peace warrant required that a 
person give a bond, generally a monetary guarantee, that they would no longer disturb the 
peace. A warrant could be requested by a wide variety of individuals, from the victimized 
spouse to a concerned neighbor. In addition, this legal restraint often accompanied a short 
period in the local jail for the abuser, depending on the perceived severity of cruelties. 
Although the warrant and the jail time were intended to provide a cooling down period 
for all involved, it often had the opposite effect of angering an already cruel spouse and 
then releasing them to the care of a surprised marital partner. Wives, in particular, 
complained that warrants were ineffective in the long term as cruel husbands would break 
these vows almost “right away.” Even if ineffectual, peace warrants served as a 
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representation that the domestic private peace and the public peace were indeed 
interconnected and that public officials not only could, but should, intervene to protect 
community well-being in situations of marital discord. As Laura Edwards contends, these 
warrants were attempts to limit the actions of husbands who had overstepped the proper 
boundaries of domestic authority, to the damage of society as a whole.
67
 Virginians, in 
particular, appeared to gravitate toward peace warrants as legal solutions to domestic 
disputes. This makes sense considering the well-documented distaste of southerners for 
anything touching on formal legal action. Peace warrants allowed southern communities 
to place the pressure of a formal legal system to bear on an abuser while not 
acknowledging any outside control over local society itself.  
In contrast, when Wisconsin residents invoked legal authorities, it was quite often 
out of an effort to press a criminal assault charge against a cruel wife or husband. As one 
newspaper put it, when a man or women made themselves “a dangerous member of 
society,” the onus was placed on their peers to curb the extent of the damage to social 
order. Therefore, unlike in southern communities, questions of honor were put aside and 
pragmatic concerns ruled the day. A justice of the peace for one county recalled how 
local citizens became so frustrated with a “notorious” wife beater that they seized him 
and turned him over to the “proper authority” to face criminal assault charges.68 Although 
this study does not examine criminal assault records, these charges repeatedly appear in 
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divorce proceedings, generally as precursors to divorce. Within the accounts related to 
assault charges, Wisconsin citizens would assert that they felt obligated to escalate their 
interventions from mediation to formal legal measures. For example, after Horace Baggs 
repeatedly kicked and hit his wife, many members of the community filed formal 
complaints. One such man, Samuel Dunbar, recalled, “I felt it my duty to make the 
complaint. I have no ill feeling against Baggs.” To Samuel this was a matter of equal 
force for the sake of peace, and personality had nothing to do with it. From the records 
we can discern that settlers in the Midwest felt fewer qualms about turning to the limited 
local legal authorities in search of a solution to problem marriages in their communities. 
The citizens in Wisconsin tolerated near lethal levels of violence but drew the line at 
death, and this partially explains their willingness to charge cruel spouses with assault, as 
opposed to pursing peace warrants.
69
  
 Finally, when the avenues of community intervention outlined throughout this 
chapter failed to prove effective, an ultimate legal remedy appeared, the sundering of 
marriage ties as enacted through divorce. Men and women across all of the states within 
this study were hesitant to suggest divorce for others because they understood that it was 
an enormous social and legal undertaking. As one Virginia man stated, divorce amounted 
to “destroying the house.” The house metaphor is apt as divorce also rocked the very 
foundations of broader societal order, a phenomenon described by numerous historians. 
By the time that antebellum husbands and wives filed their petitions, they had advanced 
through a variety of interventions and arrived at the last possible option for a peaceable 
existence. Therefore, divorce records provide not only a window into the immediate 
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events surrounding separation but a perspective on broader community understandings of 
marital breakdown and conflict.
70
  
This dissertation has sought to explore understandings of marital cruelty in the 
antebellum U.S., and this final chapter moves the discussion from perception to action as 
it examines the reactions of community members who encountered situations of spousal 
discord in their everyday lives. Going back to the opening story, this chapter has asked, 
what did Catharine do when faced with Mary’s domestic crisis? By reaching out to this 
other woman, Mary plunged Catharine into a series of moral decisions that would peak 
with her eventually physically confronting the abuser in question. Placing Catharine in 
context alongside other community members reveals that her actions were critical, but 
not singular, interventions into Mary’s troubled marriage. The community would step in 
numerous times to cajole, pressure, and eventually force, via divorce, the Grinnins to 
conform to proper, and peaceful, marital practices. This chapter contends that at every 
step of this process, the involvement of third parties in situations of marital cruelty was 
shaped by their understandings of proper domestic relations as well as their beliefs in 
domestic privacy. Outsiders first assessed whether or not cruelties were indeed taking 
place, a process fed by ideas of cruelty explored in earlier chapters. Then, they 
determined whether or not intervention was warranted and what form it needed to take.
71
      
Employing a comparative approach and expanding on Christine Stansell’s 
argument about the interrelationship of custom and intervention reveals that regional 
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location affected the ways in which community members addressed the series of moral 
choices presented to them by situations of cruelty. In Virginia, well-established local 
reporting networks facilitated a belief that private matters were legitimate fodder for 
public discussion. Virginians then pursued intervention strategies tailored to result in 
domestic peace without the risk of physical harm to the outsider. Emphasizing 
consistency over aggressiveness, Virginia’s third parties would attempt mediation and 
shaming, only resorting to physical action as a last resort when faced with the most 
egregious cruelties. This leads to the conclusion that southerners did not view “violence 
as unavoidable” but instead condoned only certain categories of violence, such as those 
practiced on slaves, while increasingly regulating others. In fact, as one studies the 
actions of community members, it becomes evident that they sought to prevent, and 
avoid, violence every step of the way. On the other hand, interventions in Texas were 
characterized more by spontaneity than by careful planning over the long term. Outsiders 
did not have the opportunity to gather information over time and instead acted on spur-of-
the-moment emotion and evidence. Broad based community action was almost 
nonexistent, with interventions taking place on an individual basis. The behaviors of 
Texans reflected life in a hybrid southern frontier society. They surely would have fallen 
into a pattern similar to Virginia had they possessed the legal or community structures to 
do so. Texans were caught in a veritable limbo, wanting to mediate but instead looking to 
violent methods of intervention because they did not have the local support required to 
make non-aggressive approaches successful.  
In contrast, individuals living in Wisconsin were characterized by a willingness to 
engage aggressively in the policing of domestic disputes. Acting without the benefit of a 
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well-established rumor network, Wisconsin citizens tended to attempt only limited 
mediation until the cruelties in question reached a level approaching lethality. When that 
threshold was reached, third parties of both genders would use violence as a tool with 
which to reestablish local peace. Countering physical force with physical force, their 
actions betrayed the impossibility of looking to formal, or even local, legal cultures for 
assistance. These men and women went into domestic frays as individuals but hoped to 
construct communities based on protest against lethal violence in the process. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that the proximity to frontier conditions influenced the pattern of 
interference adopted by third parties. Men and women in long established communities, 
such as Virginia, had numerous local resources to draw upon which, in turn, pushed them 
towards nonviolent solutions. In contrast, men and women on the frontier grappled with 
limited avenues for outside assistance and, as a result, emphasized violent solutions to 
violent problems.  
Tracing community interventions in cruel marriages across three states 
significantly enhances our understandings of violence, region, and the family. In the 
South we learn that violence was increasingly only sanctioned against certain bodies, 
slaves, but elaborate protective processes were in place if conflict erupted in white 
marriages. In frontier areas, physical force ruled the day; however, citizens refused to 
treat cruelties as acceptable and struggled to establish new norms forged through violent 
responses. Furthermore, this study shows that the uncertainties regarding the 
public/private nature of marriage that currently plague modern-day efforts to intervene in 
situations of domestic violence possess a long history. Cruel partners across all three 
states repeatedly emphasized the sanctity of the domestic realm in order to prevent 
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community action. And, men and women routinely put aside these warnings, intervened, 
and in the process constructed new marital ideals from the ashes of conflict. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Antebellum moralist Virginia Cary once mused, “Conjugal love is too delicate in 
its texture, not to undergo a thousand violences.” Through an examination of over one 
thousand nineteenth-century divorce cases, this work has shown that Cary possibly 
underestimated the vast array of tensions that could creep into romantic relationships. 
Although the majority of men and women entered into unions with expectations of 
permanence, marital failure was an ever-present phenomenon in antebellum society. To 
put it simply, marriage was changing in the 1840s and 1850s. With coverture waning in 
influence, a new set of companionate ideals emerged to take its place. Historians continue 
to actively debate the extent to which patriarchal or romantic norms held sway in the 
decades leading up to the Civil War. By examining troubled relationships, this 
dissertation finds that antebellum men and women described the ideal marriage as one in 
which both spouses worked together as a balanced, productive unit. While they surely 
desired love, duty was what mattered. This work, therefore, moves our discussion of 
nineteenth-century marriage away from supposed ideals and into the realm of day-to-day 
practices and beliefs.
1
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 Moreover, as this study reveals, many unions were characterized by perpetual 
power struggles and open discord. Focusing on those moments in which private conflicts 
spilled out into public legal arenas, this dissertation examines how average men and 
women perceived and defined marital cruelty. It asks: Where did they draw the line 
between unacceptable and acceptable conjugal behaviors?  And, it contends that cruelty 
was borne out of those relationships in which one or both partners failed to live up to the  
precepts of marital productivity. Husbands and wives also employed cruelty and violence 
in an effort to push their spouses back into traditional gender roles. An analysis of 
domestic violence always tends to emphasize continuity over change or difference, but 
this study addresses that dilemma by investigating how understandings of conjugal 
conflict were shaped and influenced by regional and local concerns.  
 Across the three states, the presence of marital cruelty directly correlated with the 
degree of gender role confusion experienced by the citizens of the area. Simply put, when 
men and women were unsure about what exactly their domestic roles entailed, this 
uncertainty prompted anxieties which, in turn, led to escalated violence. For this reason, 
Wisconsin husbands and wives were the most likely to commit near lethal cruelties in 
marriage. Without a guiding set of gender norms to cling to, midwestern husbands 
attempted to violently impose traditional understandings of marital roles upon their 
wives. Not to be outdone, Wisconsin women used cruelty to assert their bodily rights 
within unions. Southerners, too, understood marital cruelty to be connected with marital 
management. However, they were principally concerned with the relationships between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,” The Yale Law Journal, 105 (June 1996): 2144-2145; 
Hendrik Hartog, “Lawyering, Husbands’ Rights, and the “Unwritten Law” in Nineteenth-Century 
America,” Journal of American History, 84 (June 1997): 67-96. 
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abuse, chastisement, honor, and mastery. Virginians, in particular, sought to refine the 
practice of mastery so as to present the image of a benevolent South. Within a southern 
context, cruelty occurred if one spouse attempted to practice inappropriate mastery over 
the other. By arguing that Virginians carefully regulated and policed the practice of 
violence, this dissertation directly challenges the stereotype of southern bloodthirstiness.
2
  
 It also illuminates local legal practices and the ways in which antebellum 
community courtrooms existed as forums for extended dramas that were not only 
reflective but constitutive in relation to the developments of higher courts. In original 
jurisdiction cases local men and women served as judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants, and 
audience members. Characterized by broad-based community participation, these 
proceedings demonstrate the degree to which local and formal law were often one and the 
same. Moreover, divorce records from this period reveal that local consumers of the law 
were perfectly capable of articulating quite sophisticated definitions of where exactly to 
draw the line separating cruelty from insensitivity or abrasiveness, for example. They 
meted out community justice based on local knowledge, thus providing historians with 
detailed descriptions of commonly held values and beliefs.
3
  
Court records also document the gradual erosion of domestic privacy in 
antebellum society. The pursuit of a divorce in nineteenth-century America required a 
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person to place the entire contents of their private life on public display. In addition, the 
legal separation process made previously unmentionable subjects, such as the details of a 
woman’s figure, not only sanctioned but encouraged topics of public conversation. As 
historian E. Anthony Rotundo describes, “the emergence of the human body as a focus of 
special attention” did not occur until “the early nineteenth century.” Discussions of 
marital cruelty fed off of, and were shaped by, changing understandings of the human 
form. Male bodies appeared particularly susceptible to beastly emotions whereas female 
bodies bordered on the ridiculously fragile. As such, society admonished men to control 
their baser instincts and women to protect their limited productive potential.
4
  
 The rise of antebellum humanitarian reform movements had the effect of focusing 
additional attention on the body while also encouraging an active dialogue on the role of 
pain. In a departure from earlier eras, by the mid-nineteenth-century men and women 
began to differentiate between varying types of pain. Reformists directed their energies 
towards those individuals who they viewed as practicing cruelty, otherwise known as 
“the needless and deliberate infliction of pain.” Slaveholders, in particular, came under 
scrutiny for behaving cruelly and spreading “moral contamination.” As a result, southern 
patriarchs began to actively regulate the practice of cruelty, and even chastisement, when 
directed towards certain bodies, i.e. white women. They needed these women to remain 
intact and to serve as clear symbols of southern benevolent mastery. It is important to 
note, however, that the cruelties directed at other southern bodies, i.e. enslaved men and 
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women, remained relatively unchanged. Women’s rights reformers also seized upon the 
idea of pain as a vehicle through which to push for expanded bodily rights for wives. 
They argued, with limited success, that a wide variety of harmful sexual practices 
constituted divorceable wrongs. The story of marital cruelty is, necessarily, a tale 
emphasizing the limits of human depravity. In antebellum society, divorce was a failure 
and cruelty even more so. However, in the end, it is useful to remember that men and 
women pursued separations hoping to perfect, not destroy, the marital script.
5
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NOTE ON SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Original jurisdiction divorce court cases constitute the primary source base for 
this study. Cases were gathered by visiting local archives as well as contacting court 
clerks. The research net included all counties formed up until 1860 (and no counties that 
would later become West Virginia). Across all three states, only divorce proceedings in 
which cruelty was claimed were included within the study. In addition, only those 
marriages which were formed prior to 1860 were used, although the time of case filing 
was opened at 1840 and cut off at 1865. Out of this information, a records database was 
constructed that included all extant cruelty cases that were available to scholars at the 
time that the research for this dissertation was completed.  In total, this database contains 
1,541 total cases covering 145 counties across Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin. The case 
division is as follows: 358 for Texas, 742 for Wisconsin, and 351 for Virginia. The 
county division is as follows: 34 Texas counties, 36 Wisconsin counties, and 75 Virginia 
counties.  
Local court documents have traditionally been an underused source by historians, 
and this dissertation attempts to show the versatility and significance of these records. In 
a fashion similar to Norma Basch’s Framing American Divorce, this work chooses to 
highlight the practices of the courts of original jurisdiction, eschewing an analysis of 
higher court or appellate rulings. The cases in the database generally come from the 
district courts of Texas, the circuit and district courts of Wisconsin, and the circuit and 
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chancery courts of Virginia. Legislative petitions from all three states are included in the 
database as well and are accounted for in the numbers provided above.
1
  
While it is my contention that cruelty cases from the antebellum period exist as 
“potentially revealing cultural texts,” they do limit one’s ability to conduct class, racial, 
and ethnic analyses. When the records suggest an individual’s class affiliation, either 
through a litigant’s self-identification or as evident via attached property proceedings, 
this study uses that information. In the same fashion, this work explores ethnicity when 
the records provide an entry point into that conversation. Racial analysis, as well, 
represents an important component of this work. However, as slave marriage was not 
legally recognized in the South, this study is unable to explore the internal dynamics of 
those relationships.
2
 
The appearance and completeness of the court records vary a great deal depending 
on the “nature of the case and the preservation status of the documents.” At the 
conclusion of a case, the court clerk would generally roll up all of the related papers into 
a bundle and place it into a records cabinet. Within these bundles, the civil case papers 
are the most useful for modern researchers. They might contain petitions and bills, 
answers, depositions, and various administrative notices. In some, but not all, of the cases 
the conclusion/verdict was noted in a formal document, but a researcher is more likely to 
find a single line verdict scrawled on the exterior of the roll itself. Each proceeding varies 
in substance and range of commentary with some only showing a single line of complaint 
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while others take up hundreds of pages and were split into multiple rolls. As this study is 
more interested in the extended conversations found within the records, it makes only a 
minimal use of minute and judgment books as the commentaries contained therein are 
usually not substantive. Due to theft, time, and varying preservation practices, the records 
on the whole do not reflect a complete case catalogue. Therefore, this dissertation 
chooses to refrain from attempting a statistical or quantitative analysis of cruelty or 
divorce, believing that the final product would not reflect an accurate portrayal of 
historical circumstances.
3
 
Questions of accuracy have always plagued historians who work with legal 
documents. The reliability of divorce cases, in particular, has been subject of intense 
questioning by scholars. This dissertation, following in the path of Nancy Cott, Thomas 
Buckley, and others, acknowledges the framed nature of these documents while also 
asserting that the comments contained therein provide invaluable portrayals of 
antebellum life. After all, litigants needed to present believable accounts of events in 
order to receive favorable verdicts. While an individual could choose to waive the right to 
a jury trial, the majority of men and women counted upon the local knowledge of their 
peers to ensure a forthright proceeding.
4
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In addition to court cases, this study also references a variety of personal 
documents and public writings from the antebellum period. Because domestic violence 
was a generally hidden subject, these sources were gathered by visiting various scholarly 
repositories and surveying the available personal materials from the period. This research 
approach resulted in the discovery of a substantial amount of documents chronicling 
abuse from non-legal perspectives. Diaries, letters, memoirs, newspapers, church 
disciplinary records, and moral/religious tracts were drawn upon in the creation of this 
dissertation. In the end, the hope is that these sources will, in the words of one prominent 
frontier historian, “provide systematic information about the behavioral regularities of 
daily life as well as insight into popular values and beliefs,” in antebellum America.5  
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